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Alternatives to War

“From the broad standpoint of humanity and civilization, all war is an assault upon the stability of human society, and should be suppressed in the common interest.”

—FRANK B. KELLOGG.

Alternatives to War

By

Florence Guertin Tuttle



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To

ARISTIDE BRIAND

Apostle of Constructive World Peace

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Introduction

THIS is not a book of propaganda. It is a book of history, a book of fact. Much of its contents is already taught in schools. It might be called, "What every child must know." For the youthful mind, curious and free from prejudice, offers rich soil for the growth of new ideas. Later it is hampered by an undergrowth of tradition and imposed beliefs. May not this be one of the reasons why the younger mind is stimulating, while the adult mind seems inert at a dead level of common acceptances?

Alternatives to War is a book of world problems passing through the alchemy of common solutions. Our common health, stability for world commerce, and the problem of world wars, belong to our common humanity. They may be solved, not by the coöperation of a few nations, but by the whole-hearted coöperation of all.

Believing that the subject of world peace through better understanding in international relations—in view of our shrunken and magically transformed world—is the predominant question now before all people, I have tried to put the history of improved international relationships in concentrated form—a kind of capsule outline of the new institutions for constructive peace. Many valuable books have been written by experts on each of these institutions. Fifteen years of work in the international field has made one writer feel the need for a single book grouping all these processes, written in simple

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form, for men and women too busy to read the more technical work of specialists. If this fragmentary book will stimulate readers to seek fuller and better testimony, the writer will have achieved no small measure of success.

Needless to say, it is written in a spirit of intense patriotism, but a patriotism that has learned that national security lies only in securing all human society. It has not been written from a pro-British, pro-French or even pro-American point of view. It is pro-humanity. For in spite of barriers that are separating peoples today, there is a growing vision that the units of civilization must rise or fall together. This does not eliminate the necessity for clear-seeing leadership, but makes it more imperative. The writer believes that the United States, suddenly metamorphosed into the strongest of world powers, will be looked to more and more to help supply that leadership—a situation barely glimpsed or recognized at home today. The writer also wishes to register her patriotic belief that the forces that have molded this country and made it great will not be found wanting to lead us, to fulfil our greater destiny in the family of nations, (by whatever means seem best,) where we shall lead, not by domination but by practicing the new technique of co-operation.

The audience of women has been particularly considered, not because the author cherishes illusions of feminine super-idealism, but because in the United States, at least, women have more leisure than men and are giving greater response to new ideas. Lecture courses and forums, music halls and theaters would go out of business if it were not for the patronage of women. This may be a sad indictment, but it is a fact and not a theory. Women

are educating themselves on public affairs and have already an enormous influence in forming that public opinion on which all new ideas must depend for support. In the League of Women Voters, the Federation of Women's Clubs, the International Council of Women, the Woman's Trade Union League, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Association of University Women and other organizations, they already have begun to study foreign affairs, trying to digest the new systems of international justice and law upon which the world is slowly being rebuilt.

Events are pressing the new institutions forward. As economic difficulties become more complex and world-wide, the fact is being recognized that the remedy must lie largely in coöperative action.

The alarming talk of another world war should also focus attention upon the only method available for its prevention—international coöperation for peace as well as prosperity. The machinery for conciliation is at hand. Whether it be used or not depends upon the understanding and support it receives from public opinion. The responsibility therefore comes back to the individual. What the individual thinks and does in the next generation will decide the trend towards peace or war.

The situation is critical. Ignorance will drive us again over the brink of disaster. Only an enlightened coöperation will give us and our children's children that emancipation from settlement of disputes by armed force which it is at last our high privilege to bestow.

F. G. T.

Alternatives to War

CHAPTER I

THE ALTERNATIVES

WHEN General Grant said, "Let us have peace," after the Civil War, there was no thought in his mind of organized world peace. Nations still were widely separated. Communication between them was not developed. Industrialism had not woven its golden chains. The outlines of the structure of the world community were dim on the horizon. War as a national policy for settling international disputes was firmly entrenched. There appeared to be no alternatives to physical force.

Suppose, however, that President Hoover should electrify the world with the phrase, "Let us have peace." (He has almost the power to decree it.) What are the practical alternatives to war which exist to make such a desire approximate reality? He would find, first of all, that the abstract, idealistic peace of the individual nation in 1865 had given way to a world consciousness of the necessity for peace, and that this world consciousness was expressing itself in collective action, that peace was slowly being recognized as a universal obligation. He would find that within the last ten years, as President Coolidge has said, the world has made unprecedented progress toward it; that the swift march of post-war events has given practical alternatives to war never before available; alternatives that nations may use without the loss of national honor; substitutes for war that may approach William

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James's "moral-equivalent for war," since the new institutions aim to promote justice and morality between states. The acceptance of law and its agencies is becoming the moral equivalent for war.

Five alternatives to force have grown under our eyes in the last decade. And while all of the nations have not signed all of the covenants or protocols, many have signed all and all have signed some. That is, every nation in the world has become signatory to some kind of a solemn pledge that it will settle its future difficulties by pacific means.

These institutions and processes, in the order of their origin, are:

1. The League of Nations, with permanent headquarters at Geneva;
2. The International Labor Office;
3. The Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague;
4. The Locarno treaties, and similar insurance treaties;
5. The Kellogg-Briand Pact.

None of these institutions is perfect. None is as yet complete, since the circle of world signatories is not yet complete. They are new, feeling their way in a world still filled with armies. They have not been successful, always, but often they have been tried and not found wanting; they have become increasingly useful and must deepen and strengthen as human necessity widens and draws nations closer in bonds of common interests. What is needed is a widening of human understanding as to what is taking place on the face of the earth as well as support of the new institutions.

What do these separate processes actually offer? Taken

as a whole, the five institutions—and the treaties are institutions in every sense—give opportunity for “arbitration—conciliation—conference,” to disputing states.

We speak first of the Permanent Court of International Justice because it is more widely known in the United States and because the United States Senate, in 1926, adopted a resolution, by 76 to 17, authorizing our adherence to the Court Protocol. (Through a technicality in regard to one of the Senate’s reservations concerning advisory opinions, the United States is not yet a member.) The World Court makes possible juridical or legal procedure between states which question treaty rights and the interpretation of international law. Fifty-four nations are now members of the Court. The judges sit at The Hague.

The League of Nations offers permanent machinery for conciliation and conference in case of disputes between states which are of a political rather than a juridical character. Most of the disputes which lead to war are of a non-justiciable character. In addition, the League deals with practical problems of our everyday common life—economic, political and social. Fifty-four nations have signed the Covenant, including Germany and her former allies—Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Those ten states not signatory to the Covenant, which prevent the League from being universal, are Afghanistan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Sultanate of Nejd, Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Turkey, and the United States of America. All are coöperating, however, as their interests become involved.

The Locarno Treaties, hailed in this country as the first great political step forward after the Armistice, consti-

tuted a pact wherein exceptions to arbitration, represented by phrases such as "national honor" or "vital interests," were not inserted to weaken and dilute it. For the first time in history, Great Powers voluntarily agreed to submit to the settlement of disputes of whatever nature between them connected with a breach of the treaties. One of the main objects of these treaties is to safeguard the boundary line between Germany and France.

The Kellogg-Briand, or Paris, Pact does not belong with the first four processes, since it is not a process, but a pronouncement. It renounces war but does not specify means of settlement. It contains no machinery of coöperation, nor sanctions for a recalcitrant nation. General Smuts has said that the Kellogg-Briand Pact is of little value while it is left "hanging in the air," without being linked to the existing machinery of world peace. It has a moral value, however, and also an inspirational value for other nations, since it brings the United States back into the fold of nations acting collectively for the common good.

But we may not assume, because world organization for peace has had a beginning, that the millennium is around the corner, or that the old order has disappeared. Nothing could be further from the truth. As wealth increases, the old order becomes more, not less, pressing. Imperialism and its followers, militarism and self-seeking business interests, exist in every industrially expanding state. The novelty of the situation is that, for the first time in world history, the forces of peace opposed to the old order are also organized; that the peace of today is not the peace of yesterday, a vague abstraction, linked to angels with trumpets, hanging in the clouds, nor the

peace of dictionaries, a "state of rest or tranquillity; freedom from war." Peace today is dynamic, not static. Peace has organs and a body. Peace is fluid, changing with the changing times. Moreover, it has been organized and maintained by masculine intelligences, statesmen, industrialists, not dreamers who see no other road for mankind. Its strength lies in the fact that, as Professor James T. Shotwell has said, "Peace has at last entered the realm of practical world politics," and there is hope for a well-nigh hopeless world. "The peace movement," he tells us, "has not yet reached its full possibilities and is only now gathering momentum in the field of practical world politics. But it will become clear from what follows that we are passing from the theoretic beginnings to the practical and definite application of a great reform, and that in spite of all the pressure of accumulated experience, which tends to drag the world back to the routine of the past, the outlines of a new community of nations are emerging before our eyes and the formation of its principles has passed the stage of academic discussion to that of political reality."

DRAGGING THE WORLD BACK

What are the forces of the past that would drag us back and overthrow the new institutions that have arisen out of the needs of a broken world?

Every age has seen its struggle of giants between the old order and the new, but no age has witnessed the titanic battle that is going on today. The struggle is greater because the objectives are greater. Never was the wealth of the world talked of in such proportions. Billions are discussed where once millions changed hands. To follow

the figures at the recent Reparations Conference required the intelligence of a financial expert. And even one of these tiredly said he couldn't "quite understand what many of the scraps of paper were about." (He was told by a Frenchman.) In an industrial age, where nations are rapidly becoming industrialized, economic rivalries are becoming more acute as international corporations, cartels, and trusts replace individual private interests upon a corresponding scale. It is the colossal character of the struggle that made Mr. H. G. Wells characterize the situation with his usual dramatic phraseology as a race between "civilization and catastrophe."

The curious thing about the present situation is that the people who are working for civilization and the people who are helping to bring about catastrophe are working in the same states. (It is not meant to imply, of course, that any one is consciously working for catastrophe. These people are as sincere in wishing to save the world as those who see that the way to save the world is not to go on making the same old mistakes.) But it is true that every nation produces two corresponding types of mentality—those who live by fear and those who live by hope. Those who live by fear stand with their faces to the past. They see new dangers, but they look back to the old dependencies, even after they have proven independable. Force is king and might is right. They are quite willing to admit we are living in a new age—and then to forget it. For the most difficult thing in the world is to create new brain tracks. Thus they follow the line of least resistance and build up securities which history tells us fail to secure. They are strong because they belong to the majority—the class that so often prefers to act rather than to think.

In the same state may be found the sane minority—those who live by hope—who admit that there is a new day and prepare for it. This is hard work because it entails not the old preparedness, but vision, the power to create new rules for the conduct of society. It also entails the strength to realize the idea in overcoming the inertia, ignorance, and misunderstanding of the public mind. To create and to overcome is too depleting a task. Yet had it not been for the people who live with their faces to the future, the people who live by hope, slavery still would be with us, disease would not have been checked by international quarantine, child labor still would be legal and there would have been no votes for women. In every age, there is evidence of the tug of war between the established order and the new.

Catastrophe or civilization? Which one? In the past we had no choice. Today we are offered dependencies fitted for the New World. In the piling up of huge navies and armaments, in the refusal of leaders to learn from the past, in the economic rivalries that are becoming more acute, many people believe that we are approaching again the world chaos of 1914.

THE WORLD CHAOS

"The peculiar difficulty of conducting foreign relations lies in the rise of democracy in an anarchic world society," says Charles P. Howland, in *American Foreign Relations*. Perhaps nothing showed the world anarchy, the need of definitions of law and justice between states, as much as the status of international relations at the outbreak of the war. There was a reason, of course. It is a truism to say that civilization is not yet civilized. It is only

in a process of becoming civilized. And the lawlessness of modern states has been a contributing factor.

Even at the outbreak of the war the sovereignty of states was supreme. Each state was a law unto itself, with international anarchy a result. Lowes Dickinson has pictured it graphically in *The European Anarchy*. Nations committed acts which would not be permitted to individuals. Immorality, followed by national states, was not immorality, because there was little in the way of moral law or standard between states. Greed and selfishness were rife because sovereignty had no code to check them. Great states seized small states, by either conquest or economic penetration, and annexed them. Backward nations were exploited. No one could protest or protect, for nearly all were offenders. It was done. No Sinai had inscribed a code for the expanding state. Each nation alone was the judge of its own action. Each nation took justice into its own hands and decided its own fate.

The modern state system may be said to date from the Middle Ages. At the time of their beginnings, these newly built up states were too occupied in working out their internal relations—learning to live at peace within their borders, creating nationality, traditions, culture and industry—to consider regulating relationships beyond their borders. Outside states were natural enemies, widely separated and feared. Conquest was the law that governed until contacts became closer.

Later, we see foreshadowings of the advantages of the group system in concerts and holy alliances, but always for the benefit of a few sovereigns, never for the betterment of peoples at large. At the Vienna Congress, after the genius of Napoleon had despoiled Europe, there

were faint efforts towards democratizing nations for the common good. But the evil genius of Metternich prevented. "Democracy," he said, "was a disease to be cut out." And for fifty years his influence affected the course of Europe more or less. So at the Congress the bad old way of parceling out peoples like prize packages again prevailed, to the rejoicing of the powerful. "Now we know where we stand," wrote the English Channing. "Each nation for itself and God for us all," with the result that nationalism became more strongly intrenched than ever.

Even in 1914 secret treaties promising territory were made before certain states entered the war. It was custom. International law had not said, "Thou shalt not." When these treaties appeared at the Versailles table, dim ghosts of a lawless past, President Wilson fought them with his back against the wall. The result was mandates—a veiled protectorate, perhaps, but with a difference. For the first time in history, backward nations were to have a world forum before which to air their grievances. And once a year the country holding the mandatory power must give a report of its stewardship "before the conscience of mankind."

THE WORLD DRAMA

It was fitting that the drama of world organization, even though initiated by an American President, should unfold on the stage of Europe; Europe where the World War had raged: Europe with nations crowding and elbowing one another; Europe with its devastated areas, its veins bled white, its dislocated industry and disordered finance—it was natural that Europe eventually

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should produce its heroes of hope to lay foundations for the new day; that it should lead in political organization, just as it had led in literature, in music, in art and science, for generations. To suffer is to become creative. Europe was bankrupt in everything the world calls dear except that which had made it great for one thousand years—courage and vision, will power and ideals. The Balance of Power had failed. It had never maintained equilibrium—only a “striving for equilibrium.” Secret alliances had failed. Founded on the search for security, they had proven pitilessly insecure. Where might humanity turn? Naturally from the particular to the general agreement. The world had become too small for balances—too large for alliances. Its limit was the horizon, embracing mankind. Not alliances, but an association of all nations offered approximate security. The difference is wide. An alliance is a form of partnership or coalition formed against an opposing group. An association is a body united for a common object—the consideration of the common interests of all. It is not against something, but for something. It is not negative but positive, not destructive but constructive. It is opposed to isolation which is a state of being separate and detached.

It is important to remember, however, that while world organization grew out of a world need, there was not a popular world demand for it. Professor Alfred Zimmern, whose daily early morning lectures at the university in Geneva illuminate the daily Assembly sessions, has pointed out that world organization was a political concept for which there had been little intellectual preparation; little of the education that had preceded and helped other world movements—the movement for democracy

in France, for instance, which had had its Rousseau and its Voltaire to pave the way. World organization became crystallized, built upon human necessity, before the people at home were educated to know what it was all about. Later, the nations behind the League federated to support it and to inform the public mind. Peoples had been immersed in the swift development and expansion of economic organization, which usually precedes political organization. It was the drive of economic necessity, the close clash of competing interdependent industrial states, that made political world organization necessary.

Ex-President Coolidge has said recently that "men will not long recognize the sword as the major source of authority." To what authority will they then turn? What arbitrament will form an alternative, a substitute which they may honorably accept? There is no alternative except arbitration—conciliation—conference—to attain justice.

The human mind can think of no higher authority than the concepts of its highest self.

CAUSES OF WAR

It goes without saying that the new processes of peace must bear some relationship to the character of the problems they will be called upon to consider. They must have reciprocal relationship to common questions in order to have potential power of solution. Let us then consider the causes of war to discover if they are of a nature to which arbitral alternatives of force may be safely applied.

The causes of war are many. Volumes have been written upon the subject from varying angles. Yet many historians agree that through the ages up to the present the main causes of dispute have been economic. This is not

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to say that nationalism has not played its rôle, that racial hatreds, jealousies, and religious differences have not contributed. But the main motive that has prompted nations to fight nations has been covetousness: one nation possessing something another nation desired. In the older days, the desire was for land, for populations to transform into subject races. Kings were brought back in chains to parade before an exultant, conquering people, symbols of land annexed. Mr. Walter Lippmann in *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (1914) tells us of the economic undercurrent of war. The strife was for control of backward peoples; for opportunity for exploitation where wages were low and profits high. Today the struggle is for markets, raw materials, and opportunity for the investment of surplus capital. The increase of wealth has but made these objectives more to be desired.

Something in the American mind revolts at this facing of the truth, that wars are economic in origin, though Leonard Wood said that six out of seven wars were trade wars. Perhaps it is our idealism, or the Puritanism that has developed equivocation of truth instead of truth itself. Something has held back our moral development. We cannot place all of the blame for the condition mentioned by President Hoover that we have more crimes than any other nation, on the backs of our foreign-born. Something deeply inherent is wrong with our national morale. It may be in our reluctance to face facts.

Your patriotic American will say that surely the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War were not economic wars? All had economic aspects. This is not to say that ideals were not touched. They could not have been fought, otherwise. But the main

currents were economic. The Revolutionary War was fought against taxation without representation as well as from a desire for freedom. The Civil War was a war against secession—to preserve the Union. But another motivating force was whether the North or the South should develop the West in slavery or without slavery. The Spanish-American War was largely influenced by the protection of American sugar interests in Cuba, according to Professor Parker T. Moon. The American capital invested in Cuban sugar, tobacco, etc., was not less than fifty million dollars in 1893. (*Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 416.) Nations move according to the law of economic necessity, and there is nothing to be ashamed of in facing the fact. When we come to the World War, economic rivalries stand out glaringly. What about Germany *über alles*? we are asked. True, but German domination meant economic mastery. The industrial expansion of Germany—with French indemnities as a start, after the Franco-German war of 1870—was unprecedented. Germany threatened British economic supremacy. Germany, with the Bagdad railway, for twenty years threatened British domination in the Far East.

Patriotism also has been used to foment war, but it has been a false patriotism, not a true one. Patriotism, in itself the noblest of virtues, has been employed by selfish interests for ignoble ends. It was this which led Dr. Johnson to pronounce patriotism as "the last resource of scoundrels." Edith Cavell, before she was executed as a spy, said: "Patriotism is not enough." Patriotism of the old nationalistic character, alone, is not enough. Patriotism has been described as a pyramid whose base must be widened to include all nations. This does not mean

that love of country must be excluded. One may love his sister and still love his cousin.

Idealism is also appealed to in order to fan the flames of war, economic though the war may be. "It requires ideas (and ideals) attuned to intuitive emotions, to make modern nations fight." (Professor Parker T. Moon in *World Politics and Imperialism*). So we have organized propaganda during war, appealing to men's higher sensibilities to make them face the grossness of war—appealing to fear, to the necessity for self-defense, to altruism and national pride. From this propaganda arise slogans and phrases created to justify physical extermination, used without realizing that the ideas behind the war cannot be killed. They may be annihilated only by other ideas that will displace them, ideas more useful to the human race.

Today, the ugly truths about the causes of war are stripped. During the war a strict censorship was maintained on the publication and sale of books that told the economic truth about conflict—and rightly if the world enterprise was to be seen through. Such valuable contributions to world progress as Noel Brailsford's *War of Steel and Gold* and Frederic C. Howe's *Why War?* were suppressed. Also *Men in Arms*, the Austrian forerunner to *All Quiet on the Western Front*. After the war, with its ensuing world disillusion, we were flooded with a series of "Now it can be told" literature.

If war comes again, will the public mind be stirred to enthusiasm? Probably. New fears will arise, new dangers be presented. We may not be asked openly to make the world safe for investors. The appeal will be more picturesquely phrased. But the facts will remain. Will

women send their sons as ardently to physical warfare to decide who will control the oil wells in Mesopotamia or rubber in Africa? Or will they face the truth and not be swayed? Will they claim that commercial questions are ideal questions for settlement by discussion and coöperation and insist that the new processes be applied?

Women are a new force in forming public opinion. Never before have they been given opportunity to act collectively on a moral world question. As they organize and act, so may depend the question of whether the world is to become an orderly place to live in, or whether the anarchy of the industrial, sovereign, uncontrolled state is to remain.

A PROGRAM OF PEACE

An alternative for war, then, a program of peace fitted to handle modern causes of war, has been proposed for the world's acceptance. It is here, not to admire, but to be used. Civilization itself has been defined as a capacity for coöperation. "Millions," says Dr. Reinsch in *Public International Unions*, "are working together, quietly in the pursuit of their various living interests, toward the organization of world unity. It is not a thing imposed from above, by force, or dictated only by a higher rationalism, but it is the intuitive work of active men building wider and wider spheres of affiliation."

What are the arguments against general acceptance of the peace program as it now stands? Briefly they are:

I. It is a program which is not yet complete, because world organization demands universality, and the two potentially greatest war-making powers—the United States and Russia—are outside.

II. Organized peace is an intellectual concept—arriving with little intellectual preparation—whereas nations are influenced more by emotion in public opinion than by reason.

III. Peoples of the world are not yet educated to the idea.

These are formidable objections. But are they insurmountable? Let us consider each one separately:

I. The peace program is not yet universal. The United States and Russia are outside the world organization of the last ten years, though signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. True. But when a nationalistic question that admits only of international solution arises, witness these nations sending whole delegations of men to Geneva. The disarmament and economic conferences are illustrations. The necessity for such contacts is bound to increase rather than to decrease. Some day it even may be considered unworthy to take the benefits of coöperation while accepting none of the responsibilities.

II. Nations react to emotions rather than to reason. True again, but the strongest feelings are the results of enlightened self-interest—what Mr. Coolidge has called “enlightened selfishness,” a phrase felicitously descriptive. Enlightened self-interest has drawn the nations of the world together to build alternatives for war, since modern security demands, not separateness, but unity.

III. Peoples are not yet educated to organized coöperation. True. But never has the means of dispensing education been so rapid and universal as today. Christianity and the Moslem religion spread and controlled empires when there were no means of quick communica-

tion. Today one man's voice, alone, may be heard vibrating around the world, reaching millions.

The arguments against the peace processes are weighty and difficult to meet, but not by any means insuperable. Time is helping to solve them. For while progress is slow, events themselves are moving with winged feet. Let us glance at the other side of the picture for a moment. What are the arguments in favor of world organization for peace and prosperity?

1. Growing economic necessity, commerce, industry and finance, universal, delicately interwoven and entangled, as well as widespread social questions—all demand a common machinery of adjustment and opportunity for personal contacts.

2. World organization is historically evolutionary. From the tribe to the state; from the state to groups; from groups to the whole. The doctrine of evolution offers further argument. The contribution of Mr. Darwin was not only to help unravel the past, but also to supply a key to the future. For with the appearance of man a new element of brain power entered—the element of choice—and evolution became possible of direction and control. Today we may have any kind of world that enough of us wish hard enough to establish and to work for.

3. The processes, though new, are not entirely untried nor yet unsuccessful. For ten years the League of Nations and the International Labor Office have operated; for eight years, the World Court. If not fully established, they are at least beyond the experimental stage. (Mr. Balfour said of the Geneva machinery that already it had become so useful that if it were destroyed today it would have to be rebuilt tomorrow.)

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4. The principles upon which they are founded—conference—conciliation—coöperation—are right and must ultimately prevail: that is

a. The principle of applying justice between states.

b. The principle of international coöperation to settle world questions.

As we look back in history, we find that centuries may be characterized roughly by an outstanding principle. In the eighteenth century nationalism reigned, each state building up its culture, traditions, and individual strength. In the nineteenth century the principle of democracy—the rights of peoples rather than kings—was paramount. In the present century the light of international coöperation for peace and prosperity is the guiding torch, and must be, since the problem of the twentieth century is how industrially interdependent states may learn to live together in a shrunken world and maintain peace and stability.

Verily, a question is never settled until it is settled right. Mr. H. G. Wells tells us that men hate to be put right, but want to be right; this because of the conscience of mankind, the conscience that desires morality even though seldom attaining it; the conscience that was universally moved by President Wilson's war speeches depicting an association of "all of us." The United States would never consider any other, he said, while denouncing the Balance of Power as the way forever discredited.

CONCLUSION

The alternative to war, offering "arbitration—conciliation—conference," then is here. The program of peace, incomplete but complete enough to work if we desire it

to work, is at hand. If there come another war, it will not be necessary to search long for the guilty. The culprit will be all of us who know the better path but who follow the children of fear in overlooking it; who, though signing covenants promising to settle all disputes by pacific means, repudiate our solemn pledges and allow catastrophe to win in the race with civilization.

There comes a time in the history of human affairs when old ways prove wholly inadequate to a changed spirit in human society. Such a moment came when the founders of this Republic faced the problems of their new-found freedom. They might have appointed a king and let history repeat its blunders. They chose the new and more difficult path, proved to be safer in the long run. They created new agencies, new and untried charts to meet the needs of a new political life. Endless trials and conflicts were ahead of them, the most baffling being those that arose within their own borders. "The most difficult thing about freedom is to know what to do with it." But their courage, their creativeness, have been rewarded.

Such a crisis faces the world today. The new chart for humanity to steer by in new world conditions is at hand. It is not a "foreign" chart. Many minds contributed. The Lone Eagle of American diplomacy helped draft it and gave his life for it. The nations of the world caught the colors from his hands and nailed them to the new craft, because the chart was necessary for the new seas. From this beginning has grown the peace program, the peaceful solution of international problems.

This inquiry deals briefly with the nature of the alternatives to war, their constitution and efficiency. It is not

an argument in favor of them as much as a plea to face honestly, with an open mind and a heart free from national prejudice, what is already here. It recognizes the difficulties in the way. But it recognizes also that difficulties are the gymnastics of the soul. Only the impossible can save us.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY

IN THE foregoing chapter we have tried to show that the most important question before the world today is the question of international relations: how nations are to learn to live together in peace and security; that a program of peace has been formed, offering honorable alternatives to war, and accepted by most of the nations of the world community; that peace now has a chance since it has entered the realm of constructive world politics. In creating and establishing this peace program, the United States did not at first choose to ally itself. The thesis of this chapter is that, in the new world state already here, the United States is not merely a great power, but the greatest of all powers and that until there is a more general comprehension of this fact at home, and a recognition of our inescapable responsibilities abroad, we shall continue to have world instability.

THE WORLD POINT OF VIEW

Many complications may have arisen today, because the United States has become a world power without a world point of view. That a world point of view does not prevail is not surprising. Events have moved faster than our power of mental adjustment. One hundred and twenty millions of people suddenly have been called

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upon to think in terms differing from their entire tradition and training. The United States, for years immersed in economic development at home, suddenly found herself in a place of vast world responsibility. A great war thrust it upon her. She emerged from that war, as so often has been said, a creditor instead of a debtor nation. As a consequence, sixteen countries now owe us money and must continue to pay us for sixty-two years. Everything else has followed, excepting national understanding and adjustment.

Count Keyserling has said in *The World in the Making* that our understanding of changing events today depends upon whether we think locally or universally. If you think locally, you may be a good citizen, but you will not be a world citizen, as is today demanded of you. To make any contribution to your age you must think of matters beyond your country's horizon. You may not get immediate results. You may not be able to move immovable mountains, like the United States Senate, quickly. But you at least will be able to work with understanding.

In many American quarters international ideals are heard. From the Republican ranks, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler warns that we must be "internationally minded." And from the Democratic fold, the voice of the Honorable John W. Davis tells us that we must "think continentally." However we think, we must not allow partisan politics to obliterate our world interest.

That some of our national thinking should be confused is not strange, for the facts themselves are contradictory and confusing. What do we find happening in the world arena? Twice within ten years we see our cherished tra-

dition of non-intervention broken. In the Dawes Plan and later in the Young Plan, American banker-statesmen—a new creation—are asked to intervene and do intervene in the political and economic life of Europe. In the Young Plan we see three of our leading financiers—Owen D. Young, J. P. Morgan, and Thomas W. Lamont—spending four months in Paris, plunging into the entanglements of world debts and reparations, in which we ourselves are one of the leading entanglees—if we may coin the expression. What wonder that the rest of us sit at home, bewildered, trying to square the facts with the Monroe Doctrine and Washington's Farewell Address. Of course the facts cannot be squared. You can't put a circle into a round hole, especially when the circle is larger. You can only turn a new page in history and write, "Other times, other manners." You cannot clothe the giant republic of today in the swaddling clothes of yesterday. We may only summon our rebellious intelligences to try for a world point of view that will comprehend the swift-moving world panorama.

WHY A WORLD STATE?

In a brief outline such as this it is impossible to go into the history of nations that has made the present world system inevitable. Some background, however, is essential. We must answer a few inquiries. Why does the internationalist say: there are no foreign affairs today; there are only the affairs of all of us? Why a world state in a community where nationalism was never more apparent?

It is not enough to say that science and invention have transformed the world; that man has developed wings

and soared over oceans; that his relays of iron steeds cross continents linked by fast liners; that his speech, his songs, his whispered aspirations, even, may be heard around the globe. These are the products of man's inventive genius. It is largely man's economic quest, his pursuit of food and the necessities of life, that have drawn nations together; it is the problems of production and distribution for interdependent states that have helped impose the world state upon us.

As for the second question, why a world state in a community where nationalism was never greater—the first question partly answers the second. An economic necessity has driven these nations together, the everyday business of buying and selling human essentials. Few countries today are self-sufficient. Before the war, in the matter of foodstuffs, England was only about 40 per cent self-supporting. The destruction of a common war, the search for security, has done the rest. In view of these facts, we find that nationalism in no state has been so strong that it has not turned to internationalism for coöperation and common security. Enlightened self-interest has demanded it.

Perhaps the industrial interdependence of states has not been stated more clearly than by Mr. Norman Angell (*America and the New World State*, p. 6): "Here is the ironmaster of Essen (Germany) making locomotives for a light railway in an Argentine province (the capital for which has been subscribed in Paris)—which has become necessary because of the export of wool to Bradford (England), where the trade has developed owing to trade with the United States, due to high prices produced by the destruction of sheep runs, owing to the agricul-

tural development of the West. But the money found in Paris (due, perhaps, to good crops in wine and olives, sold mainly in London and New York), and the wool needed by the Bradford manufacturer (who has found a market for blankets among the miners in Montana, who are smelting copper for a cable to China, which is needed because the encouragement given to education by the Chinese Republic has caused Chinese newspapers to print cable news from Europe)—but for such factors as these, and a whole chain of equally interdependent ones throughout the world, the ironmaster in Essen would not have been able to sell his locomotives.” The American might substitute Pittsburgh or Bethlehem and the facts would be equally as true.

Mr. Angell, whose *Great Illusion* startled its readers a few years ago, holds strong ideas that national states themselves do not compete in trade. “Coöperation between nations has become essential for the very lives of their peoples. But that coöperation does not take place as between states at all. A trading corporation (Britain) does not buy cotton from another trading corporation (America). The special interests of such a community may become hostile to those of another community, but it will almost certainly not be a ‘national’ one, but one of a like nature, say a shipping ring or groups of international bankers or Stock Exchange speculators.” (How prophetic for words written fifteen years ago.) How, then, the intense economic rivalries between states? Because war is “the failure of human understanding.” “Men do not judge from facts, but from what they believe to be facts. . . . The religious wars were due to the belief that two religions could not exist side by side. It

was not true, but the false belief provoked the wars." And he disposes of the problem of isolation by saying that "neither morally nor nationally, neither in our trade, nor in our finance, nor in our industry, nor in all those intangible things that give value to life, can there be such a thing as isolation from the rest of Christendom." Humanity is united, once for all, by hoops of iron and bars of gold, and by ideas whose influence ripples to the uttermost shores of the earth. It is not a question of accepting the world state or not. It is a question of whether or not we have that spiritual astigmatism that may prevent us from seeing the vital truth—that the world state already is here.

RAW MATERIALS

The quest of civilization today is the effort on the part of each industrialized state to obtain not only markets, but also raw materials for its manufactured products. The most recent word on the subject is to be found in *Frontiers of Trade*, by Julius Klein, with an introduction by President Hoover. Mr. Klein calls the period from 1919 to 1929 the Dramatic Decade for the United States and later, the Incredible Decade. Speaking of our rapidly expanding trade, he says: "The whole fabric of international trade is held together by exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods, and would be torn into shreds by any serious impairment of the supply of either."

Take one commodity, for instance—rubber. "Rubber rules the world." Our modern civilization could not exist without it. Mr. Klein graphically pictures its world domination. "What would happen today if we should be sud-

denly and permanently deprived of rubber? . . . Every motor-car would be headed for the scrap-heap as soon as its tires wore out. Every loud speaker would be silent . . . because rubber insulation on electric wires is essential to the operation of your radio. Without rubber, every telephone would 'go dead,' every electric light would go out. You could not alleviate your aches and pains with hot-water bottles. The gloveless surgeon would be unable to perform his life-saving operations with assurance against infections. The dentist would find it much less easy to carry out those drilling, excavating, and blasting processes which he so confidently assures us 'aren't going to hurt.' Bill Tilden's dazzling shots in tennis would be a thing of memory only—as would Bobby Jones's beautiful pitches to the green. Contemporary man simply could not get along without rubber." The same dictum might be applied to oil, quinine, iodine, iron, steel, and the countless raw materials on which rest the comfort and prosperity of man. So acute is this quest for the elements of production that it has become the heart of economic rivalries. A next step in world stability surely demands that there should be some form of international control and regulation of these essentials of civilized life. It would do much to lessen the chances of war.

THE ECONOMIC EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES

The economic expansion of the United States is a fairy-tale of the modern world. Science has been the lamp that has guided this expansion, and captains of industry and our bankers the Aladdins that have lighted the spark. The genius of America did not flow towards the painting of great canvases or the creation of symphonies. It went

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where it was needed—to the conquest and control of the elements of nature, developing a technique and rhythm of its own.

Mass production and standardization are part of this new industrial technique. The results of their application in the United States in the last ten years are bewildering and staggering. "Since the beginning of the World War the United States has increased its foreign investments fourfold and doubled its foreign commerce," says Isaiah Bowman in *The New World*. Here are a few statistics springing from the Dramatic Decade.

The United States has two-thirds of the banking resources of the world:

Over 40 per cent of the gold reserve,
About half the savings bank deposits.¹

The United States manufactures 5,000,000 motor-cars a year and exports almost as many as all the other countries combined produce.

The country produces about:

	60	per cent of the world's	wheat
	60	"	"
		"	"
	55	"	"
		"	"
	51	"	"
		"	"
	66	"	"
		"	"
	51	"	"
		"	"
	62	"	"
		"	"
	43	"	"
		"	"
	52	"	"
		"	"
	65	"	"
		"	"
	42	"	"
		"	"
	80	"	"
		"	"
	63	"	"
		"	"
	62	"	"
		"	"
			lead. ¹

¹Quoted from *American Naval Challenge*, by Frederic Moore.

So advanced has American efficiency grown that Mr. Klein tells us that "we can pay the American workman two or three times as much as our competitors and yet undersell our rivals in the markets of the world."

These astounding results of commercial enterprise call for new appraisals and understanding on our part, particularly for the vast expansion of our economic involvements.

POLITICAL EXPANSION

"Political thinkers are now learning to take account of the fact that for the first time in two thousand years the strongest single force is outside of the European continent," says Charles P. Howland, in *American Foreign Relations*. That sentence offers food for thought, for the "greatest single force outside of Europe" is the United States. The reason is to be found in the development of the United States from its inception by thirteen timid Colonies, struggling for life, up to the present supremacy which holds the destiny of the world community in its hands. It is a story of great achievement, with implications of great responsibilities, both economic and political.

It was the need for security that drew the thirteen Colonies to unite. "The vital question," says Professor John H. Latané, "was not our duty to the rest of the world, but whether the rest of the world would let us live." Fear was the cement that amalgamated Colonies that did not desire to be amalgamated but accepted it on the common ground of mutual advantage. For each state was a self-governing commonwealth in itself, built upon grants from the Crown. Widely separated, diversified in

interests, each was intensely jealous of its sovereign powers. After the Revolution, for ten years the Articles of Confederation proved a leaky ark on troublesome waters. A human society bound together so loosely was certain to encounter what George Washington called "anarchy." Congress had no home, no executive head, so fearful were the Colonists of concentrated power; no means of raising money or armies to provide for the national defense. Each state was determined to allow no dictation from its neighbors. "In their desire to be without a master the states left themselves without a government." The creation of the Constitution with executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government and a central home, followed. But so distrustful were the sovereign states of its powers that it was signed only by thirty-nine of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention in Philadelphia (1787); two years passed before all the states ratified it, and it was immediately amended ten times! The Constitution, like most human documents, was the result of compromise, satisfying to no one. The need of mutual protection alone drove all states to accept.

There was every reason for fear. Great and small nations alike in Europe were colonizing. Spain, Portugal, Holland, Great Britain, and France were reaching out long powerful arms, overseas, for territory for annexation and tribute. Colonies were the foundation of empire. Without colonies empires could not exist. Out of this period of fear came the doctrine of "entangling alliances" and the Monroe Doctrine—excellent as props for the infant Republic learning to walk. These pronouncements were the crutches of fear. Whether a help or a hindrance to a mature nation reaching a giant stride, and to its

neighbors no longer adolescent, is now a subject for debate.

Today, witness the almost incredible turn in the wheel. In the list of present-day colonial empires the United States is placed sixth, though commercially first. We do not think of ourselves as an empire. But we have expanded our territory, nevertheless. The following table gives the figures of present-day colonial empires (Parker T. Moon):

(Areas in thousands of square miles.)	
British	13,616
Russian	6,400
French	4,136
Portuguese	936
Belgian	931
United States	911
Dutch	789
Italian	780
Spanish	129
Japanese	114

It will be seen that among all the great powers, after 1919, Germany, having lost even her former colonies, stands alone as the only great industrial state without an empire. Even before the war, her colonial possessions were small. This was due partly to Bismarck's policy of building a strong internal state and partly to clumsy diplomacy on the part of German leaders.

THE COLONIAL EMPIRE OF THE UNITED STATES

"If one considers merely the outlying territories and possessions which have been won since the Civil War," says Professor Parker T. Moon in *Imperialism and World*

Politics, p. 523, "the American colonial empire is over 700,000 square miles in area, with a population of almost 13,000,000 and a commerce of almost \$700,000,000."

How did this exceeding expansion come to the timid thirteen Colonies in one hundred and fifty years? Partly by purchase, partly by conquest, through territorial expansion for safety and through economic growth. These last two principles have been our guides. The railway and the steamboat have been our aids in developing the great West. American efficiency and dollar diplomacy—legitimate and not to be despised—have united in accomplishing our economic supremacy. A great war sent our wealth soaring, but it must be remembered that we were ready for it. The young Colonies had grown strong as the result of a doctrine of hard work. The tunneling of mountains, the irrigation of the desert, the capture of gold from granite, had helped form a new great nation. When the war came, national unity, national economic development, were assured. The United States had matured. The war found the United States "at the very hour when she was ripe and ready . . . for the external mobilization of her internal wealth" (*American Foreign Relations*, p. 154).

Is the United States imperialistic? That depends upon which side of the Atlantic answers. If Europe replies, the answer is unhesitatingly yes. The historian Van Loon tells us that the United States not only is, but is destined to be, the great imperialistic nation for many generations, by virtue of her enormous power and wealth. Over there, in the past, imperialism has not been considered a disgrace but an obligation—a method adopted by all great powers for their own expansion and the development of back-

ward nations. Over here, still confused with becoming suddenly the greatest of world powers and not yet able to grasp its political implications, the answer would probably be no. The United States has simply done what it had to do for national security. All the rest has been "the white man's burden." This inquiry is not concerned with opinion but with results.

What have been the results of American expansion? "For a non-aggressive nation, the United States has done remarkably well, as compared with rivals candidly intent on imperial expansion. Only Great Britain has done better," says Professor Moon in *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 525.

From the nucleus of thirteen small Colonies we have expanded to the Pacific Ocean, and from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, chiefly through purchases. But we have not hesitated at conquest. The Mexican War is an illustration. "A more unjust war was never waged by a stronger nation over a weaker one," was not written by one of our critics, but by General Ulysses S. Grant, who took part in the war (*Memoirs*). We have made Central America our "sphere of interest" very much in the manner of European imperialism, with this difference: we have allowed these countries their political freedom. The result has been a "veiled protectorate." It has been pointed out that the American method has been "more subtle, achieving as it does the desired financial and economic domination, without political annexation." It has insured us protection of our investments, a large share of trade and coaling stations. "What more could forthright imperialism have obtained?"

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

The period of 1870 to 1900 coincided with the climax of the world's economic imperialism. Imperialism today is considered the power of a strong over a backward nation, for the stronger state's own interests. Imperialism has had its changes, its fashions, like everything else. The fruits of imperialism are no longer the annexation of land, the exacting of tribute, as in the colonizing period. The quest became one for concessions, for spheres of influence to invest surplus capital and distribute surplus goods. Exploitation followed exportation, capital following the law of its life in finding profitable levels. This was the period of the carving of China into concessions, Germany coming late into the circle and demanding the rich province of Shantung. The evil results of this common practice were that political strangulation generally followed economic control. Disputes arose. Governments were appealed to. Laws were made to protect the foreigner. China today is trying to extricate herself from the law of extra-territoriality by which foreigners must be tried, not by Chinese but by nationalistic courts. If the tables were turned, Chinese or Japanese offenders in our country would not submit to the justice of American courts, but would insist upon being tried here by tribunals of their own.

The Spanish-American War in 1898 at one stroke changed American destiny. As a result of the war, a line was drawn through the isolation policy of the fathers, and the United States stepped forth as a world power. She took over the Philippines, Porto Rico, and the island of Guam, valuable as a coaling station in the Pacific. The

arena of world strife in the future, we are told, is to be the Pacific. When it arrives, the United States will be found well intrenched among those involved. In spite of our protestations, the United States is regarded as economically an imperialistic power.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The United States emerged from the World War not only a great power, but the greatest of world powers. Her territory had not been invaded. Her loss of man power was only 50,000. And wealth had flowed steadily to her in her sale of goods to the combatants. In the post-war period she has handed billions around the world with both hands. Such economic control and disbursement had never been contemplated. Transformation from a debtor to a creditor nation tells little. Only the facts in cold figures help us to understand the United States' predominant place in the world today.

Before the war broke out, our investments overseas totaled about 2 billions, and foreign investments in this country were estimated at about 5 billions. It was the capital of the great powers of Europe that enabled us to build our railroads and develop our great Western tracts. Today, however, the total of our private investments in foreign countries is between 13 and 14 billion dollars. This, added to the 11 billions of war debts owed to our government, makes us holders of about 25 billion dollars abroad. Our international financial balance has undergone a transformation since 1913 from the minus 3 billions to a plus of 10 or 11 billions. Many of these interesting facts are found in Mr. Klein's fascinating book, *Frontiers of Trade*, already quoted. As assistant to

President Hoover when the latter was Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Klein's knowledge of domestic and foreign trade gives his words great weight. Far more interesting than his facts even is his point of view as to how, in these magic ten years, American post-war supremacy has been attained:

"The great reason why American business has progressed at such an incredible rate since the war has been its appreciation of the fact that it must get away from the old and endeavor to attain steadily rising levels. The greatest monument to American industrial and commercial achievement is the enormous *junk heap* of *abandoned practises*, methods, and ideals, all of which were once 'normal,' but which today are the most useless relics of antiquity. Perhaps American business has been wasteful, but it would have been even more disastrously profligate had it remained shackled to the precedents of a mummified past. . . . American industrial growth is in the main a matter of steadily advancing machine technique, of super-organization, and of management engineering and equipment efficiency; all of which are factors susceptible of continued rapid advancement and change" (p. 24). And he tells us also that "nothing could be more disastrous than a reversion to the *utterly medieval business practises and levels of 1913*." (The italics are mine.)

Not only has our lending capacity increased prodigiously, but our commerce has advanced by miraculous bounds. Since 1821, our exports have multiplied one hundred and eleven times and our imports sixty-eight.

Since 1913, "our sales in ten countries alone in Asia and Latin America have increased 362 per cent, whereas

their sales to the rest of the world have increased only about 87 per cent in that time."

We have seen how important rubber is to modern life. The United States rubber bill represents two-thirds of the world's entire output. Our films control at least 85 per cent of the world's business, our country manufactures 90 per cent of the automobile product. In the years just before the war, excess of exports had averaged about \$430,000,000, reaching \$750,000,000 in 1913. During the war this was multiplied many times, reaching a peak of over \$4,000,000,000 in 1919, with an annual average of over a billion during 1921-25.

Mr. Klein makes the interesting statement that in 1928, 460,000 Americans went abroad as compared with 260,000 in 1923. "Our tourists' expenditures in the Old World last year were not far from \$500,000,000, which, incidentally," he says, "is more than double the annual interest charges due the United States on all of the war debts."

Europe is still our best foreign customer, taking more than 80 per cent of all our agricultural exports (farm products lead), with South America and Asia coming next. "Business in this country cannot progress indefinitely," says Secretary Mellon, "without its foreign markets." This in spite of the fact that our domestic trade is far greater than our foreign trade.

This success has been the reward of unprecedented concentration. The United States spends \$200,000,000 a year in industrial research, which is the handmaid of scientific management. "I care not who sees my processes," said an American manufacturer, asked by a party of Japanese engineers if they could look around his

works. "They will be improved before you get back to the Orient." This has allowed us not only to compete abroad, but to drive other competitors out. A Japanese correspondent of *British Industries* says: "Though immense strides have been made in the extension of hydro-electric enterprises in Japan in recent years, British interests have been unable to make much headway against the Americans." Japanese engineering genius has advanced so rapidly that the International Association of Engineers, of which the late Mr. Elmer Sperry was the president, met in Tokyo in 1929.

Naturally this new supremacy of American efficiency is not entirely satisfactory to other Oriental traders. The Peking correspondent of the *New York Times* (June 3, 1928) writes: "Although China's seemingly endless civil wars have driven many foreign firms to withdraw from the field, those European firms which hang on, hoping for eventual stabilization, all look upon American firms and the American business man as the bugbear of the future. This fear that the United States will secure and hold the bulk of China's foreign trade (Japan always excepted) is shared alike by British, Germans, French and the Belgians, and is the more remarkable because in the days before the World War 'American business' in the Orient was derided as a joke. . . . Now, with an abrupt shift, they are essaying victory in the most thickly settled parts of the world where trade plums are to be found."

DANGERS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC SUPREMACY

No American can fail to take pride in his country's amazing world-wide achievements. They are the results

of scientific cause and effect, of the peculiar genius she has long been developing for applying efficiency and invention to industrial problems. At the same time Americans must realize the dangers of excessive excellence. Prosperity has its dangers as well as its delights. The step from supremacy to domination is short and dangerous because not consciously taken.

Unconsciously supremacy may lead to domination. No impartial critic could deny that the words of Owen D. Young and J. P. Morgan at the reparations meeting, of Ambassador Gibson at the preliminary disarmament conference, and of Thomas L. Chadbourne and General Harbord at the meeting of the stockholders of the General Electric Company of England, in London, were listened to as gods from the machine. The entire world held its breath as Ambassador Hugh Gibson repeated his message of hope for a measuring rod of disarmament from the new President of the United States. (The fact is that there can be no reduction of armament without the leadership of the country which, if it desires, may outbuild the world.) Reparations could not have been settled—the Dawes Plan could not have been created—if the United States had not been willing to provide Germany with a loan to enable her to pay the Allies reparations, that they in turn might be able to settle their debts to the United States. "The United States has supplied Germany with nearly 70 per cent of the total long-term loans floated since 1924." In financial and economic life our world domination is not a fancy but a fact, and its consequences must be faced fearlessly and with understanding of the consequences implied.

Prosperity contains dangers other than those of world

domination. There is the danger of war. The discussion of the Hawley tariff bill with its upward revision of 890 items has brought a storm of world protest from thirty-eight nations and the threat of reprisals. One of the firmest has been from Canada, our needed and cherished customer. The proposal to raise the duty on farm products provoked a letter of inquiry from the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in the United States to Senator Borah, in which the writer said that the increase of duties against Canada would draw reprisals in kind from the Canadian government that might prove disastrous. Senator Borah's reply (April 10, 1929), a masterpiece of undiplomatic diplomacy, was that he would support the proposed increase in tariff, "not that he loved Canada less, but that he loved the United States more."

The *New York Times*, in an editorial April 29th says: "In Europe our return to higher protective duties is looked upon as a step backward, not only for ourselves, but for the rest of the world. The London *Economist* points out that if other countries were to follow the American plan, the result would be to make international commerce almost impossible." Such moves hold the seeds of war.

At a dinner of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Washington (May 1, 1929) G. H. Cahan of Montreal, Conservative member of the Canadian Parliament, also asserted that a changed tariff would be a severe blow to the Dominion and necessarily provoke retaliation: "By reason of your increasing financial, industrial, and political strength," he said, "your nation has not only become the Colossus of the Western Hemi-

sphere, but also you are now probably the most potent single political power of the world.

"And, therefore, your weaker neighbors, such as ourselves, naturally observe with interest, and sometimes with concern, not only the manner but the spirit in which you exercise the vast political forces which are now at your command."

We all wish to see our farmers adequately protected and assisted to equality in economic position. But would the farmers wish it at the expense of our neighbor, our relation, our best friend, even, on the north? The sinking of the *I'm Alone*, the long discussion between French and American motion-picture interests—a bitter debate in which the state departments of both governments intervened—contain the germs of modern economic war. Wars have been fought on slighter pretexts in other times. Prosperity, with one nation holding the reins over the other nations, has its dangers and necessitates a machinery of coöperation that such economic questions should not come under the "arbitrament of the sword."

ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY

The most distressing angle of American economic supremacy is undoubtedly what has been called "Anglo-American" rivalry. One hesitates to discuss so delicate a question because family disagreements are in bad taste. They do occur, however, and in this case have been widely aired.

The origin of most family quarrels is the same. A sad-eyed little lady once said: "Money makes hyenas of people." Which will be the wild beast in this family controversy? Certainly not Great Britain, long practised

in the art of compromise. The last century shows two outstanding examples of compromise rather than armed difficulty with her offspring; once, under the guidance of Gladstone in the *Alabama* case, and again, under Lord Salisbury, in the Venezuela question. Nor is it thinkable that the kindly heart of the American people will allow them to be transformed into hyenas over questions of trade with their English cousins.

Admitting, however, that there are trade rivalries and that the United States has in some instances outdistanced the mother country in trade and lending-power—does not a wise parent expect her children to surpass her? How else may there be progress? A strong desire for peaceful Anglo-American relations exists in the United Kingdom. Premier MacDonald placed the question first in his announced policies, and public sentiment of Liberals and Conservatives was with him; and one of President Hoover's first foreign moves was to send General Dawes to Great Britain as ambassador in fact and of good will.

But what if our selfish business interests and short-sighted politicians stretch tolerance to the breaking-point? Retaliation may become an economic necessity since nations must move under that stern law in order to live. We see evidence of such necessity in the French suggestion for the unification of Europe, politically and economically, a move frankly said to be not against the United States, but "in self-defence in order that Europe may live and prosper." Economists point out that great economic development in our own country has been possible because "we lack the customs barriers and nationalistic bans which vex Europe's economic life" (E. L. James, *New York Times*, April 11, 1929). Will the

child, grown to maturity, push the parent country too far? It is inconceivable to think of economics erecting barriers between the friendly English-speaking peoples.

Is there anything between the two countries which may not be settled by the new conference and conciliation method? Once the villain in the world drama was patriotism—a passion most easily inflamed. Today the villain is raw materials—a hard-boiled desperate character, dangerous unless subjected to rules of law and order. But may he not be tamed? To stage a world-peace drama and let this acknowledged marauder stalk the boards is to invite, not to prevent, world catastrophe. Some international stage prompter must be appointed to keep this desperado in his proper place as servant and not master. Let us look the facts in the face in this question of Anglo-American relationships and also “the facts behind the facts.” There is no subject in the world state that demands a more advanced kind of diplomacy to keep the will to friendship in both countries undefiled. Anything else is treason.

POWER COMPELS LEADERSHIP

The implications of power are leadership and the acceptance of responsibility; creative vision and the will to follow. Is the United States ready for world leadership? It cannot lead where it does not see clearly. Abbé Dimnet, in his clear little book, *The Art of Thinking*, says of Britain “that a long habit of world-wide power has prepared her élite for shouldering responsibilities, whereas America, not yet quite conscious of her new power, is more willing to be kind than to be a leader.” No one questions the kindness, the generosity, even, of the United

States, nor the fact that in our commercial life the United States has accepted leadership without a protest. No doctrine has hindered us, no tradition stayed us. Backed by our great resources, we have gone forward with well-directed, well-considered strides all over the world. May the same be said for our political leadership? The answer is not so prompt. In Mr. Klein's recital of the economic progress of the United States, he refers frequently to the "mediæval era before 1914" of trade conditions. Do we ever hear a reference to our mediæval political policies before 1914?—and since? Not audibly. These forty-eight states, in their foreign policy, are still governed and controlled by the timid spirit of the thirteen Colonies in 1789. Yet may not our political policies have become as outgrown as were our economic policies? Economic and political interests are interlocking and demand unity, not divorce. You cannot step forward one foot at a time. Politically as well as economically there must be a realignment of what is "mediæval" and outgrown in our new world power.

In this chapter I have sketched the beginning of our Republic, created by thirteen war-ridden Colonies, founded upon a policy of fear and timidity—and rightly—for dangers were real; I have tried to contrast this with the miraculous rebirth of a nation, through trade expansion, acknowledged by others as the greatest economic development in history. I have said that we have not hesitated to slough off outgrown trade policies. Yet, we are told that political policy should remain the same—the policy of caution, of suspicion and fear. No one threatens us. No one can threaten us. Indeed, the position is reversed: all feel threatened by us. The position calls for

a new policy, based upon power, to be sure, but it must be power guided by wisdom, by understanding that the position of a leading world power necessitates the acceptance of new political as well as economic obligations and responsibilities.

There is a saying that when a world crisis arrives the man on horseback appears. Such a hope sprang up in the United States in March, 1929. Our present leader has an unprecedented equipment. He knows world conditions. For many years, as head of the Department of Commerce, it was his business to follow them day by day.

Perhaps no man ever has had placed in his hands such a compelling, dazzling opportunity for the exercise of power as has President Hoover. It is as if an angel of light had led him to a mountain top and said: "Behold, not all the kingdoms of the earth, but all the friendships of the earth are yours, if you will rise to the height of your great vision." Perhaps the task is too much to expect of one man. He certainly cannot do it alone. The people must be with him. Battles are won not by generals, but by the rank and file. His first gestures were those of friendliness and understanding—meeting the people, first of South America and then of Europe, with outstretched hands. But the people must uphold his hands, the people must enter into his creativeness with vision, not only with the will for peace, but also with the will to understand that peace must be worked out by coöperating fraternally with other nations if success is to be grasped by his able and willing hands.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN TRADITIONS

AMERICAN diplomacy, of course, is an outgrowth of American traditions—traditions now held in an almost mystical reverence. Dead hands, once vital and courageous in reaching out to grasp the new and untried, are throttling the idealism of a new age that also calls for courage and departure. Fortunate those pioneers who must make their own tradition. Unfortunate those legates of tradition caught in a mist of ancient beliefs that prevents their seeing the dawn on the horizon of a new day.

I shrink from writing this chapter because it is like touching the sore nerve in a vital organism. The organism has grown beyond belief. But that nerve still dominates. I shrink from it because I do not really like controversy. And this subject is perhaps the most controversial point in American life. But how can one honestly shirk it? It is the crux of our foreign relationships. The thought, however, that we have thrown tradition to the winds in the expansion of our economic and commercial life, and that present-day economic and political life are so intertwined that it is often impossible to determine where one leaves off and the other begins, gives one courage to take up one's pen.

I have hesitated also to write of American traditions because my idea of the fathers of this country is not the

prevailing one. I believe that I have more faith in them. I believe that I have more respect for their mentality. Not for a moment can I subscribe to the doctrine that they had static minds. Their minds were the most fluid of their day because the most capable of change. Their courage was challenging, daring, and creative. I believe that those qualities, strengthened by phenomenal growth and success, would express themselves fearlessly today. The fathers builded well for the small, feeble state, protecting the new Republic from the real dangers of its day. I believe that they would build equally well today for this greater Republic, become the keystone of the arch, seeing clearly the duties and responsibilities of power. To my mind it is an insult to the founders of our country to think differently. It is a grave injustice to men like Washington with his calm wisdom, his political acumen, his foresight; to Thomas Jefferson, with his versatile genius—the Leonardo of our land: *littérateur*, statesman, architect, musician, inventor—to insist that politically their minds would not have expanded in one hundred and fifty years in the most changeful period of human life.

Why are we afraid of change? It is the only thing of which we may be certain. Why so inelastic? Why so fearful when there is nothing to be afraid of except the use we make of our great power? Mary Lyon once said that there was only one thing she was afraid of in this world: that she might not see *all of her duty* and do it. America, grown to manhood, might well adopt that wholesome fear. Circumstances are forcing us into the open road, the world's highway—crowded, we might say, with our own delivery wagons. Our merchant geniuses have blazed the

way for us. Political coöperation must follow and protect their economic interests. Let us not be prodded into political comradeship; let us welcome the relationship gladly, knowing that no one can hurt us except ourselves if we accept the lesser rather than the greater obligation of the exercise of our spiritual power.

THE IVORY DOOR

A few years ago, A. A. Milne wrote a play, which was produced in New York, showing the paralyzing power of tradition, and was rewarded by a long run. A young prince sat on his throne and was bored by his lack of real activity. Near the throne was an ivory door, always locked, because there was a tradition that no man could pass through that door and live. Evil spirits on the other side would destroy him. The tradition was accepted throughout the kingdom.

Well, the prohibition acted as other prohibitions act. It aroused resentment in the mind of the young prince. His one object in life became to pass through the ivory door. So he found the key, and one night went through, alone. He found no evil spirits, no hobgoblins. Only a long dusty passage leading to the gates of the city. But when he applied for admission, tired, dusty, and stained, his own people refused to let him enter. He was an imposter, they said, looking like the prince. The real prince had gone through the ivory door. No one had ever gone through the door and returned. No one ever could. So the prince was turned away from his own kingdom, saddened by the false reasoning of his people, but welcoming the adventure of life with opportunity to be himself.

The real catastrophe came to his people who resisted

change and refused to face the new facts. They did not wish to be disturbed in their thinking. They resented the intrusion of a new idea. They preferred tradition rather than truth—to believe rather than to know and understand.

Every nation has its ivory door. Every nation has traditions that must not be broken on penalty of disturbing the dust of the past and bringing ruin in its wake. The fact that times and conditions demand a wider outlook and freer ventilation is not considered. The door of tradition must be kept closed.

The United States has its ivory door. Over it is written Isolation. At first it was kept closed, and wisely. Pirate nations were about. The young Republic was putting its house in order, developing and regulating its domestic affairs. Then the inevitable happened. Traders eased through the door to buy and sell, and the country prospered. Capital quietly seeped through to let its surpluses flow over the earth, and the country prospered. In 1917 the door was opened to let "our boys" in khaki through to fight in a foreign war—contrary to every American tradition. And the country became the first world power. Once a brave boy flew over the water to connect two continents, proclaiming that "we"—the nations—were not widely separated, but were being unified by time and space. And the country waxed stronger in world friendships and fellowship. Some day, necessity guided by a far-seeing leader, will point out the fact that the only "evil spirits" that have entered have been prosperity and world prestige. And the ivory door will be thrown wide open and nailed back, that the life of the new world

organism may flow through freely, for the health and prosperity of all.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Let us look, briefly but frankly, at the Gibraltar of our tradition—the Monroe Doctrine that we have revered, and rightly, so long. The inquiry will lead us to define the Monroe Doctrine (if possible), to point out instances when we have voluntarily broken it, and to outline a future for it without loss of reverence of the past.

In November, 1819, at a Cabinet meeting, John Quincy Adams offered his theory of America for the Americans, paving the way for the Monroe Doctrine. In December, 1823, President Monroe issued his famous state paper. This was the day of empire-building. It was a warning to kings who were trying to extend their territory over the earth and impose their political system.

What is the Monroe Doctrine? The Monroe Doctrine has been called a slogan that everybody uses and nobody understands. Yet its original meaning is not complex. It is simple, as a reading of the document will prove. It is only in its modern application that it has become distorted and confused.

The Monroe Doctrine contains two great "hands-off" principles necessary for the security of the new democracy fearing overseas imperial aggression. The two principles are: first, non-colonization in the Western Hemisphere, and second, non-extension of the European political system to the American continent.

The unmistakable words of President Monroe are: "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are

henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." Clear words as to seizure of territory. The second principle—prohibitive of any attempt to impose upon America a monarchical form of government—is equally lucid: "We owe it therefore to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers (European), to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

The day of empire is over. The greatest empire of modern times is broken into a commonwealth of self-governing dominions. Absolutism has crumbled. Our territory is secure. No one would dream of annexing it. We have expanded from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. No one would dream of changing our political system. We have extended it ourselves from thirteen fear-ridden states to forty-eight states, warp and woof of the Republic.

Such, briefly, is the Doctrine as Monroe wrote it. How have we treated the Monroe Doctrine at home? Two motives have governed the United States, we are told, in the development of its vast territory: territorial security and economic growth. Territorial expansion has been gained by purchase, arbitration, and conquest. We purchased Louisiana, Florida, Alaska, and the Philippines—after a foreign war. In 1846 President Polk forcibly annexed New Mexico and California, after the Mexican War. (Texas had already been taken.) We also have annexed Hawaii (for a naval base) and Porto Rico. The Monroe Doctrine has not inhibited us here.

In our economic growth we have seen how American

industry has overflowed into the uttermost corners of the earth. Mr. Charles P. Howland (*American Foreign Relations*, p. 36) tells us that "reverence of a tradition has had no claim upon the economic explorers, their engineers and financial backers, who are carrying American capital into the unexploited regions of the earth—the Americas, the Pacific islands, Asia, and African Liberia." This involves us in political danger with other countries. Investors clamor for protection from the home government, private enterprise threatening the security of the whole nation by involving it in war; protection of its nationals and foreign investments, in their eyes, taking "precedence over the non-intervention theory and over its corollary, the Monroe Doctrine." "When an established political theory quits the field it is usually because some new non-political force has created a set of facts in which the old theory cannot survive."

So much for the non-intervention doctrine at home. Has it also quit the field "abroad"? Many times. Some new non-political force (generally economic) has created a set of facts in which the old theory cannot survive. In 1884-85 we were officially represented at the Berlin Conference to deal with conditions in the Congo Basin in Africa. In 1880 we were represented at the Madrid Conference over Morocco. We abandoned isolation completely when we became responsible for the Philippines and again when we coöperated with European powers in putting down the Boxer rebellion. President Roosevelt waived tradition in 1905 when he offered his services to bring the Russo-Japanese War to an end and made peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

But the classic example of his initiative lies in Roose-

velt's sending Henry White, our ambassador to Madrid, to participate in the Algeciras Conference (1906). To be sure, we had a small trade with Morocco, but this was not the President's motive. "It isn't a question of what happens to Morocco," he said. "It's a question of what happens to Europe. The peace of the world is at stake." In a letter of instructions to Mr. White he wrote that the points at issue were too petty to justify a war. He felt that any government which forced a fight over such insignificant disagreements would be guilty of wantonly disturbing the peace, and that he was further convinced that the people of the United States would agree with him in this and back him up in whatever action might be necessary (*American Diplomacy*, by Arthur Bullard, p. 75). "We should keep out of alliances," he said, "We should never tie up with one group against another—but all the world ought to know that we're allies of peace."

ISOLATION CHALLENGED

As the Monroe Doctrine has had to be taken from its camphor covering and reconsidered in the course of human events, so isolation, its corollary, also has been shaken and reestimated. "In 1914 the United States, which prided herself on her policy of isolation and above all else feared compromising relationships, was face to face with European powers not only in the Caribbean and in Spanish-American countries, but also in the Near East and Far East. The policy of no alliances had survived, but isolation had become a myth" (Howland, p. 16). That is, we reject it in practice while still reverencing it in theory. "In our efforts to preserve our security and in our new contests for markets, present and future, we

could no longer face the powers alone, could no longer depend on that practice of weak states, the playing off of one state against another. The American government (in 1914) was rapidly reaching a point where it must join forces, tacitly if not openly, with such other powers as had interests most similar to our own to oppose other states which threatened our prosperity. . . . The reality of the old traditions was weakening, though the formulas were still repeated. In becoming a world power the United States had already assumed some of the burdens incident to membership in the society of nations."

As early as 1862 Secretary Seward challenged Washington's principle of isolation. He did not believe that "Washington enjoined it upon us as a perpetual policy." He believed it to be a policy to be pursued until the union of the states and the integrity of the nation should be established.

"It is the policy of the United States to be at peace; but, more than that, the policy and interest of the United States alike demand the peace of the world, and it is not to be supposed for a moment that we are never to exert our great moral influence or to use our good offices for the maintenance of the world's peace." These are not the utterances of Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, but of Henry Cabot Lodge in 1906, apropos of our participation in the Algeciras Conference. Moreover, in 1916, in the League to Enforce Peace, Senator Lodge said: "I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace." Later, in his bitter fight with President Wilson over the

Peace Treaty, he repudiated these words and became bitterly reactionary.

THE FUTURE

What is the giant nation going to do with its early traditions, so often abrogated as growth demanded? Reject them in maturity? The youth does not reject the precepts of his parents, when he has become a man. He finds himself almost unconsciously handing them on to his children. And the next generation extends them further, but always in modified form suited to the changing years.

What was good for the new-born Colonies to protect their weakness, is equally good for the weak, new states born in 1919. Ten new states were created at the Versailles table. Their great need was for protection of their territorial integrity and political independence. That is why President Wilson had Article X written into the Peace Covenant. He meant to extend it, as an invaluable American contribution. Article X reads: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any danger or threat of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." It was President Wilson's historic sense that made him declare that "Article X was the heart of the Covenant"—a check on imperial aggression. America was to widen the scope of her traditions—not to reject them. Article X contained the secret of America's growth and greatness, a priceless American heritage. It was to be

America's gift to humanity—the Monroe Doctrine of the world.

As early as 1915 President Wilson advocated the doctrine at the Pan-American Congress: "If America is to come into her own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundations of amity, so that no one hereafter will doubt them." This was to be accomplished "by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity." Again he said, "that will have to be the foundation of the future life of the world. The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or territorial integrity. That is the basis—the only conceivable basis—for the future peace of the world."

In 1919 he returned from the Versailles peace table for a visit to the United States, bearing with him the new charter for states—the Covenant of the League of Nations—to submit it to the Senate for criticism before its adoption. Republican Senators were invited to the White House and an examination of the document ensued. As a result, Article XXI was added: "Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." Not only by political implication in Article X, but by actual mention in Article XXI, the Monroe Doctrine has been written into the magna charta of international life.

Without question, the Monroe Doctrine has been not only a material but a great spiritual asset to the United States. We have seen, however, that it has been modified

upon occasion to suit growing necessities and that it must be modified still further. Our sister republics in South America have long been restive under its influence, resenting its "overlordship"—fearing the implications of our new power. What was once considered merely a policy of self-defense has been denounced by Latin-American statesmen as "a policy of military offense."

When a one-time asset becomes a menace, regarded as a big stick, it is time to reconsider its implications. Consciously or unconsciously, we, too, are making traditions for our children's children. Must we not face the fact that the war and the Dramatic Decade, 1919-29, brought as great a political crisis to the fathers of today—facing our dominant world power—as confronted the fathers of the new Republic in 1779? We have established material greatness. The acute question for Americans to decide today is what is to be the spiritual relationship of the United States to the rest of the world.

The United States is looked to as the world torch-bearer of today. Are we to bear the incandescent light of 1930, or the tallow dip of 1789?

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

POLITICAL COÖPERATION

A PROGRAM of peace for a new world state would necessitate new methods of diplomacy, since the aim of diplomacy has been defined as "the preservation of peace."

The foundation of the new diplomacy is coöperation. For its practical execution we must go to Geneva. In fact, one cannot speak of international coöperation without reference to the League of Nations. In discussing world problems, all roads lead to Geneva, since on the shores of its blue lake rests the laboratory where the great experiment of organized coöperation is being carried out.

At this point the cautious reader may be tempted to consider this work as pure propaganda for the League of Nations. The truth is that the League is *history* now, and must be treated as history rather than propaganda. It must be dispassionately discussed in any inquiry into world peace, because it is the parent of the new peace program. Its progeny, the World Court, Locarno, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, are the bases of this outline of organization for constructive peace. We may not speak of foreign affairs without speaking of the League, because, for ten years, fifty-four nations have based their foreign relations upon the Covenant.

At the same time, the writer wishes to be frank. Mrs.

Beatrice Forbes-Robertson once said that if a speaker addressing an audience had anything on his mind with which the audience might disagree, he must proclaim it at once, since his audience will forgive him anything but insincerity.

In all sincerity then, let me make my confession of faith. I believe that the prevention of war is a matter of universal concern and of joint responsibility. For this object there must be permanent machinery for political coöperation. I believe that the League of Nations, for ten years, has put up a gallant effort to provide that machinery, and has provided it in many instances, with a heavy handicap against it. That handicap is that the United States left her allies at the peace table, and made a separate peace with Germany. (That is, we rejected the Versailles Treaty and the one hope of modifying it through the League of Nations.) I believe also that the League, having justified its existence, should be supported by all lovers of peace. I believe that the United States should join the League of Nations with reservations that will make it acceptable to the American people, and that as much as the League needs us, we need the League more, not only as a clearing-house for our vast foreign affairs, but also to teach us respect for law. It cannot be anything but dangerous to have a powerful nation outside the circle of the new moral commitments, unbound and the sole judge of its own actions. The new world state cannot tolerate lawless nations, large or small, however good their intentions. I would doubt, however, the wisdom of the United States joining the League and coming into this circle before there was a more general understanding of the subject. As we have said, you can't

make a contribution of value to anything unless you "see" its object clearly. The situation calls for leaders and educators who will make us "see." Until that time comes, I believe that the question of our entrance into the family of nations should be deferred.

Perhaps I should make one other confession. Believing that a closer knowledge of world politics was necessary to any one vitally interested in organization for peace, I have made many pilgrimages across the Atlantic for the sole purpose of a close-up view at Geneva of the wheels of international machinery in this first Parliament of Man. Five times I have remained through the month of September, at Geneva, while the Parliament convened. Having now made my confession and, I hope, established my sincerity, may I take you with me to visualize the new coöperative method of dealing with the complex affairs of the world?

May I add, that, before I went to Geneva, I shared the prevailing distrust of diplomats? My mind conjured the Metternichs and Machiavellis, the cardinals and carnivorous princes, whose object was to eat up the other fellow before they themselves were swallowed whole. I suspected dimly that there might be good diplomats and bad diplomats. But I was sure that the good ones were safely corralled at home.

Contact, however, broadens even nationalistic minds. Contacts show one that no single nation has a monopoly on morality. There are no good nations or bad nations, no nations black or white. They are all an indefinite gray, with occasional flashes of light. They are all made up of individuals who are struggling to do the best they can. Now I know that diplomacy is simply a method of get-

ting things done, and that politics is its medium. Diplomacy is as necessary for states as tact for families. It is a way of making you endure your "in-laws" in the family of nations. Its basis is respect for the rights of others—which I take it is the basis of law.

CONTACT THE BASIS FOR THE NEW DIPLOMACY

What was the method of the old diplomacy? The old diplomats, seldom meeting except in war and widely separated, wrote notes in which they became expert in saying what they did not mean. The result was a drifting farther apart while suspicions and hatred grew. The old diplomacy might be called the correspondence method of carrying on foreign affairs instead of the consultation method.

The new way is to get contact periodically around a council table, where matters of mutual interest may be discussed face to face. Agreement may be long in coming. But compromise finally appears based on the necessity of finding a common solution. Moreover, good-fellowship, not hatred, is engendered. Charles Lamb once said that he found it difficult to hate a man whom he knew. I have seen men in the glass-room at Geneva, at the Council meeting, grow red in the face and swell with irritation like one of those undersea animals about to blow up—always controlled, however, in the dignity and presence of other powers. And I have seen those same men, after the conference, with their arms over the shoulders of their disputants, laughingly the best of friends. For this "face-to-face" method of diplomacy promotes understanding—which means being obliged to get the other man's point of view.

President Coolidge, after the rather disappointing reception in Europe of one of his least illuminating administration utterances, said that Europe did not understand us. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin replied he was afraid that it was true, and *vice versa*, "the United States did not understand Europe." He wished it might be different. The truth was that the diplomats in Europe had grown accustomed, he said, to dropping in at Geneva and talking things over to learn each other's point of view. Consultation leads to understanding, and understanding to agreement.

The new diplomacy has two other advantages besides that of periodical contact. It provides an impartial method. Justice demands the opinion of more than two, and these two the most vitally interested. Justice demands the presence of a third party, the disinterested. When a dispute arises, a committee is formed not only of the two interested countries, but of several disinterested countries. The result may not always be pure justice, but it approximates justice. In most cases, if it has not always pleased, it has at least been found workable, since compromise is the basis of negotiations.

Finally, the new diplomacy provides a continuous machinery which the interlocking interests of the new world state demand. I heard Sir Arthur Salter speak once on the occasional, or what he called the "improvised conference." Its weakness is that it has no machinery to carry out its mandates. This was shown in the Washington Naval Conference, where the conventions were not ratified, in some instances, for two years. Permanent machinery is also necessary for diplomats to resort to at any time when the peace of the world is threatened. Lord

Grey has said that if there had been machinery such as the council table of the League, in 1914, when he was telegraphing madly around Europe trying to get diplomats together, the World War might have been averted.

FEUDAL DIPLOMACY

During the World War, Walter Hines Page was troubled by the manner in which American diplomacy was conducted while he was at the Court of St. James. It was not the matter of our actions. He never questioned the ability of Yankee shrewdness against European skill. It was the manner of our negotiations that he deplored. And he called it "our shirt-sleeve diplomacy." Well, we have improved since then. Our diplomats may refuse to wear satin breeches at court, as Benjamin Franklin first refused. But at least we keep our coats on. These, however, are trifles of diplomacy. It is in technique that we are lacking. While fifty-four nations have assembled and for ten years *practised* a new method of handling foreign relations—the face-to-face method—the United States, in many cases, still clings to the old manner of writing formal notes. This is all the more striking when contrasted with our method of handling commercial relations. We have seen how our economic experts speak of the "mediæval period before 1914" and have turned their backs on these outgrown fashions in trade. But in our political relations we are still in the postilion period—the stage-coach vehicle in an airplane age. This is all the more striking in a nation up to the minute in every other department—a nation that demands its morning papers at midnight and its evening papers at high noon.

Let us take a few outstanding examples to illustrate the

point that, though having originated new economic policies that have made us the world's greatest mixers and masters, politically we refuse to acknowledge that the world has moved. Take, for example, the World Court Protocol. In 1926 the Senate adopted the World Court resolution with reservations which in the minds of European statesmen necessitated discussion in conference. But we did not even consider conference, although the court signatories politely suggested it. The manner of our Senators in authorizing our acceptance implied, "Take it or leave it." We refused negotiations in the modern manner. In fact, instead of adopting the efficient and more rapid conference method, our State Department preferred to write forty-eight separate notes to forty-eight nations in the old feudal fashion. To the Senators it was an ultimatum and not a negotiable matter.

Again, with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, when Secretary Kellogg proposed to change the Briand plan from a bilateral to a multilateral treaty, M. Briand would naturally have replied, "Let's get together and talk it over." But he knew that the policy of the Senate was against this modern efficient habit. So the affair dragged on for months while separate notes were written and replied to by the interested powers.

The Reparations Commission of experts over which Mr. Owen D. Young presided offers perhaps the most amusing example of reluctant diplomacy to accept political facts. For ten years the government of the United States has insisted that reparations and war debts were two separate problems—although to the rest of the world they were tragically one. The vast sums which Germany has been asked to pay the Allies are largely to be paid,

according to several agreements, by the Allies to the United States. But during the four months' conference, this truth was not to be mentioned, except *sotto voce*. In fact, in the report of the experts of the Young Plan, the United States' name does not appear. The term "outgoing payments" appears to save, the press asserts, "the tender susceptibilities of the United States." But why save our susceptibilities and not French or English susceptibilities? They have delicate susceptibilities, also. Why keep our head in the sand, while we are trying to settle the most difficult problem of modern times in which we ourselves have the predominant interest? How the position must have embarrassed our representatives! What mental tight-rope walking there must have been to practise old and new economic-political methods at the same time.

Their position was precarious, also, it must be remembered, because they did not represent their government, as did the other representatives. They went as private persons, in no way official. And though the American experts were the MacGregors of the table, technically they entered by the back door, with the "help."

One more example—the Coolidge Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament. President Coolidge's motive in calling the Conference was commendable. He hoped to hasten the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations in regard to naval reduction between Great Britain and the United States. So he borrowed the League hall and the League machinery. What he overlooked was the League method—which has been steadily overlooked. That method includes not only getting together for discussion, but doing preliminary work in the way of research and preparation.

"The government of the United States acted exactly as if the work done in Geneva to date had been transacted in a language utterly unknown to them. Once more official America remained isolated, impervious to world influences, unable—or unwilling—to learn from the experience gathered by other nations," says Salvador de Madariaga, for seven years head of the Disarmament section of the League of Nations, in his book, *Disarmament*. From its inception the League had grappled with the difficulties of limitation of armament, one of its chief difficulties being to make progress against the isolationist attitude of the United States. "There is no question but that the calling of an international conference of five powers to discuss one of the points which twenty other powers were already debating with them was, to put it mildly, an unexpected action. . . . An orchestra is playing Beethoven's Ninth Symphony under the direction of an experienced conductor; another less experienced conductor turns up between two of the movements and suggests that the five principal executants retire in order to perform a Bach Quintet." The result was that nothing in the way of international harmony ensued—nothing but discords. The reason was not mainly that admirals—technicians—were sent to the Conference rather than statesmen, but that feudal diplomacy was mixed with modern diplomacy, with the resultant failure of both.

It is pleasant to turn to an American state document in 1928 that was universally praised over Europe. President Coolidge's answer to the Franco-British agreement in regard to cruisers and trained reserves was called "the most happily constructed and phrased diplomatic document that has come from Washington for a long time, and that

it deserves to rank as a masterpiece of restrained and telling argument." This was not only because of its tact and restraint, but also because it did not slam the door in the face of further conversations. It was not a finality—an ultimatum. It left the door open for continuing negotiations. And Europe and the world again took heart.

THE FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT

We have said that old ways and new ever overlap. The Franco-British agreement was an example of old-time diplomacy intruding on Geneva, leaving a storm of resentful public opinion in its wake.

The facts are of interest. The Coolidge Conference held at Geneva (1927) for the limitation of naval armaments, as pointed out above, had failed. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League also had reached a deadlock because of the failure of the French and British governments to agree (March, 1927). On July 30th, Sir Austen Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that through "private conversations" London and Paris had reached an accord. Summaries of the agreement were sent to the other naval powers, but were not published. Public opinion became indignant in England at the return to secret diplomacy, fearing a renewal of the old-time alliances.

The text of the agreement was sent to New York and was first published by the Hearst press in the United States, September, 1928, one of the reporters having obtained the text by questionable means. (The reporter was dismissed from the Franco-American Press Club and also from Paris, as a result, and the owner of his paper has since been forced to keep out of France.) The paper re-

vealed that France agreed to support Britain in her demand for a strict limitation on the number of 10,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruisers, Britain in return agreeing to work for no limitation on small submarines and for non-inclusion of trained reserves in limitation of land troops. (The use of trained reserves, instead of large standing armies, is growing in Europe—an adaptation of the Swiss citizen army system—as it removes fewer men from industry.) The United States throughout the Geneva parley had stood for a total tonnage limitation, rather than one by categories, or ships' classes. It was therefore opposed to the Franco-British agreement of limitation by number of 10,000-ton cruisers.

When the agreement was published, a storm of protest followed in the British press, not only for the manner of the agreement, but also its context, and especially the affront to the United States interests. The *London Times*, generally to be counted on to support the government, said (September 20, 1928): "Nothing more fatal to our true interests or more dangerously akin to those exclusive friendships and alliances out of which wars are made could well be imagined. The difficulty is to understand how the government could for a moment have supposed that it could be the basis for agreement." The criticisms ranged all the way from applications of "blunder" to "naïveté." Canning's dictum, "American questions are out of all proportion more important to us than European," was quoted often. The *Daily Chronicle* (Liberal) said: "We assure our American friends they ought not to attribute this *faux pas* to chicanery or wickedness. We know our Ministers and can assure them it was nothing worse than stupidity." In short, this seemed to be one of

those occasions when public opinion and the press were far ahead of governmental policy.

We have already spoken of the popular acclaim in the European press of President Coolidge's statesman-like reply to the Franco-British agreement. The *Daily News* called it "a model of dignity, clearness, and restraint. . . . Instead of telling the conspirators to go to Timbuctoo, as it might well have done, the American government expresses again its willingness to continue the task of finding a basis for all-round naval limitation. This is a fine gesture. It remains for the British and French to scrap their precious compromise forthwith" (September, 1928).

It is interesting to note the reaction of the British and French representatives to this controversy at the Geneva Assembly in September. It was my privilege to sit in at the Preparatory Disarmament Commission and listen to Lord Cushendun and Paul Boncour explaining, if not apologizing, to the smaller powers for having made this diplomatic blunder. Having come to an impasse, they offered—they had been asked, in the spring, by Mr. Loudon (Holland), chairman of the Preparatory Commission, to come to some kind of an agreement before the fall meeting, in order that progress might be made, and they had obeyed. But if the agreement was not acceptable to the other powers, and especially to the United States, they (France and Great Britain) would have to find some other. Monsieur Boncour, one of the most eloquent of French statesmen, said that he could not understand why the announcement of the Franco-British agreement had made such a stir, since it was nothing more than an agreement upon procedure. And he added that "the work of

the League was extremely difficult, owing to the fact that two of the biggest nations which followed the work of the Disarmament Committee were not members of the League." Never before in history has the world seen two of its greatest powers compelled to elucidate their actions before smaller powers. Never before was there a forum offering such world publicity. And never again can any powers move in an orbit of personal self-interest without challenging the bar of world opinion.

OPEN DIPLOMACY

No one claims that Geneva is doing away entirely with secret diplomacy. We shall probably always have it with us. Geneva is making a move in the right direction, however, by having every signatory to the Covenant register its treaties at the Secretariat. It is the beginning of "open covenants openly arrived at." About two thousand five hundred such treaties already have been registered within ten years. These treaties are then published, and "no treaty or international agreement shall be binding until so registered" (Article XVIII of the Covenant).

It was my privilege once to be taken to this department by an official of the League. The treaties are kept on shelves in numerous large volumes. It was the time of the Corfu crisis. The Rapallo Treaty, between Italy and Serbia, had just come in, but had not been filed in its volume. I had the pleasure of holding it in my hand—as near as I had ever been to the great dictator who had sponsored it. This advent of the treaty was significant. Though signed two years before, it had not been registered. Mussolini, a non-Parliamentarian, had overlooked this technicality. But when the storm over the Corfu

crisis broke, and public opinion overwhelmingly denounced the resort to force on the part of a signatory to the Covenant, he remembered his obligation, showing that he was a diplomat as well as the most picturesque of dictators. The number of the treaty for filing was about 900, as I remember it—about three times as many having been registered since.

The signatures to the World Court Protocol are also kept in this department. They are not filed in volumes, coming already bound to the League, each in its separate folio. That of Japan was bound in royal purple velvet with the rising sun of Japan heavily embroidered in gold in the center. The French Protocol of acceptance bore a hand-tooled leather cover with the insignia of France, in raised gold and silver, forming a large monogram. They were more like exquisite wedding gifts than the most important of state documents—the foundation of justice between states. Somehow, the handling of these papers made governments seem to me more human. They were the vital organs of the peace programs, and will need much careful nurturing in the next decade. They are making a new world not only for you and for me, but also for all the people in all the world. Such patience! Such unspectacular plodding for ten creative years. Shall we not respond to the obligation to do our part in encouraging the beginnings of this new open diplomacy and see that it becomes more widespread? Can we not agitate to have our American diplomatic corps take a leaf from the book of our great economists and regard our diplomatic methods previous to 1914 as also “mediæval and outgrown”?

THE FUTURE

Diplomacy in the United States is slowly advancing. Our growing world interests are driving us into closer and closer contacts where understanding of modern political methods is slowly penetrating.

Let us be liberal and give the last word to a man, since it expresses perfectly our diplomatic necessities. Isaiah Bowman, in *The New World*, says that the United States' "economic and political problems embrace a region whose extent is beyond the Arctic Circle in Alaska, southward to Samoa, and east and west from China and the Philippines to Liberia and Tangier. To face these problems of the day, the men of the United States *need more than native common sense and the desire to deal fairly with others.* They need, above all, to give scholarly consideration to the geographical and historical materials that go into the making of that web of fact, relationship, and tradition that we call foreign policy. *As we have not a trained and permanent foreign-office staff, our administrative principles are still antiquated.* Thus even the loftiest intentions are too often defeated. To elevate the standards of government, there is required a *continuous examination of contemporary problems by citizens outside of the government service.* In this way *new points of view are set up and independent judgments made available.*" (The italics are mine, for which some day I hope to apologize to Dr. Bowman, as well as to thank him for giving me a pertinent climax for a difficult chapter.)

CHAPTER V

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ORIGIN OF THE LEAGUE

THE League of Nations, of course, was not a new idea in the pages of history. Great political movements do not arise overnight. Philosophers had dreamed of it. Kings even had tried Concerts of Power, but always for their own ends. The world had not become sufficiently democratized; production and distribution had not yet resulted in that economic unity and interdependence that made some measure of political unity desirable. The search for security had made union necessary. The process of evolution is clear in the growth of the social unit from the tribe to the state, from the state to the nation, from the nation to the world group, bound together by hoops of steel and the silver wires of finance.

Nor can the Covenant claim to be the fruit of any one mind. Men of many nations worked upon the draft. For two years the British Foreign Office had been occupied with its study. Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, President Wilson, Leon Bourgeois, Signor Orlando, Venizelos, Paul Hymans—all contributed ideas to the Commission of which President Wilson was chairman. The final draft was drawn up by David Hunter Miller, of the United States, and Sir Cecil Hurst, of Great Britain, after having been discussed and worked over, clause by clause. It contains a preamble and twenty-six articles.

"The idea of a League of Nations sustaining a Supreme World Court to supersede the arbitrament of war, did not so much arise at any particular point as break out simultaneously wherever there were intelligent men," says H. G. Wells in *The Salvaging of Civilization*. Intelligent men everywhere, even in the United States, as evidenced by the activities of the League to Enforce Peace, felt that the anarchy of the lawless sovereign state could and should be ended. Moral law between nations must be defined. No state should be permitted to take justice into its own hands and imperil the peace of the world.

The World War had paved the way for concerted action. Organized coöperation had won the victory over the Central Powers of Europe. Organized international coöperation must win and maintain the peace of the interdependent world.

WHAT IS THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS?

Most speakers on the League begin by telling what the League is not. Perhaps it helps clarify the mists of misunderstanding. The League, then, is not a Utopia. It might better be called the world's workshop.

Nor is the League of Nations a panacea, like the quack medicine whose advertisement was quoted by Sir Arthur Salter, "Warranted to permit all excesses and save you from the consequences." It is not a formula for sick nations. Neither is the League a religion. To ask, "Do you believe in the League?" is like asking, "Do you believe in the Ten Commandments?" The League is a political program, nothing else.

Finally, the League is not a super-state. It cannot impose its dictums upon unwilling members. Resolutions

and conventions may be passed upon by the delegates, but must be returned and ratified by the home governments. Nationalism is present at Geneva, though it does not prevent internationalism for common ends. The League, however, has no superpower of its own.

If the League, then, is not Arcadia, a panacea, a religion, or a super-state, what in fact is it? Many definitions have been given, all of them perhaps necessary. The League has been called a machinery for the manufacture of consent among nations, since its aim is agreement. With few exceptions, the principle of unanimity must prevail. Mr. Arthur Bullard, in *American Diplomacy in the Modern World*, defines the League as a machine—"not as a means of better accomplishment, but as a better means of accomplishment." And he adds that there are a number of points "in which the new mechanism at Geneva is as much superior to former methods as the new Ford is to the pre-War model."

But the definition of new international relations that I like best is that of Noel Brailsford, the English publicist: the new diplomacy offers "the conference method instead of the conflict method," where disputes must be thought out instead of fought out. It is a more difficult method, to be sure. But to establish law and justice between states is the most pressing and the most difficult of modern undertakings. The wonder is, not that the method has had occasional failures—widely heralded, like unhappy marriages, but that, considering its handicaps, it should have obtained a distinct measure of success.

The League, then, is a new method offered for dealing with international relations, the beginning of the science of politics applied to conducting international affairs. It

is a machinery of coöperation to be used for the common solution of common problems by the interrelated world. It is no more mystical than the House of Commons and no more or less "ideal" than Congress. It is a slow process of world organization designed to meet the swift-moving panorama of post-War events. Before we define the new method and see it in action, let us glance first at the object and structure of the League.

AIM AND STRUCTURE

"The mere prevention of war, vital though it is, can never be the sole purpose of a real society of nations," says Mr. Arthur Sweetser in *The First Ten Years of the League of Nations* (1930). Indeed, the preamble of the Covenant of the League states clearly the twofold aim of its articles: "In order to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security, etc." To promote friendly relations between states is thus placed as the first duty of the new institution; to prevent war follows as a corollary. The emphasis would seem to be laid upon offering a central meeting-place where disputes may be handled in a just manner and understanding between states evolved. This in itself is a long step toward the elimination of physical force and is sometimes lost sight of.

To carry out this twofold aim, a framework of machinery was created, and has been expanded into

- (a) An assembly of all the signatory powers, which meets annually at Geneva, in the month of September;
- (b) A Council, a small flexible body, meeting three

times a year and capable of being convened quickly in a world crisis; and

- (c) A Permanent Secretariat, the continuous body employed in study and research for the League's many commissions and multitudinous activities.

The League does not consider domestic problems which relate only to an individual state.

The Assembly is always opened with a speech from the president of the Council. A president of the Assembly is then elected to serve for a term of one year, the selection coming from one of the smaller states. The following is a list of the presidents of the Assembly:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Country</i>
1920	First	M. Paul Hymans	Belgium
1921	Second	Jonkheer H. A. van Karnebeek	The Netherlands
1922	Third	Señor Agustín Edwards	Chile
1923	Fourth	Señor Cosme de la Torriente y Peraza	Cuba
1924	Fifth	M. Guiseppe Motta	Switzerland
1925	Sixth	The Hon. Raoul Dandurand	Canada
1926	Extraordinary	M. Alfonso Costa	Portugal
1926	Seventh	Dr. Momtchilo Nintchitch	Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
1927	Eighth	Dr. Alberto Guani	Uruguay
1928	Ninth	M. Herluf Zahle	Denmark
1929	Tenth	Dr. T. Gustavo Guerrero	Salvador
1930	Eleventh	M. Nicolas Titulesco	Rumania

A major duty of the Assembly is the careful consideration of a report from the Secretary-General covering the

activities of the League for the past year. This report is voluminous and far-reaching. The future work of the League is placed in the hands of six standing committees, known by their numbers as the First Committee, the Sixth Committee, etc. These committees are:

First Committee: Legal and constitutional questions.

Second Committee: Work of the technical organizations.

Third Committee: Disarmament.

Fourth Committee: Budget and questions of internal administration.

Fifth Committee: Social questions.

Sixth Committee: Political questions.

The committees at once go into session, sitting around a council table, and continue their considerations throughout the period of the Assembly—about four weeks. These sessions are generally the most interesting feature of the month; they are open to the public and are as widely attended as a rather small council-room will permit.

To the annual Assembly are sent three representatives of each state member, the state, however, having but one vote. Thus, over 150 delegates arrive each year at Geneva, bringing with them experts and secretaries who increase the number by many hundreds who flood this beautiful city every fall.

The Council is made up of five permanent representatives of the great powers and nine representatives of the smaller states elected for a term of three years. A place on the Council carries great prestige and is eagerly sought, an effort being made to have all continents rep-

resented. In both Assembly and Council, in voting, the principle of unanimity prevails, except in a few cases of procedure prescribed by the Covenant.

The permanent Secretariat comprises about 700 experts of many nationalities working peacefully and scientifically under one roof. This has been called the most efficient civil service body known to political life. Its success is largely due to the wise generalship of Sir Eric Drummond, who from the beginning has directed its great usefulness. Not often enough is this body widely recognized. It works quietly and unostentatiously. Americans, even, are found within its ranks, giving their time, at comparatively small salaries, to the establishment of this new international technique. Yet many people feel that the success of the League is due to this permanent organization which is occupied in finding facts and in preparing data for the various commissions of the League.

No one familiar with the framework of the League claims that it is perfect or that it may not be improved. Criticism of construction is now coming from the inside, however, which is wholesome, since the League, though incomplete, has grown strong enough to criticize itself.

The International Labor Organization is also a part of the League machinery at Geneva, although holding a separate annual conference and with a separate budget. The Labor Office is directed by the dynamic personality of Albert Thomas, the French Socialist. The annual conference has adopted many conventions for the betterment of labor, especially in backward countries; it is attended by delegates representing labor, employers, and the governments.

METHOD

What is the new method which has gained such wide acceptance in dealing with international relations?

The new method finds its success largely in the fact that the solution in a dispute is not left solely in the hands of the disputants, with their passions and prejudices. As we have already said, the third party is introduced—the “disinterested.” The disputants meet around a table with the facts—found by an impartial body—placed before them. The third party will be composed of perhaps half a dozen disinterested states. Out of the facts never before aired in public, a workable solution is sought. No one may be entirely pleased. But a practical compromise is generally effected.

To illustrate, Mr. Arthur Bullard writes brilliantly of the effect of the disinterested element in the Mosul case between the British government and Turkey. “The interest of the third party is peace,” Mr. Bullard says in *American Diplomacy*, and affirms that it is doubtful if England and Turkey could have reached an agreement if they had been left alone. They were obliged to argue their case before many third parties—France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Uruguay, small and great powers, “Representatives of countries that had not the remotest interest in whether Mosul should be held by Irak or be given to Turkey” were put upon the commission. A solution was happily found which saved Great Britain and Turkey from a petty war. The real question involved in Mosul was of course the oil wells—a raw material about which competition is waged so fiercely that it might easily furnish the spark to ignite the world.

Another advantage of the new method is that it tends to develop the obligation of *joint responsibility* as opposed to "sole responsibility" of the old days. Every question submitted to Geneva is handled according to this idea of joint responsibility—collective action for the common good. Every question, as we have said, must submit to having the real facts of the case found first by a commission of disinterested parties sent to the scene of conflict, whether it be Vilna, the Aaland Islands, or the Bulgarian frontier. Reports are then made before the Commission of the interested and the disinterested on a basis of facts. The Secretariat in truth has become a "fact-finding" institution. In no other way may justice be approximated and the tension which might lead to war lessened or done away with.

Apropos of joint responsibility, Mr. Bullard suggests how different would have been the position of the United States with regard to Nicaragua and Tacna-Arica if the United States had been a member of the League. In the one case we might have been spared much adverse criticism, and in the other the loss of American prestige. The conciliatory action of the third party would have reduced the friction in both of these cases without changing the essentials. The correspondence between our country and other countries in regard to the condition of affairs in Nicaragua would have been published. If sending the Marines "were the only way out—which is not certain—it would not be an act of 'sole responsibility' but international police action with joint and general support and approval" (p. 43).

Out of this new method have arisen two phrases descriptive of Geneva. One is "the objectivity of the Sec-

retariat," which illustrates the impersonal scientific manner in which the Secretariat approaches a problem and collects its facts; and the other, "the atmosphere of Geneva." Surely the League has been wise not to lend its ear to siren voices that would have transplanted the new institution to some larger and more accessible city. For in this city, removed from political intrigue and in the heart of a peaceful, advanced people, an atmosphere of conciliation and reason prevails. It is difficult to describe, but it is decidedly felt. The whole becomes greater than any of its parts. Nationalism becomes less rampant because a new psychology in international affairs is being evolved. Peace still has its complexities, but it also has its practicalities. Peace is seen to be a thing that must be created and built step by step. The atmosphere of Geneva is somehow conducive to this creation and becomes clarifying and conciliatory. Many statesmen have given testimony to this effect.

DUTIES OF THE LEAGUE

The duties of the League have been well analyzed by Professor W. E. Rappard, of Switzerland, a former official of the League and speaker at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Mass. Professor Rappard says: "The Covenant in reality contains three Leagues: first, the League to outlaw war; second, the League to promote international coöperation, and third, the League to oversee certain portions of the peace treaties."

1. The Covenant outlaws war in the only practical manner in which war may be outlawed, that is by mutual agreement of states and a machinery which offers honorable substitutes for war.

Article XII prescribes: "The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report of the Council." The report of the Council must be made within six months after the submission of the dispute, and then published. The Council makes no recommendation, however, if the matter is found to be within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the parties. (Article XV.) Three advantages are thus gained: arbitration, with machinery provided; second, delay, a cooling-off process, an international "when-angry-count-one-hundred"; and third, publicity, a showing-up of motives and justification on either side.

What are the sanctions (punishments) of the League? The outstanding one is known as the Economic Blockade. It has never been applied and the chances of using it are remote. It is valuable, however, as preventive machinery. Article XVI reads: "Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or XV, it shall be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League." The Economic Blockade is then to be applied. This calls for "the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not." It will be seen

that the Economic Blockade, although powerful, has an inherent weakness unless the League is universal, a non-member of the League, taking advantage of its neutrality, being free to supply an aggressor state with supplies. It must be remembered that the League has no armies, no military force of its own. Its authority rests upon the force of public opinion—the moral force of the world.

2. "It is a League for international coöperation." We have already covered this ground in "Aim and Method of the League"—the object being to further social co-operation as well as to lessen the friction that brings on war.

3. It is a League "to oversee certain parts of the Peace Treaties." In a measure this is true. A League official has said, however, that the League exists not merely to execute, but also to ameliorate, the Versailles Peace Treaty. This amelioration has taken place many times. At first, when the conference of Ambassadors—a survival of the war—found itself at the straining-point over an unsolvable question, it passed the problem on to the League, much as ill people turn to mental science when doctors fail. The matter was then referred to a committee of experts who from the facts found a workable if not an ideal solution, lessening the tension between states. This was the case in Upper Silesia. No solution could have been perfect. But one was found which won the approval of both the British and the French, prevented war, and became embodied in a detailed Convention accepted by Poles and Germans.

The administration of the "Free City of Danzig," with all the complexities of the Polish Corridor, and that of the Saar Basin, was placed under the ægis of the League

by the Peace Treaty. Both charges have been troublesome and are still turbulent. The Saar Basin lies south of Luxemburg, between Germany and France, and is rich in coal. As Germany had crippled the French coal mines in the occupied area, it was decided at the peace table that the coal should be ceded to France. After fifteen years there is to be a plebiscite to determine whether the Saar shall continue under French or German operation, or under the jurisdiction of the League. It is inhabited almost entirely by Germans.

Another duty of the League is the administration of mandates. Among the penalties inflicted upon Germany and Turkey by the Versailles Treaty was the deprivation of their colonies. President Wilson fought against the prevailing imperialistic fashion of annexing these territories—the ordinary spoils of war. The result was a compromise whereby Mandatory Powers were formed which should consider these mandates, not as territory to be exploited, but as “a sacred trust of civilization.” Once a year these Mandatory Powers must give an account of their stewardship “to the conscience of Mankind.”

It is hardly to be expected that an age-long evil—the exploitation of backward peoples—should be eradicated in a decade. Its roots are too deeply planted. Yet the new system, if not doing quickly all that may be desired, offers certain advantages: there is a world forum where grievances of mandated states may be aired and publicity gained; and also what Professor Parker T. Moon calls “the value of international criticism,” since reports must be read and discussed before the disinterested as well as the immediately interested nation bearing the mandatory power.

The question of minorities has not been so successfully handled and constitutes one of the great menaces to the peace of Europe. In the Covenant there is no mention of minorities being placed under the care of the League. It is one of the many difficulties "wished on" Geneva. At the peace table, across the map of Europe many new boundaries were drawn in an effort to apply "self-determination" to hitherto subject races. In effect, they are like raw gashes which will take many years to heal. Questions of race, religion, language, and tradition are involved, making it one of the most complex of questions. The one hope of amelioration, however, would seem to lie in international consideration, protection, and control.

An important section of the Secretariat is occupied with transit problems—ports, waterways and railroads. National trade routes by land or water must be internationalized or be kept open by international convention. Important conferences have been held at Geneva and Brussels on this matter of vital interest to the commerce of the world. The League has thus found great tasks crowded upon it, not only by the Covenant, but also by the shrinking circle of an interdependent life.

ACHIEVEMENTS

In a short chapter of this kind it is impossible to speak of all of the League's achievements. Pamphlets may be secured by application to The World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, and to the League of Nations Association, 6 East 39th Street, New York City. We shall only touch upon a few outstanding results.

We have spoken of the establishment of the International Labor Organization and the Permanent Court of

International Justice. The economic and financial reconstruction work of the League would surely come next.

We all remember the plight of Austria after the Peace Conference. From a kingdom of 60,000,000 people, she found herself reduced to 6,000,000. Austria was bankrupt and broken. Her markets and credit were gone. The inflation of currency had reached its limit. An egg in Austria cost almost as much as a house, before the war. Vienna, which had given the world priceless heritages in the way of beauty, of music and art, was starving. Charity poured in by millions, but was only a sop. What Austria needed was, not charity, but reconstruction and adjustment. If Austria went down, Central Europe would go down with her, and the world itself again be shattered.

In 1922 the Austrian Chancellor applied to the Supreme Council of the Allies—a survival of the war, since dissolved—for financial help. The Great Powers, hard pressed themselves and seeing no way of getting back moneys already advanced, turned the matter over to Geneva. "Let Geneva do it" had become a familiar cry. Now, fortunately, Geneva was ready for the problem. In the spring of 1920, a conference of bankers, economists, and business men had been called by the League at Brussels to consider steps to bring about the financial restoration of Europe. The result was the appointment of an Economic and Financial Advisory Committee. Recommendations were adopted which have served as a basis for all the League's reconstruction loans. These recommendations were:

1. State budgets must be balanced;
2. State expenditure reduced, especially in armaments;

3. Further borrowing should be strictly limited, and
4. Inflation of currency (by the printing of paper money) be stopped.

The League was structurally ready to take on the "impossible" task. The financial reconstruction of Austria in all its details is an enlightening story of modern world finance. Briefly, after all the facts of Austria's economic condition were assembled, a loan was arranged, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia together generously guaranteeing 84 per cent of the amount. A High Commissioner, Mr. A. Zimmerman, a former burgomaster of Rotterdam, with the consent of Austria, was placed in charge of Austria's finances. A hard time followed, but hope revived. At the end of three and one-half years of administration there was a surplus instead of a deficit in the budget. Austria still had her acute problems—largely political. But at least she had a chance to live.

Hungary and Bulgaria were next given financial aid. All three of these enemy countries have joined the League. The point of the League action is that these loans were able to be accepted without endangering "territorial integrity or political independence." In the old days, a loan from a single state meant intervention, followed generally by annexation and subjection. The League of Nations has initiated a new method of collective loans, leaving the state politically free.

The Economic Conference of the League, called at Geneva in 1927, after two years of preparation, was another milestone on the road of international coöperation. To this conference, President Coolidge sent thirty experts. There was not the slightest question or hesitation about

America cooperating with this conference, dealing with the financial recovery of Europe, and rightly. Europe is the United States' best customer. We need her markets. But the question was one of world stability, also, since the economic world state cannot be prosperous with an important industrial area like Europe financially crippled.

The World Economic Conference of 1927 convened, therefore, for two objects: "to find a policy which would help the prosperity of the world, and to find a policy which would help to strengthen the foundations of the peace of the world"—the two being interrelated.

The subjects adopted for study, discussion, and collective action were industry, commerce (trade barriers or tariffs) and agriculture. To this World Conference were sent two hundred persons, experts from all spheres, by fifty governments that participated. "The unanimous agreement of those two hundred people," Sir Arthur Salter says, "gave an incontestable authority to their recommendations. The advice was, I think, at once more authoritative and more definite than any which has ever proceeded from a Conference appointed to consider economic problems."

It is not possible here to go into the recommendations or the results. They are not spectacular. Only a beginning has been made. But the fact that nations would agree even to confer upon a subject of such vital interest to all of them as economic recovery, is great gain. The report of the Consultative, or follow-up, Committee of the Conference of 1927 reminds us that it was several years after the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920 before the Finance Committee of the League was able to attain concrete achievements in the sphere of financial reconstruc-

tion in Europe. Yet "the League did pioneer work, both by precept at the Brussels Financial Conference and by example in the reconstruction of Austria and Hungary, to lead the world back to sound finances and stable currencies." So the League's economic work must go slowly, gaining world confidence and world strength, until it perhaps becomes the most important factor in world stability. Since the causes of war are so often economic, a League worthy the name must possess a department that will face those causes fearlessly: economic rivalries, distribution of raw materials, the rush for markets, etc. As the League grows stronger, as national prosperity is found to lie more and more in the international circle, these questions must be honestly dealt with if confidence is to be generated and peace to be organized.

I well remember sitting in at a committee when this question of an Economic Conference was first approached in Geneva in 1925. How timid the states were! How nationalistic, even as we ourselves! Gradually nations became used to the idea. Their plight was desperate. Financial embarrassment gives courage. You must venture to live. You must do or die.

I remember also, in 1926, sitting in on the same committee, after it had decided to call a conference in 1927 with a year of preparation, listening to M. Louis Loucheur, the great French industrialist. It was he who put courage into the committee by an impassioned speech urging enthusiastic support of the project already adopted, putting their hearts and minds into it to make the conference a world success.

The Disarmament Commission of the League has been considering the difficult angles of the problem since 1922

and has done much preliminary work, public opinion notwithstanding. This subject will be treated in a later chapter.

The humanitarian work of the League is well known for its measure of success and for some time has had American coöperation. In the early days of the League the United States did not answer any of the invitations of the League to participate, as a non-member, in its conferences. (How could it participate in a "defunct" institution?) Then perhaps remembering Mark Twain's telegram: "Reports of my death greatly exaggerated," or perhaps the simple matter of American interests becoming involved, Secretary of State Hughes sat down one day and answered fourteen invitations at once. (It is rumored that women's organizations had something to do with this sudden recollection—women who wished American participation in the humanitarian activities of the League: public health, white slavery, protection of women and children, opium, etc.) In any case, the State Department found its manners and has not since mislaid them. The United States is now coöperating with nearly all the League of Nations commissions, since world problems touch American problems at so many points.

The League also performed a real service in supplementing the work of the Red Cross in epidemics, especially sending experts, money and supplies to Poland where typhus was raging after the Armistice.

As a preventive of war the League is handicapped, as we have said, by its incompleteness. Yet it has been found useful in preventing small wars that might have led to large wars. We refer to the cases of the Aaland Islands, Albania and Serbia, Corfu, Greece and Bulgaria,

Poland and Lithuania. We shall refer in detail to a few of these later.

The greatest usefulness of the new organ, however, has been in providing a machinery for international coöperation and in offering a central meeting-place for periodical contacts of representatives of governments to promote better understanding. If one were asked for the secret of the success of the League, with so many factors against it, one might paraphrase the words of Pope Pius IX when asked by Mr. Gladstone to what factor he attributed the vitality of the Catholic Church. The reply of His Holiness was that there were three reasons. The first was consultation, the second was consultation, and the third was consultation. If you substitute the word conference for consultation, you have also the three secrets of the vital usefulness of the League of Nations. International co-operation cannot exist without machinery—and the conference method has come to stay.

FINANCES OF THE LEAGUE

The Covenant says nothing of the expenses of the League except (Article VI) that "The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union," with headquarters at Berne, Switzerland. Experience has proven the necessity of altering this plan somewhat.

The following figures for League expenditure are taken from *Seven Years with the League of Nations* (1928), by Sir Herbert Brown Ames, of Canada, Financial Director of the League from 1919 to 1926.

The annual Budget of the League is approximately \$5,000,000 (about a tenth of the cost of one battleship). Of this sum, \$2,600,000 goes to the Secretariat, \$1,520,000 to the International Labor Office, \$420,000 to the Permanent Court at The Hague, and \$265,000 into the Building Fund. Sir Herbert Ames points out that the annual expenditure of the United States for one year on armaments would maintain the League of Nations for 125 years. (The expenditures of the United States for 1925 for military, naval, and air construction and maintenances were \$563,861,346. If even half this sum could be released, the United States could do much to educate its children, do away with slums, build more roads, parks, and playgrounds, and beautify its naturally beautiful territory—to mention only a few opportunities.) Peace has its economies as well as its opportunities for a better citizenship.

The expenses of the budget are divided among the 54 member states according to their "relative capacity to pay." For instance, the British government contributes about \$555,330 per year (a fraction of one cruiser), and Liberia about \$5,000.

The Assembly has come to assume complete control over the budget, a Commission of Control putting the estimates through the Assembly each year. Meetings are open to the public where past and new appropriations are discussed and are usually interesting.

In 1921 Lord Balfour is reported to have said that "the most dangerous reef upon which the League is likely to make shipwreck is that of internal financial administration." Yet this danger was avoided. How often, during the early life of the League, have I had to hear from

American business men, the statement, "They want us only to pay the bills," thrown at me compassionately for my interest in the new venture. Rather have they been paying our League bills since we have sat unofficially on so many commissions, whither we have been drawn by self-interest, yet the expenses of which we have not helped pay. Nearly all the states were in serious financial difficulties. Painful economies were being practiced at home. That the League did not founder on this internal reef is due largely to the administrative genius of its first financial director. When, in July, 1927, Sir Herbert Ames retired, the League possessed "tangible assets valued at \$7,000,000, with no debts of any consequence." Part of these assets were the Hotel National, bought upon the installment plan in 1920 for \$1,000,000, to house the Secretariat; the new Labor Office, built on the shore of the lake, the old one having been outgrown; and land upon the lake shore, purchased for the proposed new buildings, for which ground was broken in September, 1929.

The fact should be added that Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., has provided another asset in the form of a gift of \$2,000,000 to build a much-needed new Library.

DANGERS

What are the dangers to the League today? I say "to the League" and not "of the League," because I believe that the danger of being outside is the only danger in relation to the League. This was not true at first when the League was too weak to handle the world's greatest problems. Now, problems of paramount importance are brought to it: disarmament, world finance, economic reconstruction, problems that no nation can allow other

nations to decide for them. Self-interest prompts that every state should have a voice and contribute its national requirements. "Join the League and have a vote" might be a wise slogan.

There are still many spots in the world today capable of igniting a world conflagration—Vilna; Bessarabia, taken from Russia and given to Rumania at the Peace Conference; the Polish Corridor; Upper Silesia; the Balkan States; the Mediterranean, etc. Again, there are two countries in Europe with dictators, and one with a Communist government. If world war again breaks out every nation inside and outside the League will be drawn in. The one hope of prevention will be found in the League in the power of collective action. Therefore I believe that the danger of being outside the League is greater to world peace and to outside countries than the danger of being inside with a voice and vote as to policy.

The internal dangers, however, to the League may become real. No friend of the League would claim for a moment that its construction was perfect or had reached its ultimate development. No friend could prove that some of its changes, brought about by expediency rather than wisdom, are for the best. The criticism of the change in the Council, for instance, from nine to fourteen, and the still further enlargement if the United States and Russia are admitted—this criticism on the part of officials of the League themselves, fearing that the relation of the Assembly and the Council may be weakened, prove that the ultimate balance of construction has not been attained.

One of the surprises of the machinery at Geneva has been the strengthening of the influence of the Assembly

—the deliberative body—as opposed to the power of the Council—the executive body. The Assembly has become more than a “debating society.” It has become a clearing-house for international necessities—an initiator of needed international enactments. Moreover, the Assembly has developed the power of concentrating a strong unified opinion—of immense value today—a factor not altogether foreseen. The League, however, is “not a strait-jacket”; its construction is fluid and the position of both the Council and the Assembly will undoubtedly be modified with the necessity of the changing times.

Criticism of the League has been made that it might become a bureaucracy. I do not believe that this criticism is well founded. True, the League has endless committees and sub-committees. But these are necessary to handle the enormous world business that crowds in upon Geneva. They are sloughed off, however, when their usefulness is ended. This has happened time and again.

A criticism of more weight is that the great powers dominate Geneva. This may have partial truth. But it is also true that without the great powers Geneva could not exist. Without Great Britain and France to support it, the machinery of Geneva would have fallen. What is often forgotten is that something new has been born at Geneva, namely a world public opinion. There are five great powers, but forty-nine smaller nations in the League of Nations. The collective power of these nations is capable of bringing a moral world judgment to bear upon a great state in a manner such as the world has never known before. This was illustrated in the Corfu case, when public opinion, happily gathered at Geneva in the

persons of delegates to the Assembly, was, to a state, against the aggression of Italy.

The criticism of radicals is that it is an imperialistic League. Perhaps. We are living in the age of economic imperialism. But how safe a League could we have without the great powers? It is surely better to have them in the League, subject to international control, rather than outside. The radical point of view, however, is always stimulating and always needed.

CONCLUSION

I am aware that in this chapter I have given but an inadequate thumb-nail sketch of a great new institution, that I have but outlined roughly its origin, construction, and activities. If I have not sufficiently emphasized its technicalities it is because my object has been not to be academic, but to try to present it to the general public in simple terms.

Undoubtedly, as has been said, as constructive as the first ten years of the League have been, the most important results are the "laying of firm foundations for still larger future coöperation. . . . 1930 already has had before it a heavy program, including, beyond the ordinary current work, the closing of the last 'gap' for war in the Covenant; strengthening the World Court for its increased responsibilities; . . . the Conference for the Codification of International Law; early conference for disarmament; discussion of a two-year tariff truce; proposal for a United States of Europe: limitation of drug manufacture to legitimate needs; inquiries on slavery in Liberia and opium-smoking in the Far East; conference over technical and transit subjects; rearrangement of in-

tellectual coöperation," etc. (Arthur Sweetser, *Ten Years of the League of Nations*.)

In conclusion, I feel that I cannot do better than quote the words of General Smuts in discussing the Peace Conference: "What was really saved at Paris was the Covenant of the League of Nations. . . . The Peace Treaty itself will fade into merciful oblivion and its provisions will be gradually obliterated by the great human tides sweeping over the world. But the Covenant will stand as sure as fate. It will succeed because there is no other way for future civilization."

CHAPTER VI

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

IN OR OUT OF THE WORLD COURT?

THE Permanent Court of International Justice is of especial interest to the United States.

In 1926, the Senate adopted a resolution favoring adherence to the Court Protocol—with reservations, of course. Four years have passed, much water has flowed under the bridge, and still we are not in the Court. We are in that undignified position of being nationally on the fence. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who until his appointment to the United States Supreme Court was a member of the World Court Bench at The Hague, has told us repeatedly that the United States' interests are protected. "To hold aloof is to belie our aspirations, and to fail to do our part in forming the habit of mind upon which all hopes of permanent peace depend," he said, January 16, 1930, before the New York Bar Association. Why, then, are we in this equivocal position—neither in nor out of the Court? A technicality in regard to Advisory Opinions is keeping us out. The story will be clear as the historic battle to move the Senate to accept the Court statute is briefly recalled.

LOGIC OF A WORLD COURT

Let us get back to the peace program and the requirements of the world community. A peace program worthy

the name would demand the establishment of a world tribunal for settling international disputes as a fundamental necessity. Not that the World Court can stop wars, but it may lessen that friction and nervous tension between states that in times past have led to war. Just as the establishment of a League of Nations grew out of reason—common needs of states, not sentiment—so the establishment of a Permanent World Court grew out of the inevitable necessity for an orderly world founded upon principles of law and justice—and not from vague idealism. A shrunken, economically interdependent world necessitated a coöperating world. And a coöperating world demanded that disputing states might have their difficulties examined by an impartial world tribunal.

Such a Court is now firmly established, sitting at The Hague in Holland. Has it justified its creation? "In seven years," writes Professor Manley O. Hudson (in *The World Court*), "it has more than justified the expectations of its founders. It stands today thoroughly embedded in current treaty law. Resort to it becomes yearly more frequent. It is fast becoming indispensable to the international life of our time."

AMERICAN INTEREST IN ARBITRATION

President Hoover, in his inaugural address, said: "The Permanent Court of International Justice in its major purpose is peculiarly identified with American ideals and with American statesmanship. No more potent instrumentality for this purpose has been conceived and no other is practical of establishment."

From its inception, the government of the United States has advocated the judicial settlement of interna-

tional disputes. Prior to 1900, this country had participated in fifty-seven arbitrations, twenty of them being with Great Britain. One of them was the celebrated *Alabama* case, arising out of the Civil War. (If you visit Geneva, you must surely go to the old Hall of Justice, where you will see the room preserved, intact, where this first important arbitration was settled in 1872. There on the walls are photographs of the American and British diplomats who sat on the Board—and their wives, in bustles and flowing skirts.)

How do we stand now in regard to arbitration since we have become the leading world power? The late Theodore Burton, two years ago at the Republican Club in New York, admitted that the United States was backward in this growing world method. "Once in the front ranks of arbitration," says Mr. Arthur Bullard (in *American Diplomacy*, p. 28), "we are now far in the rear. . . . The United States was willing to arbitrate when it was weak, and unwilling to arbitrate when it was strong."

All the American Presidents for the last thirty years (McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover) have advocated the establishment of a World Court. President Harding, indeed, died on a tour where his speech-making included an appeal for the United States to adhere to the World Court with the Hughes reservations.

ORIGINS OF THE COURT

In a short sketch of this kind it is impossible to trace the historic idea of a world tribunal as it developed during the centuries. We shall begin with the two

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Hague Conferences, which included strong American representation.

The first Hague Conference convened in 1899. Curiously enough, this Conference was called by the Tsar of Russia for the consideration of the reduction of armaments, the armament of Russia being of the mightiest. Competition in armament-building was acute, and a great burden to the peoples. (China was then the goal of economic imperialism.) The United States had fought the Spanish-American War over Cuba and had become a world power by taking over the Philippines.

A strong American delegation was sent to this Conference with instructions from President McKinley and Secretary of State Hay to propose a plan for a world tribunal to which the nations might submit "all questions of disagreement between them, excepting such as may relate to or involve their political independence or territorial integrity." (Note how the Monroe Doctrine weaves itself into the international web.)

Instead of a Permanent Court of Justice, however, a Court of Arbitration was established. The American delegation accepted this compromise, believing that it would serve as "the germ out of which a better and better system will be gradually evolved." This Court of Arbitration is still in existence and has handled nineteen cases successfully since its inception. Professor Hudson tells us that in reality this Court of Arbitration is not a court at all and is not permanent. It does not sit continuously. It merely consists of a panel of 132 men from which states wishing to arbitrate choose their arbiters. It has long been deemed inadequate, taking months to select the

judges and convene, accordingly delaying the processes of justice.

Again in 1907, at the second Hague Conference, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Elihu Root instructed the American delegation to work for a "permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international cases by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility." Complete success was not reached, because of inability to devise a method of selecting the judges acceptable to great and small nations alike.

It was not until after the World War and the acceptance of the Covenant of the League of Nations that success in establishing a World Tribunal was brought about. Article XIV of the Covenant reads:

"The Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. The court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or the Assembly."

In 1920 a Commission of Jurists appointed by the League met at The Hague, June 16th to July 24th, to outline a plan for the new Court. This Commission was formed of invited jurists from Japan, Spain, Belgium, Brazil, Norway, France, Netherlands, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States. Mr. Root was the American invited. The difficulty of electing judges was surmounted

by Mr. Root, who suggested their election by a majority vote of both the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, voting separately. The small nations were thus made to feel upon a footing of equality with the larger powers.

The plan was submitted to the Council of the League and also to the Assembly. After discussion for several months and the addition of a number of amendments, the project was adopted by the Assembly on December 13, 1920.

A protocol of signature was approved by the Council and the Assembly and annexed to the statute. This protocol constitutes an "independent treaty which has now been signed by fifty-four states," making it possible to join the Court without joining the League of Nations. Opponents of our entrance into the World Court offer that this is only a backdoor entrance into the League. This is not true and is used purely as anti-Court propaganda. When we enter the League of Nations we shall come in through the front door, pushed by our economic world interests, although an American wit, Mr. John Palmer Gavit, less optimistic, has said that when the United States enters the League it will not be by the front door nor by the back door, but "by the coal hole." (In reality, we are already "in the League," sitting on dozens of commissions, learning valuable lessons in international coöperation. That is, we are willing to accept the advantages of world coöperation while side-stepping the responsibilities.)

With the election of judges, September 14-16, 1921, the Court took on reality. A preliminary session was held in The Hague from January 30 to March 24, 1922.

Officers were elected and rules of procedure promulgated. On May 12, 1922, an important resolution was adopted by the Council "allowing all states to have access to the Court on equal terms, regardless of membership in the League of Nations."

CONSTITUTION OF THE COURT

The Court consists of fifteen judges and four deputy judges. They serve a term of nine years and are eligible for reelection. Each one receives a salary of about \$6,000 (15,000 Dutch florins), with an additional "duty allowance" for expenses. The Court sits in The Hague Peace Palace built by Andrew Carnegie.

These judges are nominated, not by the League of Nations, but by the nationals who are members of the Court of Arbitration, "but no group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two of whom shall be of their own nationality" (World Court Statute, Article V).

As to the character of the judges making up the World Court, Justice Hughes said (New York, January, 1930): "As the men proposed by the national groups of Great Powers must submit themselves to the election by the smaller powers, the great powers naturally put forward men of eminence whose records they think will stand scrutiny; and as the judges proposed by the groups in the smaller powers are to pass upon the controversies of the great powers, they are prompted to offer men of the required competence."

Mr. John Bassett Moore, of the United States, was elected and sat on the Court for years, resigning on account of pressing work. His place was filled in September, 1928, by Mr. Hughes. Other representatives are men of

equally high judicial caliber from Spain, Italy, Cuba, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Japan, France, Salvador, Belgium, Poland, Germany, Colombia, Rumania and China.

The Registrar of the Court is Mr. Ake Hammarskjöld of Sweden. All fees contributed by the nations are sent to the Registrar, not to Geneva. The expenses of the Court, about \$420,000 per year, are paid out of the budget of the League of Nations. This figure refers only to the maintenance of the Court, including salaries, rent, etc. The cost of the parties to a case are not included. The largest amount paid for Court expenses by a single nation is \$46,000, paid by Great Britain (1929).

LAW TO BE APPLIED

Opponents of the World Court have affirmed that the law that the Court applies is the Covenant of the League of Nations. There is no basis for this statement. The Statute of the Court gives explicit direction that it shall apply those principles of international law generally recognized and accepted by civilized nations. These principles have been accumulating since Grotius, the father of international law.

Article XXXVIII of the Statute decrees:

The Court shall apply:

"1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

"2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

"3. The general principles of international law recognized by civilized nations."

It is true that international law has not yet been codified, although a beginning has been made by a preparatory committee that has met for some years at Geneva. The first general Committee on Codification of International Law met in February, 1930, at The Hague. An American group, including David Hunter Miller and Professor Manley O. Hudson of Harvard, attended. Codification is a slow process. To wait years for it, as Mr. Hughes jestingly said, "might carry us over to the millennium, when it would be doubtful if we should need it." International law is also being augmented by the numerous treaties and conventions that international bodies, like the Labor Conference, are putting forth. The International Labor Conference has adopted some twenty conventions, which, as they are ratified by the different states, pass into the body of recognized international custom.

JURISDICTION OF THE WORLD COURT

Article XXXVI. "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force."

This second provision refers to cases coming up under the Treaty of Versailles, the mandate system, the International Labor Conventions, treaties of conciliation and arbitration, and the Locarno Treaties.

The World Court has been kept busy. In a total of sixty-seven treaties generally negotiated since the war, forty provide resort to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Article XXXVI also contains the famous Optional

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Clause leaving freedom to the signatories to the protocol in the matter of accepting compulsory jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is to apply in "all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

- (a) The interpretation of a treaty;
- (b) Any question of international law;
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation."

For many years, only the small nations—with the exception of Germany—were willing to sign the Optional Clause, which meant compulsory jurisdiction: that is, a nation could be haled to Court over a dispute whether it would or no—as individuals must bow to law courts. But at the Tenth Assembly of the League, Premier Ramsay MacDonald announced that Great Britain would sign the Optional Clause of the World Court Statute. This action was followed by the acceptance of the other great powers, so that 42 states in the Court have now accepted compulsory jurisdiction. This fact is epoch-making and alone justifies the establishment of the new tribunal.

ACTION OF THE COURT

The Court met for the first time on January 30, 1922. Annual sessions are held in January and extraordinary sessions whenever necessary.

The Court has delivered sixteen judgments and sixteen advisory opinions. It is impossible to go into these

cases, interesting as many of them are. A list with details may be obtained from the American Foundation (Bok Peace Award), 565 Fifth Ave., New York, or the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT

So now we find ourselves up against the United States again—the scion of world powers and the most politically diffident—the Prince of Wales among nations. Let us illumine the brightest spot first, even though we rob our story of its climax. On January 27, 1926, the United States Senate actually adopted the World Court resolution, 76 to 17. But, oh, the long hard struggle to bring about this end! For four years every organization interested in foreign affairs worked like stokers. For four years their speakers went World-Courting, wooing the public to the matter of justice in international relations. For four years they prodded, informed, stimulated, insulted, and educated public opinion until it “demanded” entrance into the World Court.

This process must be patiently repeated in promulgating every great cause. Those who care must dynamite the minds of those who do not care. (Of course they really do care. They are simply too busy to give attention.) No wonder when victory comes the workers are almost too tired to rejoice. They do rejoice, though, however languidly, fill up the spiritual cistern again and go on to the next step. But why does the Senate put the citizens of the United States through these periodical, soul-wasting struggles on matters of right and justice—principles which, after they are won, bring bewilderment that they could have caused any argument whatever?

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Senator Borah led the opposition to the adherence of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Again his mind developed one of its most historic kinks. Perhaps we would better deal with him later.

From the first, a large part of public opinion was in favor of American adherence. The press did valiant work, without which little could have been accomplished; the women's organizations, the churches, universities, and chambers of commerce were easily marshaled. Committees waited on the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Senators were bombarded, stampeded, frightened. One thing always will move a Senator: if you tell him that his constituents at home are organizing for a cause in *congressional districts*, it's like building a fire under his chair. You are sure to get action. On February 24, 1923, in response to public opinion, President Harding asked the consent of the Senate to the Protocol of the Court with the Hughes reservations. These reservations are worthy of consideration. Briefly they were:

- (a) That the United States should join the Court without joining the League;
- (b) That we should have a voice equal with other countries in electing judges;
- (c) That we should pay our share of the expense of the Court (note that Judge Moore's and Justice Hughes's expenses were paid by the other nations);
- (d) That we should withdraw when we wished and that the Statute should not be amended without our consent.

The then Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, considered that these reservations amply protected our interests. He also said: "It is not too much to say that there will be no world court if this court cannot be made one, and whether it is to be in the fullest sense a world court depends upon our own action." Of course, every other nation joined the Court without reservations. It was partly our lack of membership in the League that made these reservations seem necessary.

Nothing came of the reservations. For two years, the request for adherence to the Court was buried in the bosom of the Foreign Relations Committee, a body once called by Secretary Hay "the morgue of international hopes." On March 3, 1925, The House of Representatives, by a vote of 302 to 28, passed a resolution expressing an earnest desire that the United States should adhere to the Court Protocol with the recommendations of President Harding and later of President Coolidge.

But public opinion would not let the matter rest. A year later the World Court resolution was excavated from its hiding-place in the Foreign Relations Committee and a historic battle ensued. The World War was again threshed out, particularly the subject of the debts. In speaking of this phase of the discussion, Mr. Arthur Bullard (in *American Diplomacy*, p. 80) says: "The Senate has always refused any general arbitration treaty. In every case there must be a special treaty consented to by two-thirds of the Senate. This means that we will arbitrate not to find out if we are right, not because we think we are right, but only when we think we shall win. This point of view is very clearly expressed in the *Congres-*

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sional Record reports of the debates on the World Court. There was discussion of 'debts,' not only the debts which some countries are reluctant to pay us, but also those which some of our states have repudiated" (after the Civil War). Objection was raised to adhesion to a Court which might pass judgment on these matters. "You cannot avoid the conclusion, if you read the verbatim report of those debates, that some of our Senators were worried not because they feared that justice would be denied us, but because they feared that justice would prevail."

Finally, after a long hard fight, ably led by Senators Lenroot, Swanson, and Walsh, the Senate adopted the measure providing for the entrance of the United States into the Permanent Court of International Justice. But it wasn't as simple as that. Attached were five reservations, instead of four. President Coolidge had added one to the effect that "the United States shall be in no manner bound by any advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice not rendered pursuant to a request in which it, the United States, shall expressly join."

But in the Swanson resolution of adherence these five reservations became somewhat transformed. The original fourth resolution of Mr. Hughes was now prefaced so that the United States had the right to withdraw from the Court at any time, and the fifth reservation, now famous, became recast. Its new form read:

5. "That the Court shall not render any advisory opinion except publicly after due notice to all States and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any State concerned; nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory

opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest."

One doesn't have to be a jurist to see rocks ahead. The last part of this resolution might just as well have been labeled "Trouble." It killed all chances of the reservations being accepted with the latter part of the fifth in such a form. For what signatory state could vote to give a new signatory a privilege on advisory opinions which the state itself could not claim? And what Court, worthy the name, could admit even a member it desired at the price of weakening its statute?

Why was the fifth reservation thus cast? It was bad enough for the Senate to say, "We won't come to your party unless we can go home when we like." But why did they so arrogantly dictate to the Court in regard to Advisory Opinions? In justice to the Senate it should be added that Advisory Opinions are asked of the World Court by the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations. As a rule, unanimity prevails in those bodies. It has never been decided, however, whether the Council requires unanimity or a majority vote in asking for an advisory opinion.

Added to the five reservations the Senate of course had to "resolve" a few things to remind Europe just to remember who we were. "Resolved further, that adherence to the said Protocol and Statute hereby approved shall not be so construed as to require the United States to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign State; nor shall adherence to the said Protocol and Statute be

construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." Thus again, though holding all the cards in the pack, we led from fright, not from strength.

Following the reservation, the Senate added that the signature of the United States would not be affixed to the Protocol until the signatories of the Protocol should have indicated, through an exchange of notes, their acceptances of the reservations. That is forty-eight separate notes to forty-eight separate states (the then membership) were written and replied to. At a Council meeting held at Geneva, March 18, 1926, Sir Austen Chamberlain, used to the more modern method of meeting and discussing difficulties face to face, suggested a meeting with a representative of the United States to discuss the fifth resolution. All the other reservations were practically acceptable. Such discussion could not be embodied, he said, in an exchange of notes. All the signatories felt that there was nothing even in the *intent* of the fifth reservation that by frank discussion might not be ironed out. But the United States refused the modern way, the Conference method, refused to meet and discuss the terms. In a letter to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, Secretary of State Kellogg answered abruptly: "These reservations are plain and unequivocal and, according to their terms they must be accepted by the exchange of notes between the United States and each one of the forty-eight states signatory to the Statute of the Permanent Court." Thus the most efficient of nations, in many respects, in diplomacy clung to its long-hand practices in a machine period.

REPLY OF THE SIGNATORIES

So the signatories were forced to meet and consider the reservations without any person to present the American point of view. It might have been well represented. It had every right to be heard. A clear-thinking jurist could have elucidated our position. Without such illumination, the conference was like shadow-boxing. There was no come-back of the American attitude. The foundation of modern diplomacy—contact and understanding—was lacking.

I had the privilege of sitting in on some of these discussions in Geneva. The signatories of the Protocol met there, for convenience' sake, in September, just before the Eighth Assembly of the League. As one would expect, members of the conference were courteous and restrained. They frankly wanted the adhesion of the United States. But not at a price that would hamper the usefulness of the Court or the processes of justice and world peace.

The conference, in its reply, said that "while regretting that it has not had the assistance of a representative of the Government of the United States, it has studied the reservations and conditions of the United States with a strong desire to satisfy them in the largest possible measure. . . . The Conference has taken full account of the great moral effect which the participation of the United States in the maintenance of this institution of peace and justice would have on the development of international law and on the progressive organization of world society on the basis of a respect for law and the solidarity of nations." It agreed to the first three reservations. It agreed also to the fourth

—that the United States might withdraw at any time. But it added:

“In order to insure equality of treatment, it seems natural that the signatory states, acting together and by not less than a majority of two-thirds, should possess the corresponding right to withdraw their acceptance of the special conditions attached by the United States to its adherence to the said Protocol”—though it “hoped that no such withdrawal will be made without an attempt by a previous exchange of views to solve any difficulties which may arise.”

In regard to the latter part of reservation five, it said: “Should the United States offer objection to an advisory opinion being given by the Court, at the request of the Council or the Assembly, concerning a dispute to which the United States is not a party or concerning a question other than a dispute between states—the Court will attribute to such objection the same force and effect as attaches to a vote against asking for the opinion given by a Member of the League of Nations either in the Assembly or in the Council.”

The final act of the Conference looked toward “such further exchange of views as the Government of the United States may think useful.” This hope was ignored.

President Coolidge refused to resubmit the World Court Protocol to the Senate. Perhaps he felt that it would do no good. The Senate had given an ultimatum and ultimatums are dangerous because final. A Senator must “save his face” by sticking to his decision, though the nations perish. The World Court again languished for two years, although the door was open almost all the way for our admittance.

ENTER THE NEW SPIRIT

During the two years, however, that the subject of American adherence to the World Court lay buried, a change began to be felt in public opinion. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact was agitated. American thought was necessarily centered upon the peace of the world community and America's relationship towards it. An instrument to outlaw war by general agreement must have some practical contact with accepted world organizations to settle international disputes. Moreover, a President had been elected who was not only a business man, but also a world citizen. His first important act, aside from farm relief, was frankly to attack foreign affairs.

Previous to this, on February 6, 1928, Senator Gillett had introduced a resolution in the Senate urging an exchange of views to the effect that the differences between the United States and the signatory states of the Court Protocol might be satisfactorily adjusted. President Coolidge, also, at a White House breakfast attended by fifteen Republican Senators, had announced that he desired "to resume negotiations in the World Court matter." The Kellogg-Briand Pact had been ratified by the Senate. It was certainly expedient that the United States in renouncing war should ally itself with one of the substitutes for war in the progressive peace program of the world.

On February 19, 1929, Secretary of State Kellogg mollified a growing section of our public opinion by sending a courteous note to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations asking for a reopening of negotiations. Its whole tone was conciliatory. "The government of the United States," he wrote, "desires to avoid in so far as

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may be possible any proposal which would interfere with or embarrass the work of the Council of the League of Nations, doubtless often perplexing and difficult. . . ." Here at last was a new spirit based on understanding. The Protocol submitted by the signatory governments, he felt, in relation to the fifth reservation of the American Senate, would not furnish adequate protection for the rights and interests of the United States. Yet he added there seemed to be "but little difference between those rights and interests."

It was an invitation to the signatories to the Court Protocol to open negotiations. The United States had taken a long step forward in diplomacy. The virtue of negotiations is that they leave the door open for further negotiations. No more ultimatums. Ultimatums belong to outgrown autocracies, negotiations to coöperating states.

Happily, the Commission of Jurists appointed by the Council was considering a meeting for the revision of the Statute. The Statute had never been amended. But seven years of practice had naturally suggested amendments, some of them having a bearing upon the fifth reservation of the United States.

THE ROOT FORMULA

In the early part of President Hoover's administration, a tall slender youth of eighty-four summers was sent to Europe to sit on the Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council to revise the Statute of the Court. It was the same mature youth who had helped draw up the plan for the Court in 1920. His name was Elihu Root. On March 18, 1929, the committee adopted a new draft Protocol em-

bodily Mr. Root's formula for the entrance of the United States into the World Court.

The Root formula, agreed to by the other jurists, proclaimed that if the Assembly or the Council, in their efforts to obtain light on a complex question that might threaten the peace of the world, asked the Court for this impartial illumination, the United States must first be informed. The procedure is that Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, must do the informing to see if the United States has any objection. Thereupon "if desired, an exchange of views as to whether an interest of the United States is affected shall proceed with all *convenient speed* between the Council or the Assembly of the League and the United States." The italics of "convenient speed" are mine, to draw attention to the fact that no matter how convenient or speedy the reply of the United States is, the machinery of Geneva must be delayed until we decide whether or not we have an interest in the question. An "exchange of views" also does not determine whether we shall cling to the quaint method of writing notes—interminable delay—or will follow the new method of settling the question more rapidly by conference.

If the United States "advises the Court that the question upon which the opinion of the Court is asked is one that affects the interests of the United States, proceedings shall be stayed for a period sufficient to enable such an exchange of views between the Council or the Assembly and the United States."

An objection, by the United States, to entertaining an Advisory Opinion shall be given "the same force and effect as attached to a vote against asking for the opinion

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given by a member of the League of Nations in the Council or in the Assembly." In other words, we are given equality with members of the League. To the judicial mind this seems fair and is acceptable both to President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson.

If "after an exchange of views, . . . no agreement can be reached and the United States is not prepared to forego its objection," the United States is left free to withdraw from the Court "without any imputation of unfriendliness or unwillingness to coöperate generally for peace and good will" (Article V).

Here let us insert that an Advisory Opinion is not thunder from Mount Sinai. It is just what it says it is: advisory, and an opinion—not a judgment. It is neither binding nor compelling. What, then, is there to fear? The answer might be like the verdict of the court in *Alice in Wonderland* when the jury was instructed to add up the testimony and reduce the answer to pounds, shillings, and pence. Still, the value of Advisory Opinions to an institution like the League, trying to work out a system of justice between states, must not be minimized. The Root formula recognizes this value.

The Root formula has not yet been submitted for ratification to the United States Senate, though President Hoover had a diplomatic representative affix our signature in Geneva in December, 1929. Political reasons are said to make him feel that the time is not yet expedient.

As nations have grown stronger the tendency has been to grow more individualistic and less willing to submit to the laws of justice, which means to other wills besides their own. Their strength increases their feeling of self-sufficiency. Their power breeds fear, not courage. The

courage of fifty-four nations has established the World Court and made a success of it. The fear of the strongest nation in the world makes that nation still a thing apart, not "within the law" but above the law. That this situation should continue is not thinkable. Too many Americans are devoted to the establishment of world peace upon a foundation of world justice to permit it. Only a strong public opinion demanding a cessation of quibbling and backing upon the part of our legislators can control it. It will cease when the moral conscience of our country demands action, demands our entrance into the circle of the accepted Law of Mankind. Then, in the words of a prophet too little heard now (Isaiah xxvii. 17), perhaps: "The work of justice shall be peace."

SENATOR BORAH'S OBJECTIONS

And now, before bidding our farewell to this subject of the Permanent Court of International Justice, let us briefly take up the ubiquitous topic of Senator Borah and his chimæric objections to our adherence to the world's accepted statute of justice. In fairness to him, let us start by admitting that part of his objection was undoubtedly due to the preoccupation of his mind with another world idea which seemed to him more efficacious in the establishment of world peace—namely, the outlawry of war, a Lochinvar of an idea charging gallantly from the West, which we shall consider later in the chapter on the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

When the World Court resolution was reported to the Senate in December, 1926, I, with two companions, was packed into the Senate gallery. For six hours we sat without moving and without food or drink. We were accus-

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tomed to both, but we did not miss them. They were precious hours in the hours of a not too-well-spent life. Of course the main idea in remaining so long was to hear Senator Borah.

The Senator who presented the resolution in favor of the Court consumed two hours in his task. The women on either side of me could have covered the ground in half an hour—and frequently had. But the Senator was talking for the *Congressional Record*, where verbosity is a virtue. He knew his subject and did his task well. Senators Swanson, Walsh, and Lenroot all fought valiantly for the Court. We could recite the arguments in favor in our sleep. They did not omit one—except the subconscious one—the shame of having to fight to get our country into a Court of World Justice that American Presidents and Secretaries of State had been advocating for thirty years, and whose statutes had been partly written by one of our own countrymen.

Senator Borah then followed. Senator Borah's objections were three:

- (1) That the Court was a League Court,
- (2) That it did not possess compulsory jurisdiction,
- (3) That international law had not been codified.

These still are the bases of objection to the Court in this country and are thus worth considering.

It is true that the Court is a League Court—and glad enough we ought to be to acknowledge it. The League succeeded where two Hague Conferences and American diplomacy had failed. The Court is, nevertheless, independent of the League. Justice Hughes, in his address before the Bar Association in New York, 1930, gave testi-

mony to his experience of the high character of the Court, saying that "when judges have been elected neither they nor their decisions are subject to the control of the League." The Court's decisions and opinions are given by as impartial a body of jurists as it is possible to assemble in this world.

It is no longer true that the Court lacks compulsory jurisdiction. As we have said, all the great signatory states have accepted the optional clause, though they have been slow in doing so. It would seem that other nations have fear besides the United States. Our "common human nature" is exceeding common in many respects. When the statute of the World Court was accepted the signatory states were too near the shadow of the World War to accept all their world duty at once. Their statesmen, too, had caution. The great powers were not then willing to permit the small states the right of "hauling them to court" on international matters. Here, as elsewhere, justice had to creep before it acquired courage necessary to walk.

Senator Borah is right again in affirming that international law has not yet been codified. Nor is it likely to be for half a century more. When Germany federated, it is said to have required twenty-six years to codify the law of the German states. These processes are interminable. But codification has begun. International law is in process of codification by a preliminary Committee on Codification, which has met many times, and of which the Honorable George W. Wickersham is a member. A first meeting of the full committee was held at The Hague in 1930.

To see Senator Borah in action airing his objections

was something to be remembered. His technique is that of the experienced debater. Never once did he lose personal control. As other voices were raised, his voice became lowered. As other eyes flashed, his grew more benign. It was an exhibition of great ability, directed by great restraint. He was a worthy opponent of a great cause. No matter which side you were on, you were forced to admire him. He was aggravating, you knew that he was wrong, but he was stirring. All he needed to make himself convincing were a few basic facts and familiarity with a world point of view.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE

In January, 1930, the House of Commons ratified the British government's signature of the Optional Clause of the statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The victory was gained after a difficult eight-hour debate, the Liberals voting with the Labor government, the Tories putting up a strong opposition.

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Conservative) led the Opposition. An amendment to exempt the British fleet in time of war from the jurisdiction of the Court had been defeated, 278 to 193. Mr. Arthur Henderson, the British Foreign Secretary, came out well after a scalpel-like grueling. Sir Austen wanted to know why Mr. Henderson, who was willing in 1924 to exempt the British fleet from the action of the World Court, was not now willing to accept an amendment to that effect. Mr. Henderson replied because of the existence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

"We regard acceptance by this country of the Optional Clause as the logical consequence of our commitments

under the Paris Peace Pact. . . . Having ruled out war as a method of settlement, it is surely only common sense to put something in its place. We must have machinery. . . . If that pact is not to become a scrap of paper its words must be followed and confirmed by deeds." ("Hear! Hear!")

The importance of the action of the House of Commons and its preceding debate cannot be exaggerated. For the British fleet, embodying as it does security and sustenance to the small little island, is as dear to the average Briton as life itself. Moreover, such action involves freedom of the seas, blockade, neutrality, and all those questions which for years have been not-to-be-questioned by British citizenship.

Moreover, the optional clause, we are told, will have a very real effect on Advisory Opinions. Advisory Opinions were necessary because a nation could not be hailed to court. Now, with forty-two sovereign states having signed the Optional Clause, Advisory Opinions, we are told, will not be necessary since the matter may be threshed out in court. "While America has been talking about Advisory Opinions as if the old principles that a state cannot be compelled to submit a dispute to the World Court were as strong as ever" (says the *New York Times*, January 13, 1930), "the jurisdiction has already become compulsory for about one-third of the states of the world. At this rate the Advisory Opinion mechanism . . . is likely to be practically obsolete before the United States, unless it hurries, gets in a position to use the elaborate machinery the Root Protocol provides for such cases."

This leaves one rather breathless. The world is certainly moving so fast that human mentality is often unable to keep up with it. Can it be that the Senate's four-year delay in entering the World Court on the ground of Advisory Opinions is to prove much ado about nothing?

CHAPTER VII

LOCARNO

POPULARITY OF LOCARNO TREATIES

THE signing of the Locarno Treaties was hailed all over the world—even by the United States—as the most important historic event since the Armistice. Miles of editorials were written and bales of sermons were preached commending the action. Peace was heralded as having made a real and practical advance.

No wonder. The Locarno Treaties brought security to the boundary line between Germany and France, a sore spot in Europe. Within ten years of the most bitter war ever known, these two historic enemies agreed to "eliminate the Rhine as a frictional element in European affairs for the first time since the days of Louis XIV: The Rhineland treaty closes a chapter in history."

The Locarno Treaties were hailed also because, in these conventions, great states voluntarily agreed to settle their disputes—as sure to arrive as taxes—by arbitration and conciliation. No exception was made to questions of "national honor and vital interests." Arbitration went marching on. For nine documents were initialed at Locarno, engaging Germany on the one side and Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia and Poland severally on the other, to settle their difficulties by adjudication.

The treaties also indicate a change of spirit in the rela-

tions between the signatory nations. Good will and conciliation were to be substituted for ill will and force. This was due largely to the forward-looking wisdom of Monsieur Briand and Herr Stresemann, Foreign Ministers of France and Germany. Both of these statesmen belonged to the new age trying to build upon foundations of coöperation rather than conflict. Both of these apostles of constructive peace saw that survival and prosperity demanded friendliness—not hate; that nations armed to the teeth, with guns pointing at each other across their frontiers, were no longer secure, and that any preliminary reduction of material disarmament must contain moral disarmament generated by faith and good will.

Finally, the Locarno agreements were acclaimed because the condition of their going into force was that Germany should enter the League of Nations. No longer a derelict nation, friendless and drifting upon the human sea, no longer a vanquished enemy without the circle of fraternal states, but a member of the family of nations, within the new framework of law and justice which is to restrain the individualistic, anarchistic state; subject to law but subject also to those privileges of the spirit which equality and fraternity imply. "The spirit of solidarity takes the place of that of distrust and suspicion," said Aristide Briand, after Locarno. "It is not by an accumulation of strength that it is hoped to render war impossible, but by the bonds of mutual assistance and human solidarity."

The treaties are said to mark the "end of the psychological aftermath of the World War." The psychology of force had failed. Nothing was left except to turn to the

new psychology of peace through international agreements. The parties to the treaties were those upon which the scourge of the World War had fallen heaviest. France wanted security. Germany wanted reinstatement as a great power. Locarno offered partial opportunity for both.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE TREATY.

The Locarno Treaties were initialed on neutral ground at Locarno, a beautiful little lake-town in Switzerland, on October 16, 1925, and were signed at London December 1st. The conditions precedent which made this contribution to peace possible must be brought into focus.

The League of Nations and the World Court were functioning, offering new political methods to disputing states. The Dawes Plan had temporarily disentangled the web of reparations questions and inter-allied debts, offering progressive economic solutions. The attempts of France to attain security along the old lines of alliances had brought no conspicuous success. It was the willingness of France to turn to new forms of security that made Locarno possible.

After the war it became the fashion to call France the "frightened child among nations" and to regard her as a beautiful but hysterical young woman. Three times in one hundred years great Teutonic armies had swept over the fair fields of France. Once a German Emperor had been crowned in the mirrored halls of Versailles. In the World War France had more devastated area than any other country. The population of Germany was 20,000,000 greater than that of France. Moreover, for forty

years this country had given time to building and perfecting the greatest military machine the world had ever known. If our neighbor on the north, Canada, had devoted half a century to army drilling, heel-clicking, building Big Berthas and what not, fear well might have penetrated the United States.

At the Versailles Peace Table, Marshal Foch wished to annex the left bank of the Rhine as part of a protective program. This bank was considered a "military spring-board" from which Germany could at any time launch a successful attack. The annexation was not permitted at Paris, but the left bank of the Rhine was demilitarized (of forts, etc.) and an army of occupation was arranged as a guaranty for fifteen years, with progressive withdrawal every five years. (All troops were withdrawn in the summer of 1930.)

French "nervousness" at Versailles then turned to a three-power treaty whereby Great Britain and the United States were to agree to come immediately to French assistance "in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against France made by Germany." The United States Senate, however, would not consent to this agreement. France then turned to the policy of encirclement of Germany by making treaties with Poland, the Little Entente, etc. Finally, in 1923, finding Germany in default of her international obligations, French troops entered the Ruhr, to seize and operate the coal and iron mines. But she was met with passive resistance. The British held that occupation of the Ruhr was not a sanction authorized by the Versailles Treaty. France felt herself unprotected and alone.

THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA

Meantime the search for security was making progress at Geneva, and was being linked with arbitration and disarmament. The spirit which made the whole seem greater than any of its parts was slowly permeating and influencing states to feel that security must be attained by all nations within the circle of the League. Two treaties were created within the sphere of the general agreement, after much painstaking labor. The first was a Treaty of Mutual Assistance, a system of regional guaranties. The second was the famous Geneva Protocol, a general agreement for the protection of all. (Both will be treated in the chapter on "Disarmament.") It is universally admitted that the British refusal to ratify these two treaties is one of the causes responsible for their failure. It is also an open secret that fear that, in case of an aggression, the British fleet might find itself confronting the United States fleet, outside the League, was among the reasons for British rejection.

But no honest effort is lost, in this world, and especially the educational value of a good treaty. Failures here may be stepping-stones to later success. Elihu Root has said: "It is my deliberate belief that the greatest contributions to the history of world peace are the negotiations and the exchanges that have failed in their immediate object."

I never will forget that impressive day at the Assembly in Geneva in 1925 when the delegates went up to the forum and expressed their deep and abiding faith in the Geneva Protocol, even though it had been rejected. Some day, they affirmed, it must return as a basis of true world

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security. It was at this Assembly that Mr. Austen Chamberlain, later knighted for his work at Locarno, "explained" to the smaller powers the substance of British rejection. I have always believed that it was part of British policy to make amends for the disappointment it created in renouncing the Geneva Protocol that led her to lend herself so generously to the Locarno Pact. In any case, the same delegates went from the atmosphere of conciliation in Geneva, in September, to consider the Pact at Locarno, in October. And the spirit of Locarno was simply the spirit of Geneva, transplanted, but following out the new policy of negotiating friendliness and good will.

NEGOTIATIONS

Of course negotiations in regard to a Rhineland Pact had taken place between the interested Foreign Secretaries—notably those of France, Germany, and Great Britain—some months before the Locarno meeting. France had asserted that the Locarno Pact could "only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations." Commercial necessity had brought about economic coöperation with Germany, the formation of steel cartels, etc. Political coöperation must now follow.

This attitude on the part of France brought to light a certain embarrassment in Germany in regard to the League of Nations. For it must be remembered that Germany had sought admission to the League in 1920 and had been denied. (She had, however, joined the International Labor Organization.) Application must come from the state desiring membership. Germany, fearing another rebuff—and desiring a place on the Council, to

which as a great power she was entitled—did not apply. A place on the Council would have required the affirmative vote of France. The attitude of Germany towards Geneva became dignified, reluctant, and a trifle indifferent. In September, 1924, the late Dr. Nansen, of Norway, sometimes called the "conscience of the League," visited Germany to consult on the matter with German officials. On September 24th, the German Cabinet agreed to a policy looking towards entrance to the League of Nations.

In reply to the note from France of June 16, 1925, the German Government asserted that "the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations would not be a necessary condition" to the proposed agreement. But "in view of the great importance which the German government attach to the solution of the security question they will, in principle, not raise any objection against the linking of the two problems."

Due to the result of internal pressure in Germany, the government did, however, take this opportunity to clear up other questions which agitated the German mind. These questions had to do with sole responsibility for war guilt and the evacuation of the Cologne zone of the occupied territory. The French, British, and Belgian governments replied that these questions bear "no relations to the negotiations for a security pact and have formed no part of the preliminary exchange of views." All agreed also that the Pact did not necessitate a revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

The negotiations between Great Britain, France, and Germany finally ended in the appointment of a committee of jurists to meet in London September 1st-4th to study the technical problems involved and draw up drafts

for Ministerial consideration. Thus the Locarno Conference was well prepared beforehand, leaving little to chance, which is the secret of any successful international undertaking.

There was no American representation of any kind at the Locarno Conference, though Germany had suggested the presence of the United States government as trustee. Indeed, there seemed no necessity for American participation. The treaty was not generally international, and while made "within the framework of the League," was not a League treaty. It was one of those special agreements to meet special needs, which Austen Chamberlain had suggested in place of general pacts, such as the Geneva Protocol. President Coolidge had, however, advocated something of the character of Locarno in a speech made in Massachusetts on July 3, 1925. "If the people of the Old World," he said, "are mutually distrustful of each other, let them enter into mutual covenants for their mutual security, and when such covenants have been made let them be solemnly observed, no matter what the sacrifice. They have settled the far more difficult problem of reparations; they are in process of funding their debts to us. . . . On what other basis can there be any encouragement for a disposition to attempt to finance a revival of Europe? The world has tried war with force and has utterly failed. The only hope of success lies in peace with justice."

The Locarno Conference sat from October 5th to 16th, making steady progress towards agreement. The negotiations were carried on in an atmosphere of good faith and friendliness—thanks to Briand, Stresemann, and Chamberlain. It was my privilege to hear Austen Cham-

berlain relate informally the story of Locarno at a small luncheon in Geneva. I have seen these details in print since, so there is no breach in repeating them. The final consent of the German delegation to the proposals was obtained on Mrs. Chamberlain's birthday. She is charming and young enough not to allow international birthday celebrations to trouble her. Some one had offered M. Briand the use of a launch at Locarno, and a luncheon on board was planned to celebrate the natal day of the wife of the British Foreign Secretary. But there was more than airy persiflage to mark the occasion. The delegates kept their eye on the goal—German consent to the treaty. On the shore the populace had gathered to watch the launch and see the great people when they landed. Every time the captain approached the dock, he was commanded to swing out into the lake again until agreement was reached. So what would be called in America a good old-fashioned "picnic" helped to establish a new milestone on the difficult pathway of constructive international peace.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF LOCARNO

What did the Treaty of Locarno actually accomplish? It guaranteed, in the first place, the boundary line between Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium. If either nation indulges in an unprovoked aggression upon the other, Great Britain and Italy agree to come to the rescue of the one attacked.

Secondly, it agrees that disputes be settled by pacific means—forerunner of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Unlike the Kellogg-Briand Pact, however, it states clearly what means may be employed. Not only is war outlawed, but

something specific and practical is put in its place. Disputes are to be referred to a Permanent Conciliation Committee, to the Council of the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Finally, Locarno contributed towards that "moral relaxation of tension between nations"—a tension that if allowed to continue brings about mutual hate and distrust and eventually breeds rupture and war. That good will was promoted at Locarno cannot be doubted. The atmosphere was one of mutual trust rather than mutual suspicion. Contrasted with The Hague Conference, for instance, for consideration of the Young Plan, it shines like an angel of light beside an avenging Lucifer.

The Permanent Conciliation Committee is worth consideration. It is to be composed of five members—a national of each contracting party and three other commissioners from among the nationals of third powers. Here we see again the presence of the third party, the disinterested, so essential to approximate justice. The commissioners are appointed by the High Contracting Parties for a term of three years, and their mandate is renewable. The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission is to "elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of inquiry or otherwise, and to endeavor to bring the parties to an agreement" (Article VIII, Annex C). In the event of no amiable agreement being reached by the Commission, the dispute will be submitted to the World Court.

Of course, there were reservations. Few treaties are without them. Every nation that steps forward must also glance backward. Every nation has its Monroe Doctrine or pet tradition. The first reservation is a right to legiti-

mate self-defense. A few years ago this declaration would nullify a treaty. Nations always have claimed that they were acting in self-defense. Now Geneva has offered a method for finding the aggressor—the nation which refuses to settle the dispute by peaceful means. Second, a flagrant breach of the provisions demilitarizing the Rhineland. The other three reservations hold that the treaty does not interfere with the signatories' commitments under the League of Nations. Great Britain also excepted the Dominions from being parties to the Locarno treaties.

The Locarno Pact was signed by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Other arbitration treaties were also negotiated between Germany and Belgium, Germany and France, Germany and Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia, and between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia: and a note to Germany in regard to the interpretation of Article XVI was included.

The treaties, as we have said, were merely initialed at Locarno, in October, and were signed at a conference in London, December 1, 1925. Here all the world acclaimed Austen Chamberlain and Aristide Briand as apostles of the new diplomacy of conference and conciliation, and Herr Stresemann was honored as a statesman worthy of the name. As usual, Monsieur Briand immortalized the occasion in golden phrases. No other orator is so simple, so logical, so convincing in his power to sway multitudes; no other speaker has the wit and the intuitive gravitation towards the right word, the flashing jewel to adorn his crown of ideas. At London he said that he was no less a good Frenchman, nor the German delegates no less good Germans, because "in the light of these

treaties we are Europeans only." (See in these words the foreshadowing of his idea of a United States of Europe, and note how long it must have mulled in his mind before he gave public expression to it at a luncheon in Geneva four years later [1929] "between a pear and the cheese," to quote his own words.) Continuing the European idea at London, he added: "I see in them" (the treaties) "the beginning of a magnificent work, the renewal of Europe, its investment of its true character by means of a *general union*" (the italics are mine) "in which all nations will be invited to participate—each according to its special qualifications."

"I see in Locarno," replied Herr Stresemann, sitting on the opposite side of the table, "not a juridical construction of political ideas, but I see in the work of Locarno the basis of a great future development"—the citizens of Europe, "linked together by the great conception of civilization which imbues our continent. We have a right to speak of a European idea; this Europe of ours has made the largest sacrifices in the World War; it is now threatened by the danger of losing through the effects of the war the position to which it is entitled by reason of its tradition and development."

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Locarno Treaties were mothered by the League of Nations and sired by the Geneva Protocol. The League offered a method, the conciliatory method for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Locarno is a policy—the application of that method to one of the most sensitive nerves in Europe. For the Locarno Treaties not only renounced war as a national policy in

a dangerous locality and promised to settle all questions by pacific means, but also they prescribed alternative means and did not leave disputing states with no place to turn.

To the rest of the world, I feel sure that Locarno meant more than the practical casting of political formula. It meant also the opportunity to again listen to German music, to again enjoy German art and literature. For Locarno brought Germany back into the realm of world politics upon a footing of equality and raised above militarism those things of the spirit forever embodied in the works of Beethoven and Mozart, Goethe and Heine, Straus, Einstein, and Reinhardt, to continue to profit and inspire mankind.

CHAPTER VIII

THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PEACE PACT

A CASTLE IN THE AIR?

PERHAPS the most discerning comment on the Kellogg-Briand Pact was made by one of its firmest friends and well-wishers. At the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations, September 10, 1929, Premier Ramsay MacDonald said that the pact of peace was still "a castle in the air" and the work of the League was to build up foundations for it.

No one questions Mr. MacDonald's sincerity in working for the establishment of peace. Why then should he term a pact that, on this side of the water, has been hailed as the greatest of contributions to world peace, as a castle in the air?

Perhaps we can illustrate by a figure. Supposing, after a long health campaign, President Hoover should advocate a bill suggesting that no American should eat meat, and that if he were tempted to eat meat he must not indulge his appetite. What would be the result all over the United States? The outcry would be, Yes, but what shall we eat? Every dietitian knows the answer. But unless the alternative diet was specified, the edict would not be taken seriously. Our butchers would still flourish.

For ten years Europe has been slowly building a meatless world—that is one in which war shall be controlled

and gradually abolished. But it has not overlooked its life-giving substitutes. For it knows that you cannot take away something of age-long usage, without substituting something that will prove to be of greater value. We don't want to live in an anæmic world any more than we wish to live in a world run at high blood pressure.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact takes away meat, but provides nothing that will keep the red corpuscles of the world healthy. It takes away the ancient privilege of combat, by which nations not only protected their liberties and secured their independence, but does not provide machinery for peaceful settlement—the new way of national protection and security—through arbitration and collective action. Indeed, it overlooks all the great progress that has been made along the line of collective action for peace and prosperity for the last ten years. The United States, absorbed in economic expansion, refuses to see the political program being built by the world community. This attitude has led Señor de Madariaga, in his able book on disarmament to write "The Coolidge Conference was sprung upon the world as if the work of the Disarmament Conference did not exist. The Kellogg Pact has been presented to the world as if the Covenant itself did not exist" (p. 233).

Ah yes, the gentle reader here interpolates, but that is the European point of view. Admitted. But that is exactly what we must understand in this country, if we are sincerely interested in peace. For no country, however rich and self-sufficient, can make peace alone. No country can afford to overlook the progressive stages toward constructive peace, already accepted by the major part of the world. The greatest of world powers must have a world

point of view. And that may not be gained while adhering strictly to nationalistic opinion.

Not only does the Kellogg-Briand Pact seem to Mr. MacDonald a "castle in the air" because it provides no alternatives for war and overlooks those institutions functioning for a decade, but also it is a weak castle because of the method of its American architects. The diplomacy used in changing the Kellogg-Briand Pact from a treaty of two nations to a treaty of many nations was the old-fashioned method of writing notes without end, of misunderstandings as to what you mean and I mean and they mean. A single conference, the modern method, would have brought the representatives of all the nations together, each to give his national point of view, with understanding effected.

Even Mussolini saw the necessity for conference upon this important matter regarding a multilateral anti-war treaty and said, in a letter to the American ambassador (Fletcher): "Your Excellency is aware of the fact that there is under consideration the proposal for a preliminary meeting of the legal experts of the powers whose direct interest in the proposed treaty has been enlisted. The Royal Government has adhered to this procedure, but has clearly pointed out that, in its opinion, such a meeting can only be effective if the participation of a legal expert of the Government of the United States is assured." There was no such conference of legal experts or diplomats which included the United States. The United States, in the Pact, uttered an ultimatum, without conference or face-to-face negotiations—like the ultimatum in regard to the World Court.

"Modern diplomacy calls for personal contact," says

Mr. Arthur Bullard in his *American Diplomacy* (p. 37), "and if we prefer to carry on our international relations by the old-fashioned machinery of formal correspondence, we are of course free to, but we are likely to be outdistanced by those who are progressive enough to use post-war methods. All the world rejoices that there has been some concrete result from this Kellogg-Briand correspondence. But Mr. Kellogg's success has been in getting his multilateral treaty signed and ratified, in spite of, not because of, his antiquated methods."

HISTORY OF THE PACT

But let us consider the history of the Pact itself. It is now an open secret that the idea of a treaty outlawing war between France and the United States was first suggested to Monsieur Briand by Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University. It was to be an effort, of course, to unite the divergent peace groups in the United States upon one central motive to which they could all subscribe—the denunciation and renunciation of war itself. The Outlawry of War school, headed by Mr. Levenson and Dr. Morrison, had won the sincere support of that John the Baptist of the Senate, our old friend Senator Borah. This group was against the League of Nations and the World Court. But they had secured a slogan that had the genius to appeal widely to the country—the Outlawry of War. Nothing could be more appealing or picturesque if only you could forget the antecedent problem of security.

On April 6, 1927, just ten years after the United States entered the war, Monsieur Briand gave a statement to the Associated Press addressed to the American people, ad-

vising that "France would be willing to subscribe publicly with the United States to any mutual engagement tending 'to outlaw war,' to use an American expression, as between these two countries." Then he continued: "The renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy is a conception already familiar to the signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Treaties of Locarno."

Strangely enough, this important olive branch from the Foreign Minister of France did not attain even the distinction of being placed on the front page in the American press. For two weeks after the first inconspicuous publication it was overlooked. Then it was resurrected from its oblivion by the public-spirited pen of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler. On April 25th, the *New York Times* published a letter from Dr. Butler which is worth quoting, since it became the starting point of American action. He wrote:

"The question" (of renouncing war as an instrument of national policy in settling disputes between the United States and France) "is now squarely before the people of the United States. If those moral forces to which Monsieur Briand makes appeal do not really exist among us, or, if existing, they cannot secure such direction of our policies as shall realize these ideals, then in international relations we shall have reached a stage which no American who understands his country's traditions and who realizes his country's ideals can look upon without shame and sorrow.

"Monsieur Briand's mind is thoroughly practical. He does not ask the government of the United States to accept the Covenant of the League of Nations; he does not

ask the government of the United States to accept the principles of the pact of Locarno; he does not ask the government of the United States to adhere to the Protocol for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. All that he asks is that the people of the United States shall take their own way to express the fact that in no case will they employ war to enforce their policies with reference to France.

"We have been celebrating, and justly, the tenth anniversary of the entry of the United States into the World War. Where and how could we find a more fitting tribute to the memory of those whose lives were given in that stupendous struggle than by making a solemn compact with that nation most severely stricken by that war, for the formal and definite renunciation of war itself as an instrument of policy?"

This letter became the subject of editorial comment throughout the country. The offer of Monsieur Briand demanded some kind of a reply. In the minds of thoughtful people there could be but one answer to such an offer—an affirmative one. Public opinion began to think favorably of the proposition.

There followed the Capper resolution in the Senate, proposing that "Congress itself, by joint resolution, should take up the offer (of France) and declare American policy to be in accord with it."

When the administration, with its ear to the ground, at last began to consider the matter with Monsieur Briand, a surprise was offered. In the correspondence that ensued, Secretary of State Kellogg proposed instead of a bilateral treaty, a multilateral treaty, open to signature

by all nations, "renouncing war as an instrument of national policy in favor of the pacific settlements of international disputes." This was of immediate front-page interest and the controversy began. From this time on, Secretary Kellogg fought valiantly for his project. He was strengthened by the support of the silent but stanch President Coolidge. Mr. Coolidge was the outgoing President. He had given his ultimatum—if it was an ultimatum—that "he did not choose to run." But, being human, having also expressed the fact that the world had made unprecedented progress towards peace in the last ten years—he did not say almost entirely without the official support of the United States—he would naturally welcome a world-wide gesture of peace as his administration's swan song. The fine articles of Professor Shotwell, in the *New York Herald Tribune* and elsewhere, also helped to concentrate public opinion on the desirability of an anti-war pact.

Then began the interminable exchange of notes—not only with France but with Great Britain, the Dominions, Italy, Japan, Belgium, etc. Here it would have been so modern, and natural, for Monsieur Briand to say to Secretary Kellogg: "Come over to Geneva and we'll get together and talk it over." But that would have been taboo. So the ink continued to flow and time waned. The result was finally a paper that nobody understood though everybody wanted to understand: a pact aiming at peace, necessitating coöperation—but offering no means of coöperation—a gesture of American idealism outside the sphere, and ignoring the sphere of practical world politics.

ACCEPTANCE

Although a few of the governments were slow in accepting the Pact, the peoples, in almost every case, were ahead of their governments in welcoming the renunciation of war. This was not only because they were still suffering the reactions to war exhaustion, but also, in all probability, because the proposition came from the most powerful nation in the world, which had studiously, theretofore, stood aloof from the task of building adequate foundations of peace.

Germany sent the first affirmative reply to the United States. In his scholarly book, *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, Professor Shotwell says: "No other Great Power in the world today has made such a radical change in its attitude toward peace and war as Germany. The new German Republic is an unprecedented experiment in the politics of peace. Shorn of armaments by the Treaty of Versailles and deprived for the time being of the reassertion of its military and naval power, it has been forced from the very exigencies of its post-war situation to find and apply the practical equivalent in terms of peace for the arbitrament of the sword. It has concentrated upon this task both theoretically and practically, and the new German Republic is a laboratory for the study of pacific international affairs, such as the modern world presents nowhere else."

Practically all the nations expressed loyalty to their commitments under the League of Nations and the Locarno agreements, stipulating that there should be no restrictions here. Secretary Kellogg responded to these stipulations in a statesman-like fashion and said in public

at a dinner, and in the snowstorm of notes that followed, that "nothing in the Pact violated obligations under the League." "On the contrary," he added, in a note to the French ambassador, Monsieur Claudel, February 27, 1928, "is it not entirely reasonable to conclude that a formal engagement of this character entered into by all the principal Powers, and ultimately, I trust, by the entire family of nations, would be a most effective instrument for promoting the great ideal of peace which the League itself has so closely at heart?"

This is the first time that an American administration had publicly acknowledged that the League of Nations was bound up with a beneficent ideal. From overlooking the League as a communal instrument of the family of nations, an American Secretary graciously and unwinkingly faced it squarely, acknowledging its aim and beneficence. And nothing happened to him. The Heavens did not fall or Purgatory yawn. Instead, by this frank recognition and determined pursuit of his object of modern collective action, he has written his name on the scroll of immortals who are slowly building safeguards for peace.

BRITISH ACCEPTANCE

Great Britain was slow in replying, having the Dominions to consider. Public clamor became impatient, in England, in fact, while the Foreign Office deliberated. Three considerations, it has been pointed out, were before her: her own League of Nations in her far-flung Empire, her obligations under the League which she has always placed paramount, and her unwritten law that she will never make war with the United States.

Secretary Kellogg had expressly stated that he hoped the Pact could go through with the original "purity and simplicity" of the first draft submitted by Monsieur Briand—a mere letter preliminary to negotiations, of course, and not a draft for a final treaty, Monsieur Briand having the European method in mind of consigning the technicalities to a committee of experts and then letting the statesmen enunciate the principles, after governments knew where they stood. But Secretary Kellogg had rejected recourse to a committee of experts, also a conference which was proposed later by Great Britain. American directness and single-mindedness—as well as lack of acquaintance with the new diplomatic technique—made him prefer to have the treaty stand, undiscussed, without either technicalities or the adoption of reservations which he felt might weaken its pristine intention.

Great Britain did make a reservation, however, considered by some people as emasculating the Treaty and by others as coming under the head of legitimate self-defense. Sir Austen Chamberlain, without the benefit of face-to-face discussion of the meaning of the Renunciation of War, inserted in his acceptance that he must remind "His Excellency" (Secretary Kellogg) "that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference in these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accepts the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their

freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests, any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government." So the Monroe Doctrine became a boomerang to remind us that we were not the only country with territory where one says "hands off." This reservation has been called the Monroe Doctrine of Great Britain. It was accepted by Secretary Kellogg as a necessary part of Great Britain's national self-defense.

SIGNING OF THE PACT

The Pact was finally signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, at the Quai d'Orsay, the Foreign Office of France. It was a wise act of diplomacy on Secretary Kellogg's part to choose France as the meeting-place for the signatories of the new Outlawry of War, since Monsieur Briand had been the promulgator of the idea, and the journey was shortened for the visiting diplomats.

France showed her appreciation by putting on her gayest attire. There were flags of all the nations flying over the lovely Champs Elysées, including the German flag and the red flag of Soviet Russia. And once again, so seldom seen with its former allies, the brilliant American Stars and Stripes were unfurled. The idea of peace by international agreement on that day united all nations, even those politically far apart.

At a horseshoe table in the great clock-room of the Quai d'Orsay, the signatories were seated. They were men in business attire, for the most part, diplomacy hav-

ing shifted its interests largely to economics. Around them were ushers clad in red velvet breeches, white silk stockings and coats of blue and gold. Even a democracy must have its touch of ancient splendor. Yet the scene, though simple, was solemn. The last enemy of man, save one, was to be given a universal death blow. The Goliath of war may attempt to come to life again. He may attempt his old control. But if the states gathered in that historic room on that epoch-making occasion realized what they were doing, they are solemnly committed to finding other means than the sword for settling international disputes. That is their problem and they must face it collectively. Otherwise they will be traitors to themselves and to the peoples of the world community in which all now have a responsible part.

And David, the great little Secretary of State of the greatest of world powers, who had worked so diligently and directly to fell the ancient giant—wouldn't it have been interesting to look into his mind on this great occasion? Of course there must have been a justifiable pride in having had the good fortune to bring the nations of the world together, united on a single idea. But we hope he had also a little of the feeling of the prodigal son for whom the fatted calf was killed—that it was good to be back with our allies after a political dereliction of ten years.

Monsieur Briand was the only spokesman. Once more, by his simplicity and tact, no less than by his eloquence, he proved himself the master spokesman. "I am fully conscious that silence would best befit such a solemn occasion," he said. Yet he would fail in duty to his country if he did not speak a word of welcome. No one was for-

gotten. Wilson, Stresemann, Sir Austen Chamberlain, too ill to attend, and others were brought within the circle of remembrance. The day, he felt, marked a new date in the history of mankind—a beginning and not an end. War itself was deprived of legitimacy. Peace had been proclaimed. That is much, "*But peace has yet to be organized. For settlements by force we must substitute settlements by law. That must be the work of tomorrow,*" he said.

THE PACT

The Pact is one of the briefest political documents in history. It contains but three articles:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Article III proclaims that the treaty will go into effect when it has been ratified by all the states named in the Preamble, and the instruments of ratification have been duly deposited. Monsieur Briand deposited the ratification of France at Geneva.

The Preamble also contains the important paragraph that "any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war shall be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty"—a statement certainly demanding elaboration. It has been interpreted by the Secretary of State himself as meaning that in case a signatory violates the treaty the other signatories recover their "liberty of action" with reference to such violation. That is, in case of an aggression by a signatory of the Pact, each nation is to decide what its attitude is to be. "This leaves untouched," says Professor Shotwell in comment on the Pact (Pamphlet 243, International Conciliation series), "the collective action of the guarantees of Peace under the Covenant or the Treaty of Locarno, for if they are called upon to use force against a violating nation, it is not as an instrument of their national policy but as the instrument of the *community of nations*, concerning which no single word is to be found in the whole treaty."

At the time of the signing of the Pact in Paris a note was also sent out inviting the general ratification of the treaty by all nations, and fifty-eight nations have now responded.

Of course there are exceptions to the treaty. It seems that a general convention, no matter how pure and simple, has to have reservations implicitly indicated if not explicitly embodied in the convention.

On June 23, 1928, just one year after the presentation of Monsieur Briand's original suggestion for the proposed Treaty, the United States government wrote a note to the governments of the great powers and several other

states, elaborating the implied reservation of the Treaty. The first of these exceptions is naturally the right to

(1) Self-defense. That right, the note says, is "inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. . . . Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression."

(2) The League Covenant. "The covenant imposes no affirmative primary obligation to go to war. The obligation, if any, is secondary and attaches only when deliberately accepted by a state. Article X of the Covenant has, for example, been interpreted by a resolution submitted to the Fourth Assembly, but not formally adopted, owing to one adverse vote, to mean that 'it is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.' There is, in my opinion, no necessary inconsistency between the Covenant and the idea of an unqualified renunciation of war. The Covenant can, it is true, be construed as authorizing war in certain circumstances but it is an authorization and not a *positive requirement*."

(I have quoted this American reference to Article X in full since it contains an authoritative answer from the United States Government to the haunting fear that we might have to "send our boys" to settle European difficulties. I was present at Geneva at the interesting sessions of the committee when Canada requested a fuller interpretation of Article X. The result of the inquiry—that it was for the individual state to decide its action in

case of war—was defeated by little Persia—timid and fearing aggression of greater powers—which cast the adverse vote referred to against the now generally accepted liberal interpretation of Article X.)

(3) The Treaties of Locarno. The proposed Pact would not make inviolate these treaties, but would give them “double assurance that the Locarno Treaties would not be violated by recourse to arms.”

(4) Treaties of neutrality. The question of neutrality is more or less side-stepped by the Pact. Yet it is one that the United States must face frankly, in time, since upon it hangs the question of how practical may become the new institution of peace. In case the Kellogg-Briand Pact is violated, what will be the attitude of the United States towards the aggressor? That is the question. In the preliminary notes, Monsieur Briand had said that France had certain obligations of guaranteeing neutrality, under the Locarno and other treaties. Secretary Kellogg’s reply is that “It is difficult to perceive how treaties guaranteeing neutrality can be regarded as necessarily preventing the conclusion by France or any other power of a multi-lateral treaty for the renunciation of war.”

It should be added, however, that if Secretary Kellogg had included the question of American neutrality in his Pact renouncing war, he probably would not have been able to get the treaty ratified by the American Senate.

(5) Relations with treaty-breaking states. Here the Secretary points out that any violation of the Pact automatically releases the other signatories from their obligation to the treaty-breaking state. In other words, freedom of action is given in case of aggression.

(6) Universality. While universality was the hope of

the United States in the general acceptance of the multilateral treaty, it was not considered desirable to postpone the coming into force of the Pact until all states had ratified it. Secretary Kellogg believed that the "coming into force of such a treaty, even among the six great powers of the world, would be a practical guaranty against a second world war." He was not willing, therefore, to jeopardize this "tremendous service to humanity by conditioning the coming into force of the treaty upon prior or universal acceptance."

WEAKNESS OF THE PACT

Secretary Kellogg deserves unstinted praise for the spirit and determination with which he put through his Pact—not only in the face of the difficulties and complexities he faced from states that considered themselves already committed to the general claims of his treaty—but also in the opposition at home. He was untiring. He was sincere. He performed a service that, certainly in the United States, is not even now appreciated at its far-reaching value. Let us now consider the weaknesses of this great undertaking.

The weaknesses of the Kellogg-Briand Pact we have more or less indicated: it lacks the machinery for settling disputes by peaceful means. Also, it overlooks the progress toward peace already made by the collective action of the nations of the world when ten years ago they began taking peace out of the realm of vaporous idealism and placed it on a footing of coöperative reality. Though compelled to recognize the new arbitral institutions, the League, the Court, and Locarno, by the affirmation of loyalty to their commitments upon the part of their sig-

natories, the two articles of the Pact itself, as we have said, ignore their existence. It ignores the fact that international war already had been branded a crime (Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Geneva, 1923). It ignored the Geneva definition of aggression, and finally, failing to consider the peace program slowly being built up and actually functioning, it is oblivious of the fact that arbitration is becoming the new moral equivalent for war, and that nations must be taught to use it. While advocating pacific settlement of all international disputes, it does not point out by what means this may become practical. Contrast it with the Locarno Treaty, for instance, which not only renounces war in the Rhine region, but also points out pacific means for settlement either in the World Court, the Council of the League, or a Permanent Commission of Conciliation. It would seem that the American people, the most practical people, generally, have set up the most naïve of world documents. It is this *absence of machinery* of conciliation and of sanctions that led the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations to make consideration of the Pact one of the chief items on its agenda. For it must be remembered that even before Prime Minister MacDonald termed the Pact a "castle in the air," General Smuts, a practical statesman, termed the "renunciation" valueless if it were left "hanging in the air." It is not enough to renounce war even though all nations agree. Available machinery must be provided—machinery that may be used instantaneously. For when the Pact is violated and the test arrives, inevitable confusion must ensue. Where shall we turn for institutions to protect the security of the community of nations? The

Russo-Chinese controversy, lending itself to conciliation and conference, but long hanging fire in spite of Secretary of State Stimson's prompt warning, is a case in illustration.

Another lack is that the Pact, as has been said, defines war—without a definition. It allows wars of self-defense—which, in the past, is a definition of all wars. What principle is to decide whether an aggression is self-defense or not—is not defined. The only specific statement made is that such a violator "should be denied the benefits of this treaty." What are these benefits? It does not define benefits. It does not indicate sanctions. In case of violation, it leaves "liberty of action"—which is perhaps all the American Senate would have agreed to.

An interesting effort is now being made at Geneva to bring the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact into harmony. It is proposed to get rid of some of the "dead wood of the Covenant," after ten years' experience, and declare a mandate against all wars whatsoever. The League, it must be remembered, permits war after examination of the disputes by the Council, whose report must be made within six months (Article XIII), for that was as far as the signatories of the Covenant, directly after the World War, were ready to go. In no case, however, may the members resort to war "until three months after the award by the arbitrators or by the Council." A period of nine months' delay is thus attained. The chances of war under the Covenant are decidedly slim.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, however, allows war of self-defense. Not only that, but in the words of Secretary Kellogg, each nation "alone is competent to decide

whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." Not so the Covenant. For in the case of the violation of the Covenant, war affects the community of nations "since any war or threat of war becomes a matter of concern to the whole League" (Article XI). Action then is coöperative defense "and not the single will of an aggressor nation." "It is in this connection that one sees how much less of a guaranty of peace lies in the Pact of Paris than in the Covenant of the League, which provides a machinery of investigation for the hour of crisis, and by recalling the obligation to employ it instead of arms for the settlement of disputes, forces an application of the test of aggression then and there. The choice under the League is definite and clear; a commission of investigation awaits each international disorder; the Pact of Paris merely states that pacific means—the vaguest of terms—should be employed instead of war. As a practical measure, therefore, the Pact is by no means so well implemented for effective action as the Covenant of the League" (Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, p. 217).

May the Kellogg-Briand Pact be thus implemented? Without doubt. A clause providing conference in case of the violation of the Pact would accomplish this end. In the Four Power Pact in the Pacific, executed at the Washington Conference, the United States has already adopted this method.

MORAL VALUE OF THE PACT

The moral value of the Kellogg-Briand Pact no true lover of peace can deny. It implies that governments must

learn to think in terms of conciliation rather than conflict, of peace rather than war. Eventually it must draw attention to the fact that morality between states may be built up only by institutions of law and justice binding upon all. Secretary Kellogg pointed to the moral effect of the Pact in his notes to the four Great Powers (April 13, 1928). The treaty, as it now stands, is in effect a needed moral gesture. Again the Pact is a voice from the new Sinai of nations admonishing "Thou shalt not kill." With such a preponderance of power behind it, its moral value is increased one-hundredfold. Also, it was initiated in a sincere spirit of good will. "The chief merit of the Pact of Paris is that it is a supreme assertion of international good faith." The basis upon which the new community of nations is being built is good faith and collective action. For, to quote a saying of Poor Richard, the nations of the earth, through bitter experience, have learned that if they do not hang together they must hang separately—and be exterminated.

The educational value of the Pact also hardly can be exaggerated. For it conveys to all the peoples of the earth that no matter what their previous commitments, they must now learn to think in the spirit of fraternity instead of force. This is difficult and requires long training.

Especially in the United States, the educational influence of the Pact is needed to overcome the ignorance and indifference to the progress of constructive peace made by the rest of the world. Only leaders themselves, informed of the basic facts of foreign affairs, may overcome this unwarranted lethargy, affecting our own safety. The *will* to peace is strong among us. We must learn also to tread the way to peace.

GREATEST EFFECT OF PACT

But undoubtedly the greatest value of the Pact lies in the fact that it brings the United States back at last into the realm of world coöperation. And that is not only moral but spiritual gain. The writer is not one of those who believe in the doctrine that "Europe hates us," even though individual instances may be cited. Europe was hurt by us, almost mortally wounded, by our rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and by our making a separate peace with Germany—as did Russia. Many Americans are amazed when reminded of this fact, their political memory not having registered. Europe was also bewildered by our rejection of the Covenant of the League of Nations, executed to soften the injustices of Versailles, and valiantly fought for by an American president. We were Europe's ally in putting down the battle against democracy. We have stood aloof in the greater battle of reconstruction and laying the foundations of a just and enduring peace. Our return has been on occasions of debt and financial consideration. I am aware of the millions for human relief that have been poured by us into Europe since the war. No one questions America's great heart. But Europe did not wish charity, however much it was required. It wished that coöperation which strengthens courage and understanding, and gives sympathy in inaugurating new undertakings to carry out the high purposes of mankind.

The Kellogg text does not call for coöperation. But its violation will. It must therefore be considered but as a good starting-point. The honor of the United States will demand that it go further in developing the moral idea in

which it says it believes. The conscience of the American people will be the decisive factor in determining whether the Pact is to be just another American skyscraper or whether it will provide foundations that make it a broad temple of safety for the human race.

EFFECT IN EUROPE

It was inevitable that the Kellogg-Briand Pact should be taken more seriously in Europe than in the United States. Peace is more threatened in Europe than with us. I remember the earnest interest manifested at the Ninth Assembly of the League, before the new treaty was ratified by the United States. Every delegate wished to talk enthusiastically of the Pact, in the Forum, but was restrained, I suspect, by fear of the influence on the United States Senate. The anniversary of the signing of the Pact was little noticed in the United States. In Europe it was the occasion of rejoicing and an especially fine speech on the part of the German Foreign Minister, Herr Stresemann. There was also a proposal that the 27th of August become an international holiday, in observance of so far-reaching an agreement.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact is not just a pronouncement to Europe. It is another monument on the stony road to Peace. It remains for patriotic Americans to see that it does not become a mausoleum of dead hopes.

EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES

And as if to show the world how little the Pact was understood in the United States, the Senate, immediately after ratifying a treaty to outlaw all war, passed a bill for fifteen new cruisers for the country that already, accord-

ing to the figures of President Hoover, was spending \$100,000,000 a year more upon armament than any other nation!

This fact does not decrease the solemn responsibility of the United States in regard to strengthening and making efficacious the world-wide peace Pact which it has sponsored until it becomes the keystone of the universal arch. The people themselves must act if it is to remain true that "The Pact makes the longest step forward since the noble movement to lift civilized nations above the barbarism and cruelty of international war began. It rests not upon the artificial agreements of governments, but upon the moral conviction and determination of self-determining peoples who bend governments to their will. Its weight and its value in fixing national ideals and in shaping national policies cannot be overestimated" (Nicholas Murray Butler, pamphlet 243, International Conciliation series).

CHAPTER IX

WILL THE ALTERNATIVES WORK?

THE ALTERNATIVES IN WORLD CRISES

IN THE previous chapters we have pointed out alternatives for war, offering arbitration, conciliation, and conference through the machinery of the League of Nations at Geneva, the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and the new form of arbitration treaty given us at Locarno, adding the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a moral deterrent of war.

The question now becomes, will the machinery work? Will it hold in time of storm and stress when international passions run high and nationalism inflames the public mind? Will states obey their solemn commitments negotiated by collective action for the common good?

It may be too soon to prognosticate. It is dangerous to be a prophet. The education, alike of statesmen and people, in the new international technique must necessarily proceed much further before one may speak with authority of the future. But we have some examples in the past ten years that give us hope for the future—many small examples and a few outstanding ones. We shall pass over the Aaland Island disputes, successfully arbitrated; the Jugo-Slavia-Albania controversy, when Lloyd George sent his famous telegram to the League calling for an economic blockade of Serbia and Serbian bonds

declined on the London stock exchange; nor shall we write of the Vilna-Poland irritation, still a cause of anxiety, or of the Upper Silesian question which strained the Supreme Council of the Allies almost to the breaking-point and led that body to turn it over to George, meaning Geneva, where the world's "impossible" cases now go.

In this chapter we shall deal with the three world crises that challenged world attention when the machinery functioned successfully. The first one in Europe, dealing with Italy and Greece over the Corfu crisis, interesting because a great power signatory to the Covenant challenged the competency or authority of the new weak League to act. The second, the Greek-Bulgarian border war, showing the checking of fighting already begun in the Balkans, where war clouds always hovered before the fall of the great dynasties which had continually fomented trouble there. And finally how Geneva helped to handle a war three thousand miles away between Paraguay and Bolivia.

THE CORFU CASE

I am glad to take the Corfu case first, not only because it came first, but because I had the rare good fortune of arriving in Geneva to attend the Fourth Assembly, when Greece brought her petition to the Council, and was present through consideration of the case for thirty anxious days—the most exciting month of post-war Europe.

On Friday—not the 13th—but the 27th of August, 1923, a commission composed of an Italian, General Tellini, and four associates, were driven in an automobile to attend a meeting to delimit the boundary line between

Albania and Greece. At a bend in the road, near a great forest, trees were found obstructing the way. Assassins then sprang out and murdered the five occupants of the car, putting many bullets through their heads but not searching their clothes. The motive was thus taken to be political rather than the usual robbery. The spot was on Greek soil, but near the Albanian frontier. The question of the nationality of the assassins thus was brought reasonably in doubt.

The commission of which General Tellini was head was appointed by the Conference of Ambassadors—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—an outgrowth of the Supreme Council of the Allies. This body functioned at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris, where it had a small Secretariat, which occupied itself largely with the execution of the Versailles Treaty. General Tellini was therefore not engaged on a mission of the League of Nations. This fact is important to bear in mind, since it is the crux of the controversy.

The dastardly murder caused a wave of horror and resentment to sweep over Italy, where anti-Greek feeling was already high. The strong man of Italy immediately adopted strong measures. He issued an ultimatum to Greece with the following requirements:

1. An official apology;
2. A formal memorial service;
3. Salutes to the Italian flag;
4. Inquiry by Greek authorities in the presence of an Italian military attaché, to be carried out within five days;
5. Capital punishment of the murderers;

6. An indemnity of fifty million lire to be paid within five days;
7. Military honors to the Italian victims;
8. A reply within twenty-four hours.

Greece met all but three of these demands, and added that if her reply was not adequate the Greek government would appeal to the League of Nations. She could not fight a world power. And there was an alternative.

The Italian government deemed the Greek reply unsatisfactory. Mussolini then dispatched a battleship to Corfu, the lovely island in the Adriatic, so valuable for strategic purposes, and bombarded the fortress and garrison. Many refugees housed in the fortress were killed, including women and children.

GREECE BRINGS HER CASE TO THE LEAGUE

Saturday morning, September 1st, Greece brought her petition to the League of Nations. It happened, happily, that the Council was sitting in one of its quarterly meetings. These meetings are held in the glass room of the Secretariat, so called because its walls are windows looking out on gardens and trees. Beyond is the blue lake with snowy Mount Blanc in the distance.

Nine men—representing four great powers and five smaller ones—sat around the Council table. Greece was represented by Monsieur Politis—poised, polished, a modern Solon of old Athens; Italy by her Council member, Signor Salandra, dark and bald-headed, needing only a toga to turn him into a pictorial senator of ancient Rome. Beyond the Council table were the press desks. At the sides of the glass room a few visitors were ad-

mitted. My press card took me in and gave me an opportunity to sit close to the Council table.

Very simply, Monsieur Politis stated the case for Greece. Signor Salandra asked for a delay, as he had sent for instructions to his government. So the Council adjourned and a nerve-racking week-end was had by all.

VISITORS AT GENEVA

From that time on the wheels of international machinery whirled at Geneva, though quietly and unostentatiously. The tongues of visitors to the Assembly also whirled, though not always quietly. The halls of the Secretariat were thronged with excited nationals demanding that the League "do something." It was amusing to note that the Americans, not members of the League and there only on tolerance, were loudest and most vociferous in demanding action.

The visitors were advocates of the League, and naturally jealous of its prestige and good name. Here was the League's first acute crisis: a great power had been traitor to its solemn commitments. A great state, promising not to go to war without first exhausting pacific means, had taken justice into its own hands in the bad old way. A great leader, himself a non-parliamentarian, who had gained his leadership by irregular means, and who consequently had no love for parliamentary procedure, had scorned and defied the machinery of constructive, conciliatory peace. That this seeming dishonor should be resented, that this great power should be taken to task as small powers already had been disciplined, seemed imperative to many onlookers. The League must act. Its future was at stake.

Well, the League did act, but not hastily and unwisely, in a manner that might again have embroiled Europe and all civilization. Quietly the members of the Secretariat went about their daily work. They reminded one of a fire brigade, carefully drilled, each going to his appointed task to quell a potential world conflagration. Not once did I hear a member of this new civil service instrument express doubt of the ultimate solution. The Secretariat had passed through other crises and its faith in the new method was secure.

There followed the most strained four weeks of recent European history, a month of uncertainty and suspense when no one could predict from day to day what might happen. It was a time when not only diplomats but unofficial observers went to bed with taut nerves and arose with troubled, unrested minds; a time when restraint was desirable and difficult to attain; when one's desire to be just battled with one's impulse to be unjust; a battle between the new order and the old—and a turning-point in international life.

ITALY'S DEFENSE AND CHALLENGE

Early in the week Salandra's messenger returned from Rome with instructions from his government—and again the Council met in the glass room. Salandra read a carefully prepared statement. In it he claimed that bombardment of Corfu was not an act of war, but a "pacific reprisal" following historic precedent on the part of all the great powers. The landing of armed forces at Vera Cruz by the United States in 1914 was cited as an example. The bombardment of Corfu indicated that Italy "meant business"—business being the collecting of reparations

from Greece. Salandra also said that Italy challenged the competency of the League to take action. The case, he stated, belonged to the jurisdiction of the Conference of Ambassadors, which had dispatched the ill-fated commission, and which was even then considering the matter. His peroration was, "The Italian government irrevocably expresses the opinion that the Council of the League of Nations should not proceed to take action on the request of Greece."

When Salandra finished his statement you could feel the silence. Even the air seemed to cease to vibrate. The gauntlet was thrown down. The power of the League to act was denied. Who would take up the challenge in the new battle for international law and order? Salandra mopped his great brow. His defense had been clever but indefensible. Italy may not have intended her violence as "an act of war." But her course had jeopardized the peace of the world. What state would pick up the gauntlet? It was a moment of breathless uncertainty. All eyes sought Lord Robert Cecil—sitting at the Council table—gaunt as Lincoln, with a white face set and serious.

Lord Cecil did not prove disappointing. He proved that he was a statesman and the son of a statesman (the Marquis of Salisbury). He did not make a speech. Instead he ordered one of the interpreters to read Articles XII, XIII, and XV of the Covenant. Into the silence fell the staccato voice of the reader: "The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report

by the Council." Could any words describe more clearly the violation of Italy's pledges? "If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof . . . the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." The effect of these words was electric. Italy stood condemned, not by any country's condemnation, but by the compelling words of the Covenant. A sigh of relief spread through the Council room. The challenge had been accepted, nay must be accepted, if faith in the League was to continue.

Lord Robert Cecil broke the tension. Again he showed his wisdom, his artistry even, by using as few words as possible. If these solemn pledges of the Covenant were violated, he said, the treaties of St.-Germain, of Neuilly and Trianon, would also be violated, and the foundations of modern Europe shaken. That was all, but it was enough. A movement to applaud—almost to cheer—swept through the room, but was quickly suppressed. All present felt that the honor of the League was in safe hands. The Council itself would defend it.

Each day now became pregnant with possibilities. With Mussolini challenging the competency of the League and openly declaring that Italy would leave the League if it exercised competency, the Council nevertheless continued to consider the case. So did the Conference of Ambassadors—the admitted third party. The Corfu case became, therefore, not only a conflict of states, but also a conflict of jurisdictions, with Italy maintaining that the Conference of Ambassadors had the sole right of finding a settlement.

COUNCIL ACTION

But the Covenant had been violated and the Council must also act. On September 6th a resolution was drafted by Quiñones de Leon, member of the Council from Spain, stating the measures which ought to be taken by Greece and Italy as a basis of settlement. The statement was accepted by the Council and dispatched to the Conference of Ambassadors, in Paris. This body adopted the proposals in substance, submitted them to Greece and Italy, which promptly agreed, and an acute international crisis was settled by pacific means.

Mussolini evacuated Corfu on September 27th, but not until the reparations of fifty million lire had been paid. Greece had deposited this sum in a Swiss bank, as a guaranty of reparations, subject to a decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice as to the amount to be paid. This indemnity was ordered to be paid by the Conference of Ambassadors, not the Council of the League, without recourse to the World Court, on the ground that the Hellenic government had been negligent in the conduct of the inquiry—she had not found the murderers—and that certain conditions consequently had not been fulfilled. Thus, by this circuitous settlement, originating in the Council at Geneva, the faces of certain personages involved were saved.

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ASSEMBLY

Certain indirect factors worthy of mention played an important rôle in the peaceful settlement of the Corfu crisis. The fact that fifty nations were assembled at Geneva to consider the world's business at the time of the

Grecian appeal cannot be over-estimated. For public opinion was thus mobilized and was unanimous: that is, every state stood firmly against the aggression of Italy. The press of Europe reflected this condemnation. Even a dictator must bow before mobilized public opinion.

Many people believed that it was this agreement of states so remarkably concentrated in Geneva that pushed Mussolini out of Corfu. The island was of immense geographical value to the larger Italy that was then openly advocated.

During these days of the Council's deliberations, the Italian delegation sat in moral isolation. Italy was not put upon Assembly committees. Italy was in the Assembly but not of it. This isolation was not personal, of course, nor even entirely national. It was the aggression of Italy and not Italy herself that was condemned. Here again was evidence of something higher in the collective force of the League, rather than anything that dwells in any individual part.

THE RÔLE OF THE LEAGUE

The League has been criticized for not having adopted stronger measures in dealing with the Corfu crisis, but it must also be praised for having exercised statesman-like restraint. Not only in the Council's deliberations, but also in its postponement of Assembly meetings until a solution had been found, did it show wisdom. Assembly meetings were postponed for a time because of the danger that inflamed oratory in the forum might have upon the peaceful settlement of the question.

What other course might the Council have taken? It might have applied Article XVI and ordered the eco-

nomic blockade of Italy, thus forcing Mussolini, in a bad temper, out of the League. The departure of Italy would have been a decided weakening of the new instrument of conference, which had not, at this early period, gained the prestige and stamp of approval of the attendance at its sessions of the Prime Ministers of Europe. The aim of the League, however, is not to acquire prestige, but to maintain peace—it matters not by what medium. The League did not sidestep its own duty. It arranged a solution and let another body have the glory. But there was not a world war.

By its less spectacular course, the League succeeded in accomplishing three ends: the peace of Europe, upset in 1914 by a lesser cause, was maintained in 1923: Italy, a great power necessary to world organization, was kept within the League's circle, and finally the League preserved itself as an instrument of world conciliation. The new boat was rocked, but it was not swamped. And the desired harbor was reached.

In justice to Mussolini it should be said that he proved himself, later, a statesman who would go far because he had the ability to learn: he heeded the warning of unified world opinion. He invited the Council to sit at its next session in Rome. And in December the men to whom he had given a worrisome month in September were cordially received in the City of Seven Hills.

The fact should be added that when the Italians had evacuated Corfu and the danger was over, the restrained delegates of the Assembly were allowed to go into the forum and give vent to their repressed emotions. All expressed faith in the wisdom and future of the League. It was like an old-time "experience" meeting. A Commit-

tee of Jurists was appointed to pass upon five questions arising out of the situation in the Corfu case bearing upon the Covenant, and especially upon the competency of the League. The report of the jurists found that "any disputes of members of the League likely to lead to a rupture is within the sphere of action (competency) of the League," though much of this political report was distinctly disappointing.

The important part of the story is that the new machinery of peace *worked*. I have told the story at length, though it has been told often, because I believe that many of my compatriots have not heard it. If the ears of all were open, workers for the League would not hear repeatedly, "The League's all right if only it will work!" The Corfu case is an illustration of where the League machinery worked well and with restraint.

THE GRECO-BULGARIAN CASE

This was another case where the alternatives worked. On October 19, 1925, a Greek soldier crossed the frontier and fired at a Bulgarian sentry. The sentry then killed the Greek invader, who fell in Bulgarian territory. Whereupon Greek troops invaded Bulgaria on a front of twenty miles and to a depth of six, the invasion being accompanied by artillery fire and airplane bombing. Refugees from sixty villages came pouring into the towns with tales of Greek invasion and the usual Balkan atrocities.

What was Bulgaria to do? "Once again a match was sputtering in the 'powder box' of Europe, only a short way, in fact, from where the World War started. And all this, too, just after the dazzling success of Locarno. . . . World interest was intense."

Both Bulgaria and Greece were signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations. "Here came the first break with the past. Previously Bulgaria would simply have had to fight. . . . Today she had an alternative." She ordered the Bulgarian frontier posts not to resist this invasion by force. "Not only could she now do this without loss of prestige, but she even did it at a great moral gain abroad." Then Bulgaria took advantage of her new privilege and appealed to the Council of the League of Nations.

LEAGUE ACTION

At six o'clock in the morning, Sir Eric Drummond received in Geneva the telegram of appeal from the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Now there was no Council conveniently sitting, as in the Corfu case. But there was a Council that could be assembled quickly, as there was not in the Great War of 1914. Within four hours on the same day the Secretary-General had arranged by long distance telephone to Paris that Monsieur Briand, at that moment President of the Council, should call for an immediate meeting. By eight o'clock that evening, not only had the Council been summoned, but through the machinery of the Secretariat, the Bulgarian dispatch was released to the press and also sent to all the states in the League for their information. Monsieur Briand, by telegrams to Bulgaria and Greece, had announced that the Council would consider the case, reminded the countries of their solemn obligations under Article XII of the Covenant, and "exhorted the two governments to give immediate instructions that, pending

consideration of the dispute by the Council, not only no further military movements shall be undertaken, but that troops shall at once retire behind their respective frontiers."

Both countries agreed to withdraw troops as soon as they were able, each claiming the familiar justification that it had been acting only in self-defense.

The Council also requested that a deputation made up of French, British, and Italian officers be sent at once to the region of the outbreak and report to the Council on the execution of its decision.

The Council meeting was held in Paris on October 26th, at 6 P.M., the Swedish member arriving by airplane. Representatives of Greece and Bulgaria were present. The Bulgarian Minister was heard first. When he began to explain the justice of his case, Monsieur Briand stopped him. "We are not here now to determine justice. That will come later." The question now was whether Bulgaria would suspend hostilities and submit the case to a commission of inquiry appointed by the League to judge the facts. Reluctantly, the Bulgarian Minister agreed that Bulgaria would not indulge in hostilities during the inquiries of the commission. The Greek Minister asked time for instructions from his government. The next day they arrived and Greece, too, agreed.

The Council then adopted a unanimous resolution giving the two countries sixty hours to withdraw all troops within their national frontiers; it stipulated that all hostilities should cease; and it gave warning that "the resumption of firing will be visited with severe punishment." This was on October 27th. On October

28th the Council was informed by the Greek representative that the Greek troops had entirely evacuated Bulgarian territory with no incident of any kind. A dramatic touch was given to the evacuation by the fact that the last troops crossed the line at midnight—eight hours before the time-limit fixed by the Council of the League of Nations.

But this is not all. If the incident were only the recital of how the Prime Ministers of Europe spectacularly stopped an incipient war, it would not be so well worth chronicling. It is the follow-up, preventive work of the League, that is invaluable; the daily routine of the commissions going about their conciliatory tasks; the hourly work of the Secretariat, unraveling a network of international complications quietly on the banks of Lake Lemán, offering a new insurance for world stability, that makes this case more than a mere edict to "cease firing."

A Commission of Inquiry was appointed to make a thorough investigation of the facts of this disturbance, establishing responsibility and reporting to the Council of the League. This report reached the Council at the first meeting of the thirty-seventh session on December 7th. It contained information not available to the Council at the time of its drastic action. It then became known that when Bulgaria's appeal reached the League on the morning of October 23rd, a battle on the scene of the incident was imminent. "*The Greek government had ordered its troops to attack Petrich at 8.30 A.M. of the 24th.* There were sufficient forces on both sides to make serious consequences probable." No wonder the report adds that "the suspension of operations took place in exceptionally pro-

pitious circumstances." The inflammable Balkans, always a match-box, might again have produced the spark to ignite an international conflagration.

The value of the report of the commission to the Council lies in its understanding of the historic conditions back of the outbreak and in its wise recommendations. These recommendations included:

(a) The reorganization of the frontier guards and the maintenance of posts at a greater distance from the frontier than hitherto. The attachment to the military authorities concerned of neutral officers to insure the execution of these measures on parallel lines in both countries.

(b) The establishment, if necessary, of a conciliation commission composed of a Greek officer, a Bulgarian officer, two neutral officers and a chairman (to be selected from among members of organizations working in the Balkans which are attached to or in relation with the League).

Reparations were ordered to be paid by Greece to Bulgaria to the amount of \$210,000. This was for damages done to property, cattle, grain, etc., and for losses in killed and wounded.

A vital part of the recommendation was concerned with the minority question—one of the most difficult and least well handled of the League's difficult problems. The report points out the necessity of eliminating a principal source of discontent. The commission notes "that there are in Bulgaria many refugees of Bulgarian origin who have arrived at different times from Greece, where they left property. Under the minorities treaty these persons are entitled to return to Greece. Greece, however,

under the pressure of circumstances, had used land belonging to Bulgarians to settle refugees from Asia Minor. The commission recommends that the Greek government should offer compensation for their land to persons renouncing their right to return to Greece."

The Council adopted the recommendations in its own report, appointing a commission of conciliation to sit for two years, and advised "the Bulgarian and Greek governments to keep it informed of the progress achieved in this important work." Sir Austen Chamberlain was *rapporteur*.

It might be said that the Bulgarian-Greek incident was merely a border riot, which probably would have been settled locally, in time. Such settlement, however, presumably would have involved great loss of life, and the result would have been in favor of the stronger nation. That was the habit of the past. One historian at least is not of the opinion that this particular war was only a border brawl. Let us finish by quoting an American—Professor Shotwell of Columbia: "This was not a mere incident in European history. Had the two nations actually gone on with the struggle, their neighbors would inevitably have been drawn in, the flames in southeastern Europe could hardly have been held behind the Danube. And if the Little Entente were engaged, the great powers could hardly have escaped as well. At least this much can be said, that the murder of Sarajevo seemingly held no greater potentiality of war in 1914 than the events which promised a general Balkan conflagration in 1925. Instead—the League of Nations applied the '*definition of aggression*,' and hostilities ceased."

BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY

The last example is interesting, especially to Americans, since it came nearer home in the Western continent. I must deal with it briefly.

How often do we hear, "The League is all right for Europe," forgetting that there are sixteen South American republics members of the League of Nations. The Bolivia-Paraguay case shows the new authority reaching out a long arm many thousand miles from Geneva—able to exert an influence over two of its distant members. Here is the story:

One of the most inaccessible spots in the world—the vast Chaco district in South America—has long involved Bolivia and Paraguay over boundary lines, outlets to the sea, etc. In December, 1928, Paraguayan soldiers captured Fort Vanguardia in Bolivia, with an ensuing loss of life. Both countries became inflamed, thousands volunteered to the colors, parading through the streets with war-like banners. The Latin temperament was set for immediate conflict.

Again the Council of the League happened to be in session, holding its fifty-third meeting in the mild climate of Lugarno, as Herr Stresemann had been forbidden by his doctors to go to Geneva.

News of the Chaco clash reached the Council on the first day of its session and brought an anxious period. Obviously the Council must act, since two members of the League were preparing for war without resort to conciliation. But what of the United States, not a member of the League? Would not such action be resented as "intervention," contrary to American policy and threatening even

the Monroe Doctrine? Equally, would not lack of action alienate Latin-American members of the League?

The Council was in a quandary. Notwithstanding the fact that neither Bolivia nor Paraguay had appealed to the League—as in the Corfu case and the Greco-Bulgarian incident—the Council had an obligation to fifty-four nations as guardian of the peace of the world. Cables were therefore sent to both nations recalling their obligations under the Covenant. (Bolivia meantime had suspended diplomatic relations with Paraguay until she could “obtain reparations for the assault and the satisfaction to which she was entitled.”)

Cables then vibrated between South America and Lugano, the whole correspondence later being transmitted to all state members of the League and to American states not members, the United States, Mexico, etc. Thus world-wide publicity was given to the action of Bolivia and Paraguay. (Incidentally, as a result of these messages, the League paid a cable bill of \$26,000. But this insurance of peace was infinitesimal compared with the cost of war.)

The American government did not resent the Council of the League of Nations' action. Instead, Secretary Kellogg courteously welcomed it, announcing that the United States would not intervene alone. For it also happened that America's partial League—the Pan-American Conference—was convening in Washington. This body offered mediation, which was in time accepted by both Bolivia and Paraguay. The Council gladly retired in favor of this nearer home helpful method—thus obviating the danger of a divided jurisdiction—as ever, in consonance

with the Geneva spirit, the peace of the world and not League prestige being the end desired.

A neutral commission of nine powers was formed, the Pan-American Conference picking five members, and Bolivia and Paraguay each appointing two. The work of the commission was to fix responsibility for the Vanguardia attack, the settlement of the boundary line being left to a subsequent inquiry. On December 26th, demobilization of the volunteers who had enrolled to fight against Paraguay was announced. The incident faded as front-page news, but has since flared out and again challenged the offices of the League Council. A thing is never settled until it is settled right, whether it be a boundary line or responsibility for a bombardment. To be settled "right" the case might be taken to Geneva, where the facts would be considered impartially—quite a different thing from action on the part of a Council not asked to intervene.

In certain quarters there has been a tendency to dismiss the Chaco encounter as an *opera bouffe* uprising. True, but even an *opera bouffe* conflict may contain the seeds of a larger war. Great oaks from little acorns grow—and wars grow much more rapidly. The germs of war spread as virulently and swiftly as the germs of contagious diseases. An unchecked war in the Chaco soon would have challenged the interests of the A.B.C. powers—Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The duty of the Council is to take troubles when they are little and to prevent their growing large. The unhesitating action of the Council in acting to stop the Bolivia-Paraguay war will "undoubtedly constitute a most far-reaching precedent for

the organization of the world for peace"—and no war is too small for such action.

The *Evening Post* has put the matter of the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute clearly (January, 1930): "There is something absurd about this continuing dispute over an almost inaccessible boundary. It is the quarrel of two small boys over some trifle that could easily be divided between them on perfectly fair terms but which neither wants the other to share. The whole thing could easily be dismissed if quarrels were not so contagious and so troublesome to peaceful persons going about their normal business."

We all like to win approval when we have seen our duty and done it. From all over the world cables of approbation flowed into Geneva, not only from South American countries, but also from Europe and Asia. "Never before was an international move on so vast a scale either attempted or even possible." League action in this first Latin-American dispute appreciably increased the League's world stature. Congratulations came from large and small states alike.

So the machinery to circumscribe the spread of war is at hand. That is the point of these three illustrations. The alternatives to war will work if the nations *demand that they work*. It remains for the peoples of the world to unite to strengthen the alternatives and uphold their difficult task.

CHAPTER X

IS DISARMAMENT POSSIBLE?

DIFFICULTIES

FIRST, we must define what is meant by disarmament. Certainly not a cyclonic scrapping of the armies and the navies of the world. What is meant is limitation of armament by international agreement. For as the Irishman said that he would not drop his brick while the other fellow held his, so no nation will reduce perceptibly until all are willing to reduce together.

It goes without saying that reduction of armaments is one of the most difficult questions we have to face in the intricate building of the program of peace. For here enter diversities of need, of geographical situation, of financial and industrial status—making proportional reduction bewilderingly complex.

One obstacle not often enough considered has been the meeting of two points of view—the American and the continental—upon disarmament, views related but clashing because of lack of mutual understanding. Let us glance at them.

THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW

What are the attitudes, seen from two sides of the world, which make attempted agreement on disarmament difficult and necessarily halting?

The United States point of view in regard to reduction of armament is just what we would expect from her geographical situation and tradition. Isolated from the warring nations of the world, protected by 3,000 miles of sea sentinels on the east and on the west and with friendly neighbors on the north and on the south, absorbed for a century in her internal industrial development, the United States remains unthreatened, traditionally aloof and unafraid.

When, however, we became a world power and were forced by our world position into coöperating with other countries upon common world problems, we tackled the disarmament question with forthright American directness: the way to disarm was to disarm. So we summoned the Washington Conference, cut with our sword the Gordian difficulty, and told the great powers what to do. We had not learned then that coöperation meant long, careful negotiation preceded by endless fact-finding—the Geneva method.

Battleships were eliminated from the naval race, but later every other kind of craft got into the armament competition and ran like hounds. Very well, then, we said, we will have another conference and reduce every kind of vessel in the fleet. Get out the yardstick. Naval reduction then became a question of guns, tonnages, and speed, a matter of arithmetic and technicalities where you could hardly see the ships for the forest of figures. The American point of view became largely one of *reduction by technicalities*, with little consideration of the *political* factors which dominate reduction.

At London, this American point of view clashed against a difficult political situation. Without recognition of po-

litical conditions, reduction became impossible. Public opinion at home, not educated as to the political obstacles, watched impotently over them, feeling that in the matter of reduction it had been unforgivably cheated.

THE CONTINENTAL VIEWPOINT

The continental or European point of view is also what we would expect of Europe. In reality a peninsula of Asia, Europe is threatened on the east by hordes of so-called backward races. Within her borders, numerous nationalistic peoples live with differing tongues and traditions. Boundaries are close, too often in the past washed with rivers of blood. Moreover, Europe was the scene of the World War, with devastated areas and populations and devastated hearts left as a heritage. Europe is the burnt child—the cruelly mutilated and maimed child—who dreads the return fire of shrapnel and shell. If we lived in Europe, if we were familiar with shrapnel tearing through human flesh, we would feel the same. Therefore, Europe is caught in the psychology of fear. Europe needs security above everything else. You cannot mention disarmament in Europe until you speak of security first. And security lies in political guaranties.

So now we have these two points of view: the American, with all the good will in the world, direct and intensely practical, believing that naval reduction is a matter of reduction of classes of ships, of applied mathematics and technicalities, and reluctant, through our tradition against foreign entanglements, to consider that disarmament rests upon political conditions; and the European point of view, granting the necessity of technical reductions, but regarding them as surface factors of

the question, while below lies the deep need of security—political insurance—as a basic preliminary of reduction of armament. Thus far, these viewpoints are like the shining bars of a railroad bed that progress ambitiously side by side but never touch. Until these two viewpoints, each essential to a solution, meet and merge, we may look for little practical reduction of arms.

THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT

Yet in spite of their divergence, the American and continental viewpoints each have made contributions to eventual armament limitation and control. The viewpoints are slowly narrowing towards each other as international interests are bringing continents closer together and are promoting understanding.

To the United States must be given the credit of having called the most successful disarmament conference held within the decade between 1919 and 1929. To be sure, Will Rogers called the Washington Conference the "Disagreement Conference." But there was little inclination to disagree with the one nation that had come out of the war strengthened and not impoverished, able to build the largest of fleets and able to dictate terms.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Senator Borah was largely responsible for calling the Washington Disarmament Conference in response to the demand of an aroused public opinion. Two factors had contributed to this demand. First, the proposed increase in the United States navy. In August, 1916, Congress voted the largest naval appropriations in its history. After the war these demands became greater until the General

Board of the navy asked for an increase, advocating the building of a navy with "power second to none." The American people, unable to see the need of a large navy with its added taxation, after a victorious war, joined Senator Borah in opposing the big-navy bill.

The second factor in calling the Washington Conference was the Japanese War scare, worked up and inflamed by the chauvinistic press. The "next war" was to be in the Pacific. Japan was irritated against us, and with some reason: the restriction of our new immigration laws, the "open door" policy in China, and our naval bases in the Pacific alarmed her. At that time there was a movement launched to fortify the island of Guam and make it the "Gibraltar of the Pacific."

The Washington Conference convened during the Harding Administration, on December 4, 1921. Four great powers attended—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—with four additional powers having interests in the Far East—Holland, Belgium, Portugal and China.

The then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, was well prepared. At the opening of the Conference he made a startling proposal for scrapping battleships. His speech was the second American shot that was heard around the world. Its effect was electric. That his proposal dealt simply with but one class of armament—navies—and that but three countries—Great Britain, the United States and Japan—had navies of importance, does not detract from the brilliance of his achievement. Nor does the fact that the experience of the war had taught that battleships were of little use as fighting units. (Admiral Sims had said that in another war the place for our battleships was "up the Mississippi River.") Mr. Hughes's speech of-

ferred clear reduction, his ratio of tonnage, etc., being set at five ships each for Great Britain and the United States and three for Japan (5-5-3). A naval holiday of ten years also was arranged, in which the building of capital ships must cease—that is until 1931.

No reduction could be made upon submarines, cruisers, and destroyers, since these craft are the weapons of the smaller nations, the refusal to consider reduction being led by France. So in a short time the race in competitive armaments was on again.

The second accomplishment of the Washington Conference—the signing of the Four Power Pact for the Pacific—was even more important to the future than the spectacular gesture in regard to battleships because it contained political significance. The signatories were Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and China. If trouble arises in the Pacific, this Pact calls for a conference to deal with the matter. It was the signature of the United States to this agreement for conference in the event of aggressive action that gave hope at the London Conference of the United States' signing a similar Pact for the Atlantic.

The Four Power Pact did away with talk of war between the United States and Japan; brought to an end the Anglo-Japanese alliance of years; prohibited new naval bases or fortifications in certain regions in the Pacific and increases of coast defenses; but, above all else, relieved Japan of the feeling that the guns of the Pacific were directed at her. Thus did this diplomatic, *political* gesture—sometimes wrongly spoken of as the "Locarno of the Pacific"—do away with the mists of misunderstanding that often lead to war, and by offering the con-

ference method in case of an aggression, helped relieve the tension in that vast sea known rightly or wrongly as Pacific.

Let us consider now some of the ill effects of the Washington Conference. First, in the case of France. France always has held that the questions of land, air, and naval strength were one in the problem of disarmament. The diplomats of the world see the logic, but reply "one thing at a time." When naval reduction is in hand, land forces will be considered. Moreover, France felt herself slighted at Washington. The courteous Mr. Hughes had one definite object at this Conference in which France could not help him, and devoted himself to the brilliant Mr. Balfour. Monsieur Briand was therefore kept waiting while the three great powers discussed their naval problems. France could not get satisfaction on the subject of smaller craft which were necessary for her protection. The French delegates went home, therefore, sore and humiliated. Their refusal to accept the Coolidge invitation later, in 1927, though courteously made, undoubtedly dated back to 1922.

Another defect of the Washington Conference was that it had no machinery to carry out its edicts. Everyone's business became nobody's business. This is true of all "improvised conferences," unrelated to permanent world machinery. Some of the treaties enacted at the Washington Conference were not ratified and deposited at Geneva for two years. There was no organized body appointed to carry on.

But perhaps the chief characteristic of the Washington Treaty was that it ignored the new trend in diplomacy—coöperation. "It was not a coöperative affair, but followed

the lead of the United States" (Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy*, p. 261). And why? Mr. Howland tells us (in his *America's Foreign Relations*, p. 527), that the position of Mr. Hughes was "so strong, American naval supremacy was so inevitable if his proposal should be rejected, that his program was at once accepted in principle." That is, the proposal was a pronouncement of power from the strongest of world states which gathered the nations together and issued an edict. It was the dictum of an isolationist country, a pioneer country, insular and engaged for over one hundred years in developing its internal resources and which had not taken time to learn the new method of coöperation in the world community.

THE COOLIDGE CONFERENCE

The second effort of the United States came in February, 1927, when Mr. Coolidge suggested a conference at Geneva. Both Italy and France declined to attend, as only sea armaments were to be discussed. It must be remembered that all the states of Europe, except Great Britain, are more interested in the reduction of land armaments than in navies, but believe that the problems must be considered as a whole, with the question of security taking precedence. France also felt that the conference could not succeed under the terms laid down by the President and did not wish to assume responsibility for failure.

The Washington Conference was a dramatic success. The Coolidge Conference was a distressing failure.

The Coolidge Conference may be said to have failed for three reasons:

1. Insufficient preparation;
2. Domination of admirals and experts who considered the technical but not the political essentials of disarmaments; and
3. The machinations of William C. Shearer, sent to the Coolidge Conference by three leading American shipbuilding firms, whose interests it was to have the Conference fail.

The first two reasons speak for themselves. Mr. Shearer, as an agent employed to obstruct agreement, deserves further interest. Two years after the Coolidge Conference, Mr. Shearer sued certain shipbuilders for \$250,000 in addition to the \$50,000 which he claimed they already had paid him. This larger sum, he asserted, was due him as a result of his lobbying later in the Sixty-ninth Congress, the result of his activities being the authorization of eight more cruisers and the appropriation of \$780,000,000 for further naval expenditures.

On the publication of this suit, two years after the Coolidge Conference, President Hoover ordered an investigation of Mr. Shearer. In a statement, the President pointed out that the question was not one of propaganda, either pacifist or militaristic, but one of "hindering the Executive of the United States in trying to negotiate better understandings with other countries," adding that the nation must be rid of these secret influences. For there are doubtless many Shearers of whom the public does not hear.

In Geneva and in Great Britain it was believed that Mr. Shearer's poisonous misrepresentation of facts had helped wreck the Conference. This may be too flattering

to Mr. Shearer. The investigation of his case offered amusement, revealing Mr. Shearer's genuine humor when he termed an official of the Bethlehem Steel Company the "Star of Bethlehem," and another well-known dignitary "The Tower of Ivory."

If Mr. Shearer did not originate the ill-fated word, "parity," he did much to popularize it. The slogan at the Coolidge Conference became—"Parity or no agreement." The admirals split on the questions of cruisers and neither parity nor an agreement was reached.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

President Hoover, on coming into power, at once took up the mailed gauntlet, working for parity where he said disparity now prevailed, and proposing through Mr. Hugh Gibson, at a League Conference of the Preparatory Commission, to find a yardstick of apportionment. At the suggestion of President Hoover and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Five Power London Naval Conference was called and became the third conference where American interests contributed to the intricate problem of the reduction of arms (January, 1930).

President Hoover always stressed the fact that he was looking towards real reduction—and not merely limitation. In his famous Armistice Day speech he had declared:

"We will reduce our naval strength in proportion to any other. Having said that, it only remains for the others to say how low they will go. It cannot be too low for us." This led that large part of the American people, restive under heavy taxation, and that smaller portion interested in building constructive peace, to expect a real reduction of arms at London.

PARITY

A witty admiral said that the London Conference was founded on faith, hope, and parity—and that the greatest of these was parity. Almost from the beginning, however, parity smothered any faith and hope of real naval reduction and awoke bitter reactions in the land of its birth.

How did parity work out? In the first place, it became like parrot disease in its power to spread: if the United States had parity with Great Britain, Italy must maintain parity with France, and Japan must have 70 per cent of whatever Great Britain and the United States claimed. It goes without saying that with these examples on the part of great states, smaller powers would become exposed to the disease. Parity seemed to develop rivalry, not reduction, and to be irreconcilable—like praying for snow and sunshine at the same time. A more disappointing word on which to base a reduction of armament for which the whole world was waiting hardly could have been found. Mathematically applied, parity between the fleets of Great Britain and the United States worked out, not in reduction, but in the necessity of building 400,000 tons of ships to equal the age-long "mistress of the seas," with a cost to the United States of about \$1,000,000,000! And this proposed war-like gesture by the country that within the year had proudly initiated the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war! Where was the American sense of humor that during the first month could even consider such a proposition—to say nothing of our moral sense?

Why do we need parity with Great Britain? Because William Shearer wished it on us? Are our needs the

same? The largest of empires with her far-flung dominions, and with her tight little island of the home country, which could be starved in two weeks if her sea routes were not kept open, needs countless small craft to protect food ships and trade. With naval bases everywhere, these small craft can easily refuel. The United States, unthreatened, and with few naval bases, needs larger ships that can operate over wider range. That is the explanation of our demand for cruisers of 10,000 tons. Must we burden ourselves with unneeded ships and staggering taxation for the sake of parity? If parity is to be the keynote of reduction, and parity means reducing upwards, one is tempted to inquire with Mr. Norman Thomas, why not begin at zero?

At London, though parity seemed to be not a yardstick but a big stick, it resulted eventually in a real limitation in competitive armaments. In future, if it must be used, might it not profitably be employed in building up parity in constructive Peace?

REDUCTION IN BATTLESHIPS

Perhaps the greatest shell-shock from the London Conference to the home towns came from the subject of battleships. At the beginning of the Conference Mr. MacDonald made a sincere gesture to abolish capital ships. Great Britain is struggling under a smothering burden of debt—\$5,000 a minute, according to Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer. England still has the dole. Economy, therefore, is a necessity. The lesson of Gallipoli in the Great War also is remembered. Of the five classes of ships to be considered at London—battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplane-carriers,—battle-

ships, outgrown as mastodons, alone offered the greatest hope of practical reduction.

But the United States refused to scrap battleships. This was a proposition "too low for us," though practically all the nations were with Mr. MacDonald. The United States not only blocked the way for this immediate economy, but asked for permission to build a super-battleship like the *Rodney*! This would entail an expenditure of between \$40,000,000 and \$50,000,000 for a type of ship that many naval men, air experts, and Arthur Brisbane had declared obsolete! As the *Christian Science Monitor* said, it was a suggestion "menacing and at the same time grotesque."

ABOLITION OF THE BATTLESHIP

Why did the United States delegation stand against the abolition of the battleship, after initiating a ten-year holiday in battleship-building at the Washington Conference? Probably for two reasons. First, prestige. Battleships are impressive at the heads of our fleet. They are symbols of power. They are emblems of force. Battleships are useful to send to Central American countries as evidence of our benevolent intentions. Even when inactive they are psychological factors in imposing the old idea of armed and vigilant peace.

Secondly, because of the vested interests. Each battleship contains a personnel of at least 1,500 men. The United States has eighteen battleships; Great Britain, twenty; and Japan, ten. On the eighteen battleships of the United States, 27,000 men must be fed and clothed. This means large orders in shoes, underwear, uniforms, etc. We can hardly expect the firms that supply these orders to be enthusiastic about the abolition of our super-ships.

In actual warfare, it has been demonstrated that battleships are no longer useful. They are open to attacks from the air, they cannot catch cruisers, and they are targets for submarines. To abolish them by international agreement would not weaken national defense. In modern combat they are not only useless, but they are as embarrassing as a dinosaur at a dinner party. If the only safe place for them in another war is "up the Mississippi River," why not scrap them and spend the money for something useful? The cost to the United States for maintaining our eighteen battleships is \$40,000,000 a year.

As a gesture of friendship between the United States and Great Britain, how potent would have been the acceptance of this one channel of practical reduction. The "unthinkable war" would have received a real blow. Confidence and good will would have been created by the psychological reactions in both countries. It is only fair to state, however, that the American delegates would have had to meet the wrath of the American Senate. "In time of peace prepare for war"—a tradition of the thirteen timid Colonies—is still cherished. That is, if you want something, "prepare for the reverse." No American business man would run his business, no American woman would conduct her home, on this basis in the light of modern logic.

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES

The reaction of at least one section of public opinion—the United States—to the proposed naval expansion of the London Conference is interesting and significant. On March 2nd, a long cable of protest, signed by 1,200 prominent American citizens from all over the country,

was sent to the American delegation in London. The original signatories were Professor James T. Shotwell, Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, and Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt.

The cable called attention to President Hoover's Armistice Day address, protested against the proposed "reduction upwards" of the American fleet, and advocated the principle of conference of the United States with other powers if a violation of the anti-war Pact occurred.

This cable attracted extraordinary attention throughout the United States and in London, the press for the most part commending it. Owing to some of the English interpretations, however—that parity and reduction were incompatible—the instigators of the cable, on March 4th, felt it advisable to send another cable on their own responsibility.

Attention was called to the fact that both President Hoover's address and Ambassador Gibson's speech (April, 1929, Geneva, at the League's Preparatory Commission on Disarmament) had emphasized that reduction and not mere limitation was to be the aim of the United States. Mr. Gibson had said, after a strong plea against increasing existing armaments: "Let us therefore take the bold course and begin by scrapping the term 'limitation' in order to concentrate upon a general reduction of armaments."

President Hoover had said in his farewell address to the American delegation on the eve of its departure for London, January 7th: "Our aim is actual reduction of naval building programs and not mere limitation, which would permit nations to build up to a maximum warship tonnage greater than their present programs contemplate."

On the question of reduction rather than mere limita-

tion, Secretary Stimson, over the radio, as late as January 28th, had said: "We have come over here to try to negotiate a treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, by which each of these countries will *limit* and *reduce* its navy. . . . We believe that we can do both of these things and yet add at the same time to the security of our country."

The second cable also advocated further exploration of the joint conference method, a political gesture necessary to further lower tonnage exactments on the part of France. The cable ended: "We feel that it would be nothing short of disastrous if the first disarmament conference held since the ratification of the anti-war pact should result in naval expansion. The question before the London Conference is a simple one: do the governments plan their naval settlements in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact or do they not?"

As a result of this protest from home, Secretary Stimson came out with a surprising statement, March 5th, that the United States would scrap 200,000 tons of its fleet. At the time of the London Conference our fleet strength, exclusive of airplane-carriers, was 1,200,000 tons. But, alas! on analysis of this suggested reduction, it was revealed that only "ghost ships" figured: that is, reduction was to apply to ships already discarded and seen "gently rotting and rusting on mud flats in many harbors." Nothing in new tonnage or new programs was affected.

Mr. Frank H. Simonds, who cannot be accused of an excess of idealism, commented in the *New York Evening Post*, March 6th, as follows: "What one wishes is that Mr. Stimson, instead of producing his phantom fleet and sinking it to satisfy the champions of reduction, had come

out boldly and told the American people the unpalatable truth—that the price of parity is the biggest construction program of modern times; that as long as we demand parity we *shall necessarily have no influence in a conference called in the name of reduction*, or even of limitation.” (The italics are mine.) . . . “What we are going to scrap is already dead. What we are going to build will be first-class fighting-stuff.

“Such being the case, why should we pretend that we are out for reduction, much less suggest that we are achieving it? What the world and the London Conference criticize is not that we advocate such a building program, but that we pretend that we are out for reduction, and all the other wicked countries are so nationalist and militarist that our idealism counts for nothing.” Mr. Simonds suggests that a President who asks for reduction and a Senate which insists upon parity may be the explanation. In any case our sympathy is with the American delegation, caught between this Scylla and Charybdis of national desire.

THE POSITION OF FRANCE AT LONDON

THE FRENCH NOTE

To comprehend discussions at the London Naval Conference we must understand the French or continental point of view. For three months it shone through the fog of negotiations and ultimately prevented the writing of a five-power treaty for limitation of naval argument. This point of view was stated in a note given out before the Conference, December 25, 1929. It was a crystalline Christmas present from France to the Great Powers.

The note is remarkable for its lucid thinking. In dealing with great issues it has been said that the French approach them from a sense of right or logic; the English from propriety, fitness; and the Americans from duty—a Puritan heritage. It seems to us that duty is a sane and safe beacon to follow.

The French note contained the outstanding principles which would guide France at St. James's Palace in London. They are interesting because France never deviated from them. They are historically important because they represent the new world point of view, that disarmament must be superseded by political guaranties giving security, and not be regarded as a mere reduction of ratios. Briefly epitomized, the four points underlying French policy that was to become history at London were:

1. Negotiating at London to be considered within the framework of the League of Nations' general disarmament plans.

2. That the Kellogg-Briand Pact, while a real step towards the preservation of peace, in its present state could not be regarded as a guaranty of the security of nations because "its national application has not yet been organized."

3. French naval needs must be established upon the requirements of the French nation and not upon the mathematical ratios as set forth by the Washington Conference.

4. A definite Mediterranean naval accord similar to existing treaties for the Pacific and the Black Sea, the agreement to include Great Britain, Italy, France, and Spain.

The note ended with the offer of hearty coöperation.

The reply of Great Britain was equally courteous. Prime Minister MacDonald met squarely each of the four French points. In substance he agreed that the work at London would be preliminary to the permanent work of the League of Nations' Disarmament Commission at Geneva; took issue with the sceptical view of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and said that the Covenant of the League and the Pact must be regarded as complementary one of the other; claimed that Great Britain, on the strength of the new peace instrument, had already made proposals "to provide for a very considerable reduction" in the strength of the British fleet (she reduced her demand for seventy cruisers to fifty); was willing to discuss limitation either by global tonnage or categories of warships (a conflicting Anglo-French issue); pointed out that in regard to a Mediterranean pact, the League Covenant already offered facilities for "joint consultation" and also a measure of security, but would be glad to "exchange views with all the powers concerned."

The English reply pleased French public opinion and brought Premier André Tardieu in good spirits to the London Conference. He radiated cheerfulness. Why not? The position of France, he felt, was logically strong. He was hopeful, he affirmed, and so he desired to be helpful.

TARDIEU PERIOD

The first few weeks of the Conference might be called the Tardieu period. The Premier was smiling, good-humored, bland, but stood firmly on his thesis: he would adjust his proposed naval program according to prospects of security. The French claim was for a fleet equal to the Italian in the Mediterranean, to the German in the At-

lantic, with a few more ships for Asiatic waters. This French program called for 800,000 tons of ships, regardless of capital ships, which French opinion regarded as obsolete, the program to be completed in 1942. It must be remembered that the France of 1930 was a different country from the France of 1922, at the Washington Conference. Then poor and devastated by the World War, France had been obliged to take an inferior naval position. At the London Conference, grown financially strong, she was determined to wipe out the sting of Washington and emerge as a primary naval power. It must also be recalled that France regarded the problem of limitation of armaments as a whole—*i.e.*, the size of her navy would be more or less influenced by the reduction of her land and air forces.

The fall of the Tardieu government and the illness of the French premier absented him many weeks from the London Conference. The interval was spent in figuring bewildering technicalities over parity—a kind of poker-game bargaining over size, speed, guns, etc., in naval categories. It was a time of confusion and the lowest ebb for the hopes of the Conference.

The disappointing firm French stand naturally produced different effects upon the American and British delegations. The Americans were equally adamant that they had come to the naval conference to talk limitation of ratios, not political aspects. They were out for parity. That was their story and they stuck to it. But the British had no firm ground on which to stand. They were bound to give ear to both fair charmers, no matter how much they wished the other one were away. On the one hand Great Britain could not swing away from France. She

must live with France, as France well knew, being a continental as well as an oceanic power. On the other hand, there were the Rapidan conversations in the United States. Great Britain was pledged to give naval parity to the Stars and Stripes. But if France did not get security, she was liable to build upwards. And if France built upwards, especially in submarines, not only would parity be threatened but also the two-power standard Great Britain had always maintained: a navy stronger than any two combined powers. The protection of her far-flung dominions she felt demanded it. So Mr. MacDonald, peace-lover and man of good will, found himself on the horns of an armament dilemma.

ITALY AND JAPAN

And Italy? With France standing immovably on security, Great Britain on Dominion approval and the United States on parity—where were Italy's feet planted, with her famous "toe and boot" jutting into the sea? On the obnoxious word—parity. Italy was too poor to fight, too poor to build. But she claimed she must have parity in naval strength with France. (It must be remembered that at the Washington Conference Italy was given parity in battleships with France. Here, Pertinax declares, lies the real beginning of the Franco-Italian trouble.) Perhaps no greater amount of suasion was spent on any one nation at London than on Italy to get her to retract. Signor Grandi, the able young Italian, stood his ground. His reply was characteristic. "You have to face your governments. I have to face a man." Mussolini could not produce figures. Italy did not intend to build. Italy was

playing purely for *prestige* and was honest enough to say so.

Japan also had her foot of earth on which she took her unwavering position. Japan must have 70 per cent naval strength of Great Britain and the United States in order to maintain national defense.

So national flags waved over London with no outward expression of the new agreements that were gradually changing the policy of nations—to steady and influence them. Then a change was felt. Monsieur Tardieu—the man whom Clemenceau considered his logical successor—was supplanted in London by the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, apostle of the new Europe and of organized world peace.

BRIAND PERIOD

The Briand period of the London Conference ensued, with the result that conversations turned more towards the new processes of peace. The London fog lifted. Navy men gave way to statesmen. Negotiations shifted from the tangle of technicalities to the broader plain of political necessities. Pacts and promises were recalled. Peace was brought from a basis of war and suspicion to constructive organization. The Conference took on new life and heart as parity dropped somewhat into the background and political policies were brought more to the fore.

Monsieur Briand failed at London in getting his objective—security for France, the least secure of all great powers. But into the records is written the history of his persuasive eloquence. The French Foreign Minister put forth arguments for a world constantly diminishing, built

upon common rules of law and order. He stood for the consultative principle in case of violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. He stood for joint action against an aggressor nation. Failing that, he stood for local treaties of mutual assistance, for strengthening and interpreting Article XVI of the Covenant—without success. The Conference stood for what the American delegates above all others had come for: naval, not political accord, though ultimately even naval accord must rest on political policies pursued.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFERENCE

Let it be said, however, to the everlasting credit of Secretary Stimson that he bravely agreed to confer in case of a world aggression even with the menace of the American Senate behind him. This fact always should be remembered by every right-thinking American who believes the Kellogg-Briand Pact to be something besides a scrap of paper. Monsieur Briand will not forget it, nor will France. But England could not agree to give wider guaranties. The temper of the British people is against sanctions and was not for underwriting another Locarno. The position of Prime Minister MacDonald was also too insecure. The leader of a minority government which already had escaped defeat narrowly, he did the best that he could under the circumstances—he swung to the American point of view of no commitments. The American delegation could go home without taint of political obligation. Though having broadcast a great political document to outlaw war, it was not yet ready to accept its world-wide implications.

RESULTS OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

The hope of the London Conference was for practical reduction. The result was a practical limitation of armaments, a real gain, however, since for the first time in history naval competition is checked until 1935, the date of the next Conference, but involving also a building-up program on the part of the United States, to reach parity with Great Britain.

In actual accomplishment at London the facts stand:

- (a) A three-power treaty limiting naval building;
- (b) A five-power treaty agreeing to a five-year naval holiday for capital ships with the scrapping of nine, five for Great Britain, three for the United States and one for Japan, and an agreement on humanitarian regulations for submarines. The moot question of cruisers, on which the Coolidge Conference had been wrecked, was settled by allowing eighteen for the United States, fifteen for the United Kingdom, and twelve for Japan.

The limitation treaty was signed by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. France was prevented from signing by failing to receive that security on which she based her reduction; Italy by failing to secure parity with France. The negotiations between these countries are to continue, however, until an agreement is reached.

The famous safeguarding clause is contained in Article XXI of the treaty. If any of the three signatories to the limitation treaty finds itself "materially affected by new construction of any power" outside the treaty, it shall be

entitled to increase its armaments. The same privilege, however, is allowed the other two signatories, and all must advise each other and confer. Mr. MacDonald declared this clause to be protective and not likely to be used.

The treaty was written in thirty-two hours—a record-breaking achievement. This phenomenal speed was acknowledged to be due to the ability of Ambassador Morrow. The American delegates were booked to sail for home on the *Leviathan* on Tuesday. No one but the Americans dreamed that the treaty could be written in the remaining time. By working day and night, all through the Good Friday previous to the sailing, this giant task was accomplished and a 7,000 word treaty produced. “Magnificent,” commented the various delegations. “They were splendid,” said Ambassador Morrow, commenting upon the English workers in the Foreign Office who gave up their holiday. The treaty was signed Tuesday at noon in the red-and-gold room of St. James’s Palace. And the American delegates, in the triumph of American efficiency, sailed Tuesday evening, tired but happier men, bringing with them “the first complete treaty of naval limitation in the history of the modern world.”

To the thousands of people in the home countries looking for surcease from the burden of taxation the treaty, in spite of its accomplishment, is a disappointment. Their hopes had been high. The leading spirits in calling the Conference had led them to expect actual reduction. As Monsieur Briand had said, at London were gathered 85 per cent of the nations controlling the navies of the world. If reduction had been relative, national security would

have remained the same. By comparison with the figures of the Coolidge Conference of 1927, a paper reduction is claimed. These figures were too high, however, to permit of acceptance. In the London Treaty a small reduction, about 5 per cent, is all that can be claimed.

Why was it that, with such a preponderance of naval control present, with every government signatory to a recent treaty to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, a timid and not a "bold course," as advised by Ambassador Gibson, was followed? Monsieur Briand gave the clue in his speech at the signing of the document. All of the countries present, he affirmed, "were not equally ready to pursue such a wide debate" (covering three months) "to its logical conclusion." He certainly was not referring to France and Great Britain, nor to Italy and Japan. All of these countries had been pursuing a similar debate for ten years at Geneva. It does not seem fair to charge the American delegates with unreadiness to "follow the debate to the logical conclusion." The American delegates were not isolationists. Secretary Stimson had been one of many Americans, including ex-secretaries Hughes and Kellogg, who had believed that the United States should join the League of Nations. It was the power back of the delegates that was not yet "ready" for a treaty of practical reduction—the American Senate. The delegates were handcuffed in writing the London Treaty. They must bring home something that the Senate—still talking of "involvements" and entangling alliances—would pass.

What clashed at London was the United States' traditional opinion and the world point of view—as voiced by France. The isolationist doctrine triumphed—for a

day. But tomorrow coöperation must triumph, cutting its way through the granite strata of outgrown dogma, not only because it is the only way to achieve reduction of world armaments, but also because it is the ultimate hope of safety even for that nation "too rich to be loved" whose politicians think it can safeguard its present world interests by remaining with its face to the past.

What of the future of disarmament? This common world question will return now where it belongs—to the center of world discussion and world action—Geneva. There the road is long and does not lend itself to rapid progress. But the question will be pursued thoroughly, scientifically in all its aspects to its "logical conclusion." There peace-building is active and continuous and must be so if the world is to be saved another holocaust. For it is true, in the words of Mr. MacDonald the day after the signing of the London Treaty, "Another war will be as sure as tomorrow's sunrise if an *active peace mind*, not of the *pious* but of the *practical kind*, does not intervene."

BI-PRODUCTS OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

Not all of the good results of the three-month London Conference are written into the limitation-of-arms treaty. There were bi-products, seeds sown, contacts made, habits of discussion implanted that were valuable enough to be noted.

For example, take the good will generated. The London Conference proved that questions of most vital national interests may be discussed, from varying angles, with the utmost friendliness of spirit. This in itself is a triumph—that the peace conference remained a peace gathering in fact. The American delegation must here be

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given credit for its good-humor and for its courage in determining to make the conference a success. Understanding also was promoted, face-to-face contact bringing that inevitable illumination of another's point of view. International education was thus advanced. The American delegates not only improved their capacity for speaking foreign languages—French, Italian—the understanding of the Japanese, who command a soft, gentle English. They were also educated in a broader world outlook and in the new world community phraseology.

Secretary Stimson in one of his speeches twice spoke of a "world-conscience"—a word rare in American statecraft, and of disarmament being "a continuous process." Of course he did not mention where the process was to continue. Our League-phobia forbids that. The press dispatches tell us that there was a long argument at London admittedly to keep the name, League of Nations, out of the preamble of the limitation treaty—for the sake of the American Senate. The other countries agreed, provided the Kellogg-Briand Pact would be kept out also. And not only the American delegates, but also that public opinion at home that followed the proceedings daily in the press—they too learned that disarmament could not be achieved by considering technicalities and ratios, alone. In this light—the education of public opinion in every country—every conference is a success even when it seems a failure, because of the furthering of that world opinion upon which world security now rests.

Better Anglo-American relations were fostered at London. Perhaps parity is not too high a price to pay for this great gain. Let us remember, however, that, having gained the right to parity, we do not have to proceed to execute

it. The American people will decide whether they wish to accept the enormous outlay and taxation involved in building to naval parity with our blood relation with whom we declare war is "unthinkable." They will ask, against whom is this great fleet to be built? Let us not forget also the sacrifices of Great Britain in relinquishing her supremacy of the seas. She admits another to the head of the table beside her, where her very existence has hitherto demanded that she should rule alone.

And Geneva? Geneva will profit by the outcome of the London Conference. The Anglo-American difficulty over cruisers in 1927 has been overcome. And an accompanying report to the treaty notes that a compromise has been effected on the method of limitation on the so-called global-category question. Both of these subjects have delayed the League's Preparatory Disarmament Commission. Action on land and air armaments—more difficult than naval—must slowly and carefully follow since the League is committed to action.

The wheels of the only continuous, permanent machinery for lightening world problems must continue to move, however slightly. Though facing the most intricate problem in history, the limitation and reduction of armament, these wheels cannot afford to falter. And the task of building the structure of organized peace, patiently, stone by stone, must continue "tomorrow—and tomorrow and tomorrow."

WHY DO DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES BECOME ARMAMENT CONFERENCES?

Disarmament Conferences become Armament Conferences because they are conducted in terms of war instead

of peace. In speaking of the London Naval Conference, Miss Josephine Schain, one of the three American women who went over to ask for real reduction, described the conference, after her return, as "a circle of fear in which the delegates are thinking still in terms of war and not of peace." In the past this was inevitable. In the present, it is inexcusable. The marvellous decade has changed the world attitude toward war though not yet universally establishing it. The absence of the United States from the Family of Nations slows up the process.

The London Conference was conducted as if the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Covenant of the League of Nations did not exist. Dominated by the demands of the United States with each state jealous of national prestige, the delegates became forgetful of the new Hopes. If the strongest nation present, the United States, had had the courage to build on the new fact in our international life—the Kellogg-Briand Pact—facing the perils of peace as the Fathers faced their perils in founding the Nation, the other nations would have followed because already committed to creating and maintaining an orderly world.

CHAPTER XI

DISARMAMENT CONTINUED

GENEVA—THE WORLD POINT OF VIEW

FOR a clearer understanding of the continental point of view, that security must precede disarmament, we must go to Geneva, the seat for ten eventful post-war years of international coöperation. There we find not a continental, but a world viewpoint, since Geneva has been slowly but surely forging a world opinion. There we find the real beginning of the outlawry of war, when in 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations, now accepted by fifty-four governments agreed that "any war or threat of war" was a matter of joint responsibility of all and each member agreed not to go to war without first submitting its dispute to settlement by pacific means—i.e., "arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, or by judicial settlement."

Any institution aiming to outlaw war by international agreement through providing alternatives to war, thus stabilizing and creating peace, must necessarily grapple with the problem of the reduction of armaments. Indeed, the peace of 1919 had demanded it. The fourth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points requires "adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Moreover, the Versailles Treaty had made the disarmament of Germany and the Central Powers a preliminary to general disarmament.

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But more compelling still, the Covenant itself demands reduction of arms. So important to the framers of the Covenant was this question that it was the first subject considered after the establishment of the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. Article VIII reads:

"The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of a peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

"The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments.

"Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years."

It has been the fashion among carping critics, addicts of the drug of fear, to say that the League of Nations has done nothing towards solving the problem of disarmament. In reality Geneva has been the scene of the most comprehensive and continuing effort in human history to find a formula for general disarmament. The League could have no other choice, since the regulation of armament is a fundamental of world organization.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS' CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT

Steadily since 1920 Geneva has blazed the trail with heroic failures and valuable accomplishment on the overgrown path of world-wide reduction of arms. Geneva has focused public opinion on the subject by bringing it into the open and giving it wide publicity. Geneva also has

made reduction a major issue between the two greatest world powers—Great Britain and the United States. Geneva has produced an annual League of Nations Armament Book giving the comparative strength and cost of the sea, land, and air forces of each country in the world, including the United States.

Let us glance over the preparatory work of the League. It has been said that however unsatisfactory the results on disarmament may seem to the impatient reformer, "the historian of the future will note that more has been done in Geneva in the last ten years than in the preceeding ten centuries."

The League's work may be summarized under the familiar terms "arbitration, security, and disarmament." The Council has intrusted the investigation of the disarmament problem to two main committees, with various advisory bodies. The committees are:

(1) The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, whose task is to do sufficient preliminary work on the technical subject of reduction and limitation in order to give the first Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Arms a chance of success; and

(2) The Committee on Arbitration and Security which is seeking means to strengthen the general security that the Covenant should offer its signatories through political guaranties, as well as to consider their "geographical situation and circumstances."

The results have been voluminous, staggering, and altogether necessary. The problems involved are of enormous difficulty. For example, the question had to be considered, What are armaments? One cannot limit them solely to guns and munitions, since factories producing

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equipment, food, and clothing for soldiers must be included. Shipyards—are they not also a necessary extension of armaments? That is, one must consider the industrial strength back of the nation in any successful reduction of arms.

The Committee on Arbitration and Security, in its search for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the elimination of war as a means of settling international conflicts, has provided model treaties drawn up by experts. Out of these model treaties, the Ninth Assembly in 1928, produced the General Act on arbitration and conciliation. This has been ratified by a sufficient number of states to become effective, the last being France directly after the London Conference of 1930—an act of conciliation, it was thought, towards a militant, sword-clashing Italy.

The League also has adopted a convention, at the suggestion of Finland, to give financial assistance to states which are victims of aggression.

The League, it should be remembered, is dealing not only with naval limitation, but with the further problems of land and air forces. Here the work necessarily must be slow, since it has had to "pierce the steel armor collected during long centuries around the conceptions of national prestige, national honor, and national duty."

Step by step, Geneva will proceed to consider this weighty problem underlying world stability, going as fast only as the understanding and will of the peoples behind the governments are willing to give coöperation and support League work.

The League of Nations also has produced two treaties aiming at the solution of disarmament, treaties which,

though not accepted, are nevertheless worthy of consideration as forerunners of Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

The First Assembly of the League in 1920 soon discovered that the question of disarmament was a political and not purely a technical one and appointed a Permanent Committee on Military, Naval, and Air Questions. In December of the same year it was decided to create a Temporary Mixed Commission to study the subject of the reduction of arms. The Third Assembly (1922) decided that disarmament must be linked with security. After having considered the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission, the Third Assembly passed the famous Resolution XIV as a basis by which a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee might be made effective. Its first two articles were:

(1) No scheme for the reduction of armaments, within the meaning of Article VIII of the Covenant, can be fully successful unless it is general.

(2) In the present state of the world, many governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country.

As a result of Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, the Temporary Mixed Commission drew up a Treaty of Mutual Assistance, a defensive agreement having as its central aim the reduction of armament. Its first drafts were drawn by Lord Cecil of England and Colonel Requin of France—the first a Conservative Englishman

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with a world point of view and the second a brilliant French officer who could think in terms of peace as well as war.

This treaty was a system of regional guaranties and understandings—since it was felt that no general pact was then possible. No state was to be asked to give assistance to another state outside its own continent; the treaty established demilitarized zones; allowed for partial treaties or agreements within the general treaty, under the ægis of the League; provided for reduction of armament proportionate to the security furnished by the treaty; undertook to furnish the League with information with regard to armaments, which information was subject to a revision every five years from the entry into force of the treaty.

The agreement was unique in that it declared in Article I that aggressive war is an international crime (never before so stamped). No definition of aggression had then been found, and the decision of which country was the aggressor was left in the hands of the Council.

I suppose I am partial to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance because I attended many conferences of the Mixed Commission in 1923, in the glass room of the Secretariat. The committee sat at a horseshoe table at one end of the room, the press representatives and observers at the other. My seat was near the table where I could watch the representatives of the great powers and smaller states as they discussed, paragraph by paragraph, this first paper to free themselves from the incubus of war. Earnestness was written on every face. I remember the clarifying speeches of the chairman, Monsieur Benes, then only thirty-eight years of age but Prime Minister of Czecho-

slovakia, and said to have the best diplomatic mind in Europe. And of Monsieur Lange of Norway, white-haired and tall, with a fine ethical viewpoint. There was great discussion about the "partial treaties"—the treaties to be allowed within the League—and fear was expressed that they might degenerate into the old-time alliances that had helped bring about the war; the moderate reassuring words of Lord Robert Cecil, than whom there is no more zealous protagonist of the good name of the League and of whom it has been said that he is a "statesman to whom the League owes more than to any other living man" (Madariaga, *Disarmament*).

Well, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, though accepted unanimously at Geneva, died at birth. Great Britain could not ratify it. An election had occurred, a new government was in power, and the viewpoint had changed.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

But the battle for the reduction of armaments, based upon security, did not end. One year later the famous Geneva Protocol was drawn up. A change was slowly taking place in public opinion. Arbitration, as a substitute for war, had caught the popular imagination. In 1924, Ramsay MacDonald, who as leader of the Labor Party became Prime Minister, was sure to take advantage of this new factor in the path of limitation.

In 1924, Mr. MacDonald himself attended the opening session of the League Assembly, as did Monsieur Herriot, Premier of France. These liberals were in agreement over the necessity of a general treaty for disarmament based upon security in place of the treaty of regional guaranties. The Geneva slogan, after eloquent speeches

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from both the French and the English Ministers, became "Arbitration—Security—Disarmament"—now known as the Geneva formula in which the new alternatives to war were to play their part.

The Geneva Protocol (1924) followed, in the main, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance but went farther. It was a general treaty of "pooled security"—the states undertaking to employ police measures against an aggressor. The gaps in the Covenant were stopped by the declaration that all international disputes must be settled by peaceful means—judicial settlement or arbitration. It defined the aggressor as the party that refused to arbitrate; the sanctions to be applied were Article XVI—the economic blockade, as in the Cecil-Requin Treaty. And it provided for a general Disarmament Conference in June, 1925, after the protocol had been accepted by a sufficient number of the powers.

It is interesting to note that the definition of the aggressor *as the one to refuse peaceful consideration of the dispute* was contributed by a group of Americans led by Professor James T. Shotwell, David Hunter Miller, and General Tasker H. Bliss.

This treaty, too, was unanimously accepted at Geneva where it still is considered by many to be the most helpful instrument ever drawn against the institution of war. I was not present when the fifty-one nations answered the roll-call of acceptance and so did not hear the dramatic response of each state replying in alphabetical order—Albania, Britannique, etc.—with the resultant "yes" or "*oui*" sounding from the various delegations in the great hall. But I am told that the occasion had the solemnity of a religious revival; for here at last was concrete

help and implementation. I am told that when the treaty was accepted unanimously and the members realized that there was hope that their children's children might not have to make the sacrifices they had made, tears stood in many a delegate's eyes. At last security, with honorable substitutes for war, seemed within sight. But again the delegates were doomed to disappointment. When the treaty was submitted to the home governments, Great Britain again affirmed that it contained obligations she could not assume. The Labor Party had gone out. The Conservatives headed by Mr. Stanley Baldwin had come into power. And the Laborites and the Conservatives did not see eye to eye.

It was my good fortune, however, to be present at the Assembly in 1925, when Sir Austen Chamberlain went into the Forum and explained why Great Britain had rejected the Geneva Protocol. Great Britain had the dominions to think of, he said; it could not undertake to preserve the status quo; it disliked being bound by the written word; everyone knew that Great Britain had reached its height without a written constitution; and it preferred the particular Pact, within the League, to the general agreement. Not one word was mentioned of the strong power outside the League, alone strong enough to meet Great Britain. But everyone knew that the danger to England was that, if she accepted the Protocol, the British fleet might find itself arraigned against the fleet of the United States. The price of peace was too high. It was interesting, however, to hear a great power, probably for the first time in history, feeling bound to justify its conduct before a parliament of smaller nations.

The Locarno agreements, accepting compulsory juris-

diction for all disputes, but not dealing with the reduction of armaments, followed immediately upon the heels of this Assembly.

Before leaving the subject of the Geneva Protocol, it should be said that no one "blamed" Great Britain for her rejection. The Protocol placed great responsibility upon Great Britain as the greatest of the powers in the League. The real reason of refusal, courteously not voiced, was generally understood. The things that are not said, in any parliament, often shout louder than the things that are declared. Every delegate at Geneva knew too well that with the United States outside the organization of the World Community, Article XVI, the economic blockade, the one weapon or sanction of the League, may not successfully be applied. So long as the United States remains a *neutral*, unbound by the new laws of justice between states, free to supply the aggressor state with munitions, food, etc., Great Britain cannot take a chance of drawing her sword against her kinsmen across the seas. This is the crux of the problem for organized world peace. Let every American take these facts solemnly to heart!

The disappointment at Geneva, nevertheless, cannot be overdrawn. On the ratification of the Protocol by four of the great powers and ten of the smaller states, a disarmament conference was to have been called. Security would then have been sufficiently guaranteed to make reduction of armament feasible and practical. The bubble burst, humanity's hopes were blasted, but the idea refused to die. I, myself, heard every delegate who went into the Forum in 1925 express in some way his loyalty to the Protocol of 1924 in spite of its rejection. The principle behind it, they felt, was right and must in the end prevail.

But the delegates have learned patience. They have learned that great movements wait upon other great movements. You can grow a poplar in a few years, but it takes a century to develop a wide-spreading oak.

The Geneva Protocol was an expression of the world's collective demand for peace, born out of the agony of 1914. It was ahead of the times, but it was not born in vain since out of its loins have sprung stalwart progeny to point the pathway to peace. The minds which fathered the Protocol sponsored also the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol are, therefore, milestones on this path, successful failures to mark the efforts of the human spirit to build a civilized and controlled international life.

THE CONFERENCE AT ROME

One other attempt at limitation of armament must be credited to Geneva. In February, 1924, an international Naval Conference was held at Rome for the extension of the principles laid down in the Washington Conference which had dealt only with the three major powers. Soviet Russia was here represented. The Conference ended in a deadlock mostly on the claims of Russia and Spain. Russia claimed that she had three seas to patrol—the Baltic, Black, and Pacific, and suggested that she should have a ratio of sea power equal to that of Britain or of the United States. The smaller nations put forth the argument that they too had sea routes to guard, and that during the war the major fleets became heavily overbuilt while they did not increase naval power. The Conference was handled largely by experts who did not consider

diplomatic and political aspects, and no agreement was reached.

EVENTUAL EUROPEAN UNITY?

But in spite of the League's failure to obtain results in the reduction of armaments, something was gained which may eventually lead to limitation, something which is not often noted. Europe was being drawn more closely together. The war had begun it. Contact at Geneva has cemented it and helped to develop that common consciousness which is slowly leading to the federation of Europe. While this purpose is primarily the need of economic unity—the abolition of tariff frontiers in order that Europe may compete successfully with other continents and have a chance to survive—it also may be that this predominant need and search for security, which Europe must also find, may lead in time to political federation and narrow down the groups dealing with limitation of arms. Fear has been the parent of many Federations. This was true of the thirteen American colonies, and of Germany and Italy, who federated after the danger to Europe of the Napoleonic campaigns. Geneva, by its periodical, carefully planned contacts is making collective action more and more possible.

WHY IS LEAGUE PROGRESS SLOW?

In our opinion, the slowness of the League does not spell failure, but necessary caution. True, there have been no spectacular successes in limitation of arms, but the League offers the only continuous, searching, and thorough method of attacking the subject. Success will come in building carefully. No real student of international

relations would expect this most deep-seated of all national practices—the right of armed self-defense—to be greatly modified within ten years. World politics promotes world patience and a willingness in this most vital of subjects to go slowly but surely to a desired end.

The League has been obliged to go slowly because the rhythm of the League itself is slow. It is not a super-state. Every resolution proposed at Geneva must be sent to the home governments for ratification. Action by fifty-four nations is not a rapid process.

Again, it is axiomatic that any effective limitation of armaments must be general. And the League is not yet universal. The strongest of world powers, for political reasons, has not seen fit to amalgamate with the only body logically fitted to deal with the question of disarmament. There is no question but that the absence of two of the potentially most powerful war-making states—Russia and the United States—has contributed to slow down the rhythm of the League on disarmament and even on occasion to thwart its aims. "In our opinion the chief responsibility for the stagnant state of disarmament lies with the nations which remain outside the League. No amount of vituperation, invective, or self-congratulation can alter the fact. The League is a courageous attempt at solving world problems in a world way, and those who remain out of it are badly crippling this effort without contributing any positive alternative of a true constructive character." This, of course, is only an opinion. But it happens to be the opinion of Señor Salvador de Madariaga, for seven years the able director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations Secretariat.

It comes as a shock to realize that the pacific United

States, with all the good will imaginable, has helped to retard the peace of the world. The Geneva Protocol is not the only example. I remember with a sinking of the heart being present at a committee meeting when a letter was read from the Secretary of State of the United States (Mr. Hughes), stating that the United States could not participate in a convention looking towards control of the traffic in arms, a subject imposed by the Covenant and to which a commission had given many months of hard study. When the English delegate (Lord Robert Cecil) finished reading this disappointing letter, falling like molten lead on the representatives of the nations assembled, he dropped the letter on the table with a sigh and said: "Well, we shall have to begin all over again." That was all. And they did begin again, gallantly.

In fairness to our country it should be said that later, in 1924, the United States agreed to be represented at a conference for the limitation of the international traffic in arms and has since coöperated. We should realize, however, that our fluctuations have played their rôle in holding up the world's vital peace processes. Some of us who love our country feel that her lack of international policy and program has been lamentable.

DANGERS OF ARMAMENTS

The following figures of comparative military and naval expenses of the four great powers were given out by President Hoover, July 23, 1929, the day before the coming into effect of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, brilliantly celebrated in the East Room of the White House. It was good politics, but how the gods of war must have

chortled! Without doubt President Hoover then expected the Pact to be the corner stone of naval reductions.

UNITED KINGDOM

1927-1928 (actual expenses)\$570,758,400
1928-1929 (actual expenses) 551,464,200
1929-1930 (estimates) 547,274,600

FRANCE

1928-1929 (estimates)\$407,915,000
1929-1930 (estimates) 523,241,000

JAPAN

1927-1928 (actual expenditures)\$212,383,000
1928-1929 (actual expenditures) 224,352,000
1929-1930 (estimates) 235,351,000

UNITED STATES

1927-1928 (actual expenditures)\$624,600,000
1928-1929 (actual expenditures) 684,700,000
1929-1930 (estimates) 741,000,000

These figures were supplied by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce with the exception of the United States figures, which were supplied by President Hoover.

In a statement accompanying the figures, President Hoover pointed out the fact that the United States has the "largest military budget of any nation in the world today, and at a time when there is less real danger of extensive disturbance to peace than at any time in more than half a century. . . . The hope of tax reduction lies in large degree in our ability to economize on the military and naval expenditure and still maintain adequate defense. Our whole situation is certainly modified by the Kellogg Pact."

In his Armistice Day speech, President Hoover pointed

out the fact that there are nearly 10,000,000 more men, including active reserves, now under arms than in 1913.

These figures are alarming and dangerous. For one fact the past teaches is the evil psychological effects of huge armaments, not only in promoting suspicion and mistrust, but also the truth that armaments have wills of their own, demanding active expression. This will to power gets under the skin of commander and enlisted men alike. It is said that the World War would not have occurred if the German General Staff had not been eager to see the colossal machine it had created in action.

WAR HORRORS

In this book I have purposely kept away from the "horrors of war," preferring to stress the hopefulness of the program of creative peace. The horrors are well known, but do not seem to be a deterrent. The hope lies in the substitution of constructive alternatives that will make the whole childish war game seem obsolete and silly whenever public opinion demands that it be so regarded. The question of whether you vanquish your enemy by pouring boiling oil on his head or blistering gas seems equally ridiculous as a means of settling international disputes. But since a part of humanity still prefers mediæval methods in this time, we are confronted with a condition and not a theory. Daily in every country potential war horrors are not being suppressed, but are constantly being multiplied and must be sternly faced and considered. Witness the advance of poisonous gas.

Many people believe that a strong, peace-loving nation like the United States, fabulously rich and unthreatened, if it would but take the lead, could end the whole infan-

tile practice of piling up war horrors on the ground of obtaining *safety*. What is needed is modern, clear-sighted leadership with courage to speak out and point out that evolution from hot oil to hot gas is not evolution. It is not even static. It is progress backward—a method we would not tolerate for an instant in any other department of our up-to-date existence. The horrors become only considerably more horrible. The suggestion, for instance, of “humanizing submarines” cannot be taken seriously by the adult mind. You might as well consider humanizing a cage of tigers. Such a leader, with courage to point out the obsolete childishness of pursuing the war game, relic of a dominant male civilization, and with knowledge of modern dependencies, might go down to temporary defeat, for many leaders must challenge this age-old Goliath. But it would be a glorious defeat insuring immortality such as Woodrow Wilson is gaining for the sacrifice of himself to the ideal of an orderly world community.

President Hoover has pointed out the fact that the United States is spending nearly two billions every year more than any other country on naval, land, and air armaments. A differing scale of prices accounts for some of this. But we are also keeping well up in the armament race in deadly inventions.

To illustrate. I had an illuminating experience a few years ago. Quite casually I met a friend, an inventor, and asked him what problem he was working on. Very clearly and with great gratification he told me of the perfection, at last, of a bomb, to be dropped from an airplane that was warranted to be 100 per cent perfect as a hit. The bomb was almost fool-proof, he claimed. Any aviator could ascend and by means of a small instrument adjust

the bomb so that it could not fail to descend straight upon the mark. When I asked if I could see a pamphlet about it, he replied, "Mercy no! This is in the secret archives." And these secret archives were not in wicked Europe, but in the unthreatened United States. Two years later I read of the successful try-out of the bomb in one of the numerous war games reported weekly in our papers.

A young friend, a Boston chemist, told me recently: "Do you know the truth about the advance made in perfecting poisonous gas in this country? We have now the ability to wipe out, not only soldiers at the front, but whole civilian populations, men, women, and children, at home." Bacteriology is also progressing along the lines of loosening deadly germs to produce pestilence and exterminate crops, cattle, and human kind. And so the story goes—millions for defense along ancient lines, but hardly one cent, in comparison, for modern methods of practical coöperation for peace.

War horrors and armaments in this age, with space annihilated, with the world transformed into a whispering gallery, with world friendship knocking at our doors and our economic interests world-entwined, are not only a danger; they are a damning evidence of man's inhumanity to man, a challenge to Christendom and a monument to humanity's stubborn inability to learn.

DIFFICULTIES OF DISARMAMENT

But even with the merging of the two points of view—the American and the continental—which is gradually taking place, the difficulties of practical limitation of armament remain deep-seated in the minds of people themselves and apply to every country in proportion to its

insecurity. One must sympathize with these needs and respect them. The difficulties to be combated may be grouped under three heads—fear, nationalism, and the power of old habits of thought.

Of the three difficulties, the question of fear is the most paralyzing. Nearly every individual in every nation is held by the octopus of fear—fear of poverty, ill health, or war—real dangers—or by smaller fears often imaginary. We are reminded of the man who, when dying, called his children to his bedside and said: "My sons, I have had a great deal of trouble in this world—most of which never happened." Fear fans the right of national self-defense, as old as the instinct of self-preservation. To dislodge this fear by encouraging dependence on modern methods than physical force in a world completely metamorphosed is necessarily a long and tedious process. Here again, substitution is aided by self-interest—enlightened or selfish self-interest—which leads to voluntary coöperation to propitiate fear.

Nationalism is a mighty deterrent against disarmament, for it must encounter pride and prestige—those hydra-headed inheritances of the ages. Yet even these difficulties may be overcome by the modern principle of mutual advantage. The right to aim and fire at will has long contributed to national complacency. Yet every federation of states has challenged this right by bringing it under some larger necessity. It is said that when Bismarck aimed to federate Germany one of his greatest difficulties lay in persuading the princes of the many petty principalities—always clashing—to give up their right of declaring war. A larger ideal—the protection of the new German state—pushed the smaller one out—again the principle

of substitution. Today, modern wars seldom remain private wars. Private wars tend to become world wars. No state can defend itself alone. No state can be secure alone. So nationalism does not hesitate to step into the circle of internationalism when collective action is more advantageous. The transformed economics of our time have emphasized the interest of *togetherness* and paved the way for political coöperation of more engaging interest. So we find national pride and prestige, still strong but forced to give ear to the new dictates of international security.

But perhaps the most deep-seated difficulty to uproot in considering the limitation of arms lies, as we have said, in old habits of thought. The new order requires a new technique in thinking. For in the last analysis, "the only substitute for armaments is intelligence," and in this transitional period international intelligence, or understanding, is quoted low on all the curbs of the world. Here, the soil of our brains has grown hardened with the years. It has been said that it is impossible to estimate the resistance of the human mind to a new idea. How deep-cut those brain-tracks relying on tactics of force, repudiate them though we may by our words! How difficult to "substitute the substitutes" even though reason tells us that eventually we must! It requires courage to face the fact that something new has been born in the world to oust the old dependencies upon armaments—something as revolutionary and far-reaching as democracy's edict against the divine right of kings. It means a revolution in our manner of thinking necessitating the scrapping of outgrown dogma and especially of dogma that has become a sacred political creed.

Can we make new political brain-tracks? It can and has been done, but only with the aid of the expulsive power of a new idea—an idea of greater advantage to a miraculously changing universe. Educate the public mind, intrench the new idea through understanding, and a new technique of thinking will follow. Every revolution has followed this course, led by courageous souls who believe that the spongy gray matter which rules us—sometimes hardening like *lignum-vitæ*—is meant to be our servant and not our master. The limitation of armaments waits upon the education and will of the various peoples to limit armaments by using the alternatives to war. That is the fact behind the facts. Unfortunately there is no subject upon which there is so little knowledge and so much misunderstanding, even among officials themselves.

SOLUTION

Is there no solution, then, to this intricate question? In the minds of students of the science of world politics there is: Disarmament waits upon the problem of security through world organization. Disarmament belongs to the soluble questions of the world community and its new dependencies. "When international society will be so organized that every dispute which it is not possible to settle by the ordinary means of diplomacy can and must be submitted for final judgment to a competent international authority, then armaments will melt as snow in the sunshine of spring," says Dr. Rappard.

The world community will settle the question of disarmament collectively around the fact of an interdependent world where no nation, however strong, can build its security alone. Certain localities will then be interna-

tionalized, sore spots will be supervised, and sea lanes will be policed by the guardians of the world with the seas made safe for all. Militarism will then be robbed of its fangs because it will become protective instead of competitive. Security will not lie, then, in making some other state insecure. Security will show the new advantage, not each for each, alone, but security in each for all.

Great-seeing minds are needed to further this evolution, open minds willing patiently to inform themselves on the world view of disarmament, followed by strong, eager hands extended to coöperate in solving the technical and political complications. Too often now we find that "small hands are busy everywhere, small crooked hands, grabbing right and left for what they can get, unaware of the *one-ness* of the world, impoverishing themselves by what they acquire, while the world waits for the great hands of the creative statesman big enough to realize how small his country has suddenly become" (Madariaga, *Disarmament*).

Will the United States produce these creative statesmen? Will it furnish the great hands needed today? In time it will, it must! No sincerer line is written in this book which is founded on a passionate sincerity. The country that could so largely contribute to untangling the infinite intricacies of the reparations and debt questions and help produce a Dawes Plan—a Young Plan—can surely help furnish the mentality for ameliorating and controlling the specter of armaments, lifting the burden of taxation from the backs of a bowed humanity. What a glorious opportunity! What a self-purging adventure! But we must have a new picture of "hands across the sea." We must have great hands willing to grasp other great

hands, in conference, in contact that will dispel suspicion and promote friendship; great hands willing to cooperate in banishing the law of the jungle, willing to substitute a new law founded upon international morality and justice to maintain a controlled and civilized world.

CHAPTER XII

IMPLEMENTING THE ALTERNATIVES

SUMMARY

WE HAVE completed our brief inquiry as to the progressive organization of international peace. Let us retrace our footsteps with a short résumé of our course, since the success of any inquiry lies in knowing clearly where you are going.

We have seen that the world, shrunk through science and invention, has become a community; that this community is in process of organization; that great progress has been made in economic coöperation; but that political coöperation moves more haltingly, largely because of the super-nationalism of many states.

The problem is how this magically transformed interdependent world may learn to live in ordered peace and prosperity; how the sovereign, anarchistic state may be taught to accept common law founded upon justice and morality, necessary for a regulated human society—as the individual already has accepted such restriction. The goal is a stabilized world with sufficient machinery to deal at once with explosive nationalities in order that commerce, science, and the arts, social progress and life itself, may advance without periodic threat of utter dislocation.

The problem is being worked out by the greatest as well as the smallest of states, no one state being strong enough to stand alone. The vastness of the problem ap-

pealing to the vital interests of every country and especially to national security, makes it the most compelling problem of all time. It challenges the wisest statesmanship, the most creative imagination—and the profoundest thought of our age.

The principle by which nations are beginning to build a more orderly world, we have found, is the principle of international coöperation. Out of this principle we have seen emerge in the last ten years the League of Nations at Geneva; the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, the Locarno Treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Pan-American Treaties.

Taken as a whole, these processes offer an unprecedented program of practical, progressive world peace. Taken separately, they offer honorable alternatives to war—arbitration, the World Court, conciliation, conference. In the old days a challenged nation had to fight or be disgraced. Today a nation may choose an alternative to war without having its honor impugned. Indeed, the nation that chooses to go to war today must suffer disgrace, for it will have broken its solemn pledges to humanity.

We have traced these new institutions, with no precedents to guide them, from feeble beginnings to a definitely useful place in international life. We have seen some of them functioning in world crises, averting armed conflict by offering peaceful alternatives to the old flash of the sword.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from this brief international survey? That there is enough machinery existing today to keep the peace of the world *if the peoples want peace*. What is needed is not more machinery, but more understanding of the peace processes. If the

Alternatives to War

people of the various nations will understand, support, and strengthen the new alternatives, above all, *insist that they be used in time of acute danger*, we shall have an ordered world and humanity will have a chance to spiritually fulfill itself.

NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE ALTERNATIVES

The new processes of constructive peace have done well in ten years, but their priority is by no means established. At least ten or fifteen years more of arduous effort are required to allow them to become so woven into the web of international life that they will act as automatically as processes of law and justice act with the individual. If we do not give them our whole-hearted support and understanding, we shall be overtaken by the old forces of armed might. For might is still alert. Society is still resting upon bayonets. If we draw the sword again we shall surely perish by the sword. And we shall deserve to perish, because, knowing the better way, we have been too slothful to rouse ourselves and deliberately establish its moral authority.

PUBLIC OPINION

On what must the support of the new institutions of peace depend? Naturally upon the public opinion of the nations—the strongest force in the world today. In democracies public opinion is made up of mass thinking on common questions. It has been said that in vast aggregations there is no public opinion, only many public opinions. Nevertheless, in a democracy, *a* public opinion must be formed in order to get action. The will of the

people, however conflicting, must be crystallized eventually and speak out for good or ill.

It was different in Bismarck's day. When his generals asserted that public opinion would not stand for his proposed tactics, the Iron Chancellor thundered, "It is your business to manufacture public opinion."

Public opinion is still influenced by self-seeking business interests, scheming politicians, and a chauvinistic press. But the liberation of the democratic spirit makes the manipulation of public opinion by a few powerful minds at the top more difficult. Democracy does not aim to develop leaders alone. It aims also to develop the mass. Theoretically at least power is transferred to myriads of small-scale minds asked to act upon large-scale movements. This is why public opinion is so difficult to wield in a democracy. These small-scale minds must be taught to lift their heads from the daily task to take in wider horizons. This is particularly true of a country like the United States, whose world status has changed so fast that the mass mind has been unable to keep up. Take the question of the entrance of the United States into the World Court, for instance. Mrs. Ruth Hanna McCormick claimed that she won her nomination for Senator in the Illinois primaries on the issue of the World Court. The Middle West has been notoriously indifferent to foreign affairs. Can any one believe seriously that the World Court was a vital issue to the Illinois voters? Probably not one in a hundred could explain the peculiar relationship of the United States to the Court: that the Senate had already voted our entrance; that what was keeping us out was but a fraction of the fifth reservation concerning advisory opinions. The World Court was a manu-

factured, not a real issue. It served its purpose in a campaign won on feminism and inherited shrewd political tactics. It will require time and patience to educate the mass mind as to the character of the problems in which the United States by her world interests is implicated today, and to create a world public opinion in regard to them.

The new institutions for peace must look to some kind of world opinion to support them. Men are learning that world peace, for instance, is a matter of joint responsibility, and that present-day security demands common action. Fifty-four nations have agreed that an ordered world necessitates a common law for civilized mankind; that if there is to be a universal human society, men must agree to march together. One sovereign state insisting upon the right of its independent action has the power to delay the world march. Unfortunately, there are two great states as yet unwilling to submit their sovereignty to the new rules of common action—Russia and the United States. Let us glance at Russia.

RUSSIA

Any survey of international relations, however brief, would be incomplete without taking into account that modern enigma, the Russian revolution. Any survey that is not motivated by tolerance, lack of passion, and a fair mind is worthless. Unfortunately, revolutions do not beget these qualities.

The Russian revolution has been called the most interesting political movement in history. To write of so vast an upheaval and rejection of accepted tradition without first having visited Russia, seems a presumption. In

Maurice Hindus's book, however (*Humanity Uprooted*), we have an insight into the crowding problems of Russia so objective, so impersonal that as Professor John Dewey says in his Introduction, "To read these pages with sympathy is to travel the road of a liberal education." With admirable restraint Mr. Hindus outlines principles governing Communistic Russia without prejudice. At the end of his absorbing pages you must decide yourself whether the new Russia is the "greatest miracle or the greatest scandal of the ages."

Russia is not concerned with world organization upon capitalistic lines. The new Russia has but one goal: the development and establishment of the Communistic party. Nothing else matters. The cause is the acid that is etching a new life in politics, in economics, and in the social field. The object of the cause is the abolition of private property and the elevation of the proletariat to own and control the tools of production.

The Communists—a small proportion of the entire population—rule Russia with an iron hand. The proletariat is in power—3 millions of industrialists dragging 135 millions of peasants in the same direction. The proletariat is master. All the avenues of education are open to him for adjustment to his new position. He himself, however, is submitted to a strict régime. If he fails to conform he is as ruthlessly sloughed off as anyone outside the Communist party. The cause is the cause of the under dog, its mission to raise him to a plane of equality with other groups.

In economic life the Marxian theory, that labor produces all wealth and is therefore entitled to the control of its distribution, is carried out. Sacrifice and poverty

are willingly endured for the ultimate gain. No more exploitation. No more of the control of the few over the bent bodies of the many. The mask is to be torn from the face of modern civilization and the hypocrisies and injustices revealed. Russia's five-year economic program—to transform its vast territory and resources into a modern industrial estate—is proceeding with the ardor of a new living faith. Factories are rising and turning out goods incredibly. Collective farming with modern machinery is organized in certain localities and is making headway. Work, learn, speed up, are slogans. American engineers, American architects, American technicians are employed in large numbers, teaching young Russia American efficiency, and are the only people who are well paid. America is the one country to be emulated, for the United States is master of the machine. In Russia science is worshiped and the god of science is the machine.

Education is intrenched and illiteracy is rapidly being reduced. The cinema and the radio are used widely to spread the new ideals. Music and the drama are given to help raise the proletarian. Religion is excluded—atheism encouraged—the bourgeois god of the old régime rejected. Women are placed on a plane of perfect equality with men. Feminine chastity is optional, though the child must be protected. Home life is the scene of conflict between the young idea and the old. The power of the family is on the wane, as it already is waning in lands outside of Russia.

But it is to the youth of Russia that the miracle of the revolution is most apparent. The youth of Russia is said to be the happiest in the world. Youth gladly accepts sacrifice for a larger ideal. With all its strength young Rus-

sia believes that it is building new mansions for an oppressed world. Everywhere youth is leading, elevated to positions of responsibility and power. With a light heart youth accepts economic restrictions to mold a new universe. If Communism fails, the effect on this eager enthusiasm will be blasting and tragic.

But what of war? We are interested in Russia's attitude towards organized peace. New Russia thinks of war. Russia believes that for her war is inevitable. Encircled by hostile countries, caught in the psychology of fear, Russia prepares for war. Russia is ready to fight. Such a war, says Mr. Hindus, if allowed to come, would be the most ghastly in history; a war not only of nations, but of classes, a war fought not only at the front, but also at the rear, exterminating women and children—"the last word in human barbarism."

But there is another side to the shield. Russia does not want war. Russia needs peace to establish and ground her new internal life. "Every day of peace is a day of victory. No nation ever needed peace more desperately than Russia." Russia, therefore, is willing to coöperate for world peace, marking time to put over her collectivist program.

So we find Russia signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact—not that she regards it as a panacea for peace, but that it helps create a new psychology of peace. And the new Russia utilizes all the aids of modern psychology. In 1927 we find Russia attending the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League at Geneva, astounding the world by proposing through her representative, Litvinoff, immediate and complete disarmament for all nations. This

proposal was as sincere as it was naïve, since time and peace are the great allies of the revolution.

Russia also has sent representatives to the Economic Conferences at Geneva, willing to take advantage of any economic enlightenment, even though disapproving of the system, that will make her industrially as great as the United States.

Can a nation building a new society on ruthless hatred for the rest of the world be counted on to support the new institutions of peace? Alternatives to war, created by imperialistic nations, would naturally be considered the gesture of a frightened world to save itself from self-extinction. Such alternatives would be considered as promoting capitalism—not peace.

Will the world circle widen to admit Russia fostering class antagonism—making “a great love out of a great hate”? Some day Geneva must widen its circle to welcome Russia. It must if the world is to be ordered and controlled. To face an antagonism frankly is often to dissolve it. Russia needs time more than any of her pressing necessities, and time has a way of bridging impossible chasms. Russia’s need for capital, for technical knowledge, yes, even for friendly human contacts, eventually may bring her to accept arbitration as the great alternative for war.

THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

From the Russian revolution back to our own American Revolution is only about 150 years—the world-shaking revolution of 1776; a revolution against the age-long might of kings, an effort to establish representative government taking power out of the hands of the few and

placing it in the hands of the untutored many. The American Revolution was the Bolshevik movement of its day. It is interesting to reflect that the only two great powers that have not definitely accepted the new programs of constructive peace are two nations that have had the virility to start governments founded upon new lines, wide apart in method, but summoning the same characteristics of courage, sacrifice, and initiative.

In a previous chapter we have traced the first foreign policy of the thirteen federated American Colonies. European empires were stretching out long arms to attach territory and impose monarchical forms of government. It was not a question of whether representative government would be successful, but whether it would be allowed to live. "Democracy was a disease that must be cut out," said Metternich. Distance helped. Slowness of communication helped. Time helped. The Constitution drawn up after the Articles of Confederation had produced ten years of internal anarchy helped most of all. Out of this time of storm and stress emerged American political formulæ in regard to foreign countries—the Monroe Doctrine, the warning of entangling alliances, and the principle of isolation and "In time of peace prepare for war." It was a foreign policy naturally based upon fear.

But in 1930 behold the turn of the wheel. The machine age has transformed the unlimited resources of the young country into the greatest of industrial empires. The World War has changed it into a creditor instead of a debtor nation. Production on a scale never before imagined, flowing out. Wealth in a river of gold, flowing in. In finance, bankers to the world. In famine, granary of the world. In engineering, university of the world. By

no nation threatened. By all nations feared. In economic leadership, unchallenged. In political leadership, still uncharted and groping because still led by the policy of an early fear.

Through the graphic pen of Mr. Julius Klein, Assistant Secretary of Commerce under Mr. Hoover, we have seen that the Dramatic Decade (1919-29) brought economic supremacy to the United States through the scrapping of our "utterly mediæval" business practices previous to 1914, and by refusing to "become shackled to the precedents of a mummified past."

In our far-reaching world contacts of today we have seen that we have scrapped few of our political theories as mediæval and outgrown. Has economic absorption so blinded our eyes that we cannot see the original necessity for the critical examination of ancient political dogma, for readjustment and expansion of the courageous faith of our fathers, now that we have become the greatest of world powers?

Few of our leaders are making this examination. Fewer still of our Senators. If they were making this adjustment we would be building new traditions, a new foreign policy—not reckless of our home interests, but more conscious of our far-reaching world interests. If the Senators realized our new world status they could not haggle thirteen months over the upward revision of a tariff, protested, not only by our debtors, the nations of the world, but also by our own economists as being ultimately suicidal to our home as well as our foreign interests. They could not allow the World Court Resolution, already passed 76 to 17, to languish for four years, unratified. They could not hesitate over the acceptance of a disarm-

ment treaty which has for its chief virtue the elimination of naval competition for five years between three great powers.

Since the war especially, the official leaders of the foreign policy of the United States have tried to abstain from political contacts abroad, while giving our coöperation generously to economic reconstruction. But Mr. Owen D. Young tells us that you cannot separate politics and economics today, since they merge and overlap. In a brilliant speech in California he called them sisters: the one sister, politics, charming and well dressed; the other, economics, a Cinderella in rags. In reality they are Siamese twins. Because of this fundamental unity, not to be broken without world dislocation, no state, he affirmed, could live in political isolation today.

PUBLIC OPINION CHANGING IN THE UNITED STATES

Yet public opinion has changed considerably in the last ten years in the United States and is changing fast today. After the war, we revolted against the injustice and complexities of the Versailles Treaty. Four years of altruism were followed by years of reaction and self-complacency. We had done a good international job only to become more intensely nationalistic. Happily we passed through our period of devotion to 100 per cent Americanism and America first—what has been called the period of parochial Americanism. Our responsibility as a world power has shaken us more or less out of it. We are glimpsing the fact that nothing can happen in the world today without involving the United States. And this fact is giving public opinion a new slant.

We have said that one difficulty in human affairs today

is that the United States has become the strongest of world powers without a world point of view. But we are beginning to develop a world mind and to see ourselves in our relationship to the new world state. Economics is helping. Enlightened self-interest is moving us. Science and invention are drawing the web closer, and the press is a great contributing factor.

The fact that peace itself is a coöperative affair of all nations is aiding in spreading a world point of view. We want peace, but we are not yet ready to pay the price for peace. With the establishment of the organization of progressive peace, official America can claim no worthy part. Individuals have helped. An American President fought for the Covenant. Colonel House and Raymond B. Fosdick helped establish the Secretariat. An American woman, Florence Wilson, served ably for seven years as librarian of the League of Nations. Countless Americans have served on committees. But neither officially nor as a people did we give our moral support to establishing the new institutions of peace at Geneva and The Hague. Instead, history will relate that for years we gave them open hostility. But time and public opinion have changed all that. Now we are coöperating actively in practically all world commissions. It is interesting to note that, owing to our interest in League affairs, the State Department is sending Mr. Prentiss Gilbert—an experienced diplomat—to Geneva with the rank of consul, and permanent headquarters near the Palais des Nations.

Perhaps the greatest event to turn the public mind of America back to Europe has been the promulgation and acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. We shall return to that later. Let us first consider some of the agencies

that have aided in building a wider public opinion in the United States in regard to foreign affairs.

BUILDING PUBLIC OPINION

Every campaign for the education of public opinion is said to pass necessarily through three stages: disseminating information—facts; agitation, in season and out, and finally, realization leading to action generally of a political character. The United States always has had its crusaders for peace before peace had an organic body, when it was based mainly on aspiration and good will. A few years ago we had over 1,200 peace organizations. Now these have multiplied, adding organizations working for the new constructive peace and becoming great centers for the distribution of world facts. The Foreign Policy Association, with its luncheon discussions, led by its able chairman, Mr. James G. McDonald; the League of Nations Association; the American Foundation, established by the late Edward Bok; the National Council for the Prevention of War, in Washington; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sending large groups of editors and professors abroad to visit The Hague and Geneva, later coming home to spread first-hand information in regard to international coöperation—a method of educating educators; Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt's Conference on the Cause and Cure of War; the National Council of Women; the American Association of University Women, with Dean Gildersleeve; the National League of Women Voters, with Miss Ruth Morgan; the General Federation of Women's Clubs, instituting round-table discussions of world relations for leaders, to mention only a few—have all been helping inform

public opinion in regard to coöperative peace and the new alternatives for war.

Travel is helping to build the new peace. Every summer Geneva becomes a Mecca for Americans. The American Committee with headquarters near the Secretariat reports many thousands of Americans registered by them every summer, and taken through the departments of the Secretariat by college students equipped for the task. This helps counteract Leaguephobia in the United States—a microbe arriving in 1920 and difficult to dislodge. Countless numbers of current-topic lecturers flock to Geneva each fall to attend the Assembly and to listen to Professor Zimmern's illuminating talks on world relations, taking notes, and trailing them later over the map of the United States. They must go if they are to be equipped for their work, for constructive peace is not static, but dynamic, changing every day.

IGNORANCE AND INDIFFERENCE

I believe absolutely that ignorance and indifference are the worst foes retarding an intelligent public opinion in the United States. There is prejudice, of course. But I have seen too many audiences converted, not by propaganda, but by a straightforward recital of the truth, to believe that the prejudice is deep-seated. (I am not speaking of Senators who never change. We have to leave them to time.) Facts convert audiences, not oratory. An American audience must be stimulated to do its own thinking. It does not want to be educated. It wants to be informed. Then international coöperation for peace becomes like salvation—it comes from within. One does not "convert" anyone to the theory of the nebular hy-

pothesis or natural selection. One explains these phenomena—and the facts do the convincing.

Indifference to foreign affairs in a country so safe geographically, so removed politically from the world arena, as the United States, is not strange—though it does not excuse us in these days of lightning communication. But there is a curious condition about ignorance in regard to world relations in the United States: it is an ignorance found at the top of society rather than at the bottom, an ignorance of the classes rather than the masses. The American Federation of Labor has passed resolutions in favor of our entrance into the World Court. But it remains true, nevertheless, that many college graduates, presidents of this and that trust, are in the elemental stage of progressive international relations. Ask half a dozen educated men at a dinner party—doctors, lawyers, financiers, industrialists—to explain clearly what Locarno meant—said at the time to be the greatest historical event since the Armistice. You may find yourself like Diogenes with his lantern. Absorption in personal interests, intense concentration in economic pursuits, favor the one-track mind to the exclusion of wider ideas. Yet not to know today of the new methods of diplomacy, the institutions beginning to establish international law and justice and to offer honorable alternatives to war is to acknowledge oneself an international illiterate. One's beliefs, one's opinions, one's prejudices are immaterial, for these processes are now history engaging the statesmanship of the world.

The press is helping perhaps more than any other agency to lift the fog of ignorance in regard to our transformed universe. If we read a reputable daily paper not

for the purpose of picking up tidbits of gossip and the latest news of gunmen, but "as a page in history," we shall be enriched by an accumulation of world, not merely local, news that may contribute towards building a world opinion. Miss reading one of the great dailies one day and you will find yourself twenty-four hours behind in knowledge of world news.

OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ALTERNATIVES

The citizens of the United States are a moral, conscientious people. Our Puritan inheritance has seen to that. It might be claimed that as we have neither accepted the League Covenant nor ratified the World Court Protocol we are not morally deficient in failing to support and strengthen the new alternatives to war. It might be offered that we are already giving them our support by coöperating with these processes—even though by a back-handed, dog-in-the-manger coöperation.

Not so with the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Here is a Treaty which we ourselves have promulgated. Here we have given our word of honor to a society far more advanced in the organization of peace than we ourselves that we will never settle our international disputes except by pacific means. What means? We must think through the implications of the Pact or become a moral derelict to our world pledge. It is not enough to want peace. We must know how to *build* peace. It is not enough to make a moral world-wide gesture and whip the Senate into acceptance. It is not enough to ease our conscience and become suddenly modern by a peace order on a large scale—then proceed to forget it. The Kellogg-Briand Pact has not yet educated us as a people to peace methods

because we have not yet taken the Pact seriously. If we did we would be *preparing for peace* with all the force of those great resources we commandeered in preparing for war.

TAKING THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT SERIOUSLY

The truth is that the Kellogg-Briand Pact is not taken as seriously at home as it is abroad, where for ten years there has been concerted effort to replace war by processes of arbitration and conciliation. Congress does not take the Pact seriously. If it did it would not continue to indulge in great naval appropriations. The American delegation at the London Naval Conference did not insist on the Pact as the new factor in international life and reduce accordingly. The American navy does not take the Pact seriously. A well-known admiral recently, in the *New York Times*, wrote two columns of criticism of the London Treaty, voicing our further naval needs, without mentioning the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

By failing to pursue the implications of the multilateral treaty we are not only preparing for war in the same bad old way ourselves, but we are compelling other nations to prepare. For in the matter of reduction of arms the United States is the pace-maker. We alone among nations are capable of unlimited building. England accepted parity at London not because she wished to give up her supremacy of the seas, but because she did not wish to be forced to accept a position of inferiority. By holding aloof from entering the circle of the new processes of peace, by building armaments as we have never built before, we have retarded the processes of organized

peace and have contributed to the continuance of the reliance upon arms.

IMPLEMENTING THE PACT

Without machinery that will function in world crises the Kellogg-Briand Pact has been called but a "pious gesture." What may we do to make this gesture practical? There have been many suggestions. One is to outlaw war in fact. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, it is claimed, renounces war, but does not make it a crime among nations. Granting the advisability of such a course, the question remains, What machinery shall we look to for carrying out this enactment?

The Outlawry of War party pins its faith to a World Court. But a supreme court of international justice, we have found, handles only juridical questions concerning the interpretation of law, treaties, etc. War, however, is more liable to arise from non-justiciable causes: economic rivalries, nationalism, boundaries, prestige, etc. For the solution of political questions we must have political institutions.

To implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact we must ask ourselves two questions: What alternatives shall we use after renouncing war? And what shall we do when the Pact is violated? In answer to the first, we must either use the machinery of the alternatives already provided or devise a wasteful duplication. As to our action when the Pact is violated, certain "next steps" have been considered as compelling:

1. Conference when the Pact is threatened.
2. Conferring with the Council at Geneva as to finding the aggressor.

3. Abstention from selling to the aggressor.

Let us consider these questions.

1. The development of the principle of conference—men sitting around a table to settle their international disputes without, however, national domination—has been called a stupendous event comparable to the birth of representative government or the arrival of constitutional order. No matter how weary we may grow of tedious international conferences, their bickerings and collapses, we cannot reject the principle of consultation, since it offers modern alternatives to force. A conference discussing anything vital will normally have collapses. A conference proceeding smoothly indicates discussion of little that is worth while. The Kellogg-Briand Pact says nothing about conference, but fortunately its joint author, Honorable Frank B. Kellogg, says that the principle of consultation is inherent in the Pact itself.

2. Consultation with the Council of the League to find who is the aggressor is advocated because here is a body that has gone far in perfecting the principle of consultation and has been called "the best example of the procedure of the new diplomacy"; moreover, it is the only body capable of being assembled quickly and able to marshal behind it the public opinion of the world. We should not have to join the League of Nations in order to consult with the Council over a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Our representative in Geneva, of whom we have already spoken, would be there to consult in world crises and would be in touch also with Washington. We could not be forced into war by consultation. We should not have to "send our boys" abroad to fight foreign quarrels because of consultation. But we surely will if we do

not consult. The one hope of keeping the boys at home is in acting quickly with those away from home.

3. Agreeing not to sell to the aggressor is a more difficult and a far more controversial question. For here we find the question of the freedom of the seas and the rights of neutrals involved—a question we are not yet ready to discuss, though it contains the crux of the peace problem. Until we face the question whether war is still a private matter, left to the individual sovereign state, or a question of joint responsibility to be considered an act against the community of nations, we shall not be able to see the problem in any but a nationalistic light. The question that is interesting the rest of the world is what the United States would—or rather would not—do if the Kellogg-Briand Pact were violated. If we insist upon our rights, as a neutral, to supply the aggressor with ammunition, food, etc., then it has been said that we “become an accomplice of the aggressor.” If we adopt neutrality towards a violation of the Pact—and many minds feel there is a moral obligation inherent—we need not enter either into commitments or sanctions. But we shall, nevertheless, advance the cause of organized world peace by letting it be known and counted upon what the United States would do in case of aggression.

CHURCHES HELPING THE ALTERNATIVES

Once it was said that the Church was on the side of the heaviest battalions. Perhaps this was inevitable when Church and state were combined. Now in these days of religious democracy it is not surprising to find the churches supporting the alternatives of war. The Church Peace Union, the World Alliance for International

Friendship through the Churches, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, have long given loyal support to the World Court, the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This fact is stupendous and offers an enormous field for informing public opinion.

The United States is developing religious leaders who are making better known the new facts of constructive peace. Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, secretary to the World Conference for International Peace through Religion—not attempting to convert each other at their great world conferences to a universal religion, but with the purpose of finding common grounds for supporting world peace; Dr. S. Parkes Cadman with his spiritual force given to a radio audience now encircling the globe; Mr. Fred Smith, with his international experience of years and his valued book, *Must We Have War?*—these are but a few of the spiritual crusaders for the new faith that peace must be built and *supported* if it is to function and endure.

It has become the fashion to decry the decline of religion and to endeavor to place science in its place as a human torch. The work of science, however invaluable, is but a feeble light for the soul, neither warming nor satisfying the aspiring mind. It is true that orthodox religion has been challenged. But faith remains a human necessity, spiritual hunger still refusing to be fed upon materialism alone. The ethics of Christ remain the most satisfying chart for human guidance. Every age has had its new interpretation of religion in the search for an abiding faith. In the last century Emerson gave us transcendentalism. Today we have humanism. The truth seems to be that in spite of science man is incurably religious. Man cannot live by bread alone. He still looks

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at the stars and reaches out for the sublime. Some power higher than himself he must find for spiritual contact—as mysterious as electrical contact and quite as vital. He may end by finding the power within himself—where we are told the Kingdom of Heaven lies. Sorrowing people find there the Comforter. Happy people find a new joy in obeying spiritual law. But the search ever goes on.

CREATIVE PEACE SPIRITUAL

Can anyone doubt that the power that makes for righteousness is in this movement to unify a disordered world? "God hath made of one blood all nations of men," said a man who understood the spiritual law of his time—Saint Paul. Can we not unite to minimize their differences, preserve their precious gift of nationality, and organize their common needs in a common world? We are told that we must love our neighbor as ourself. Who is our neighbor today? Not just Canada, with whom we have lived in peace with an unfortified frontier for over one hundred years. Isn't our neighbor also France, reaching out welcoming arms to an unknown boy who flew over the deep on a dark night and landed on Le Bourget Field? Isn't it Germany, sending a great airship three times to our shore, with a captain whom we delight to honor and cheer? Aren't our neighbors the Laplanders giving hospitality to our explorers—in touch with us every day? Aren't the people of the whole round world, riding in our Fords, using our frigidaire, here, there and everywhere, our neighbors in a magically transformed world? And just here may we say, by the way, let no one belittle the American contribution to the new civilization

because it seems materialistic. Open plumbing is as great a gift to society as open diplomacy, since cleanliness is next to godliness. Mass production with higher wages is a civilizing, uplifting force. American "materialism" has helped bring happiness and spiritual freedom to humanity all around the globe.

And artists, all the army of people of creative imagination, the writers, the painters, the musicians of our day—can not they see the spiritual significance of the progressive peace movement? The moneys freed from the immense burden of taxation for armaments engaged in purely national defense? In time, our minds freed to feed on the really vital things men live by, in an ordered controlled world? Every artist should make it his business to know and support the alternatives to war. The future of his art is at stake.

UNMARSHALED INFLUENCE OF WOMEN

I have left the power of women to influence public opinion until the last because I believe that it is the greatest unutilized and in many localities the greatest untrained force of our times. The nineteenth century was called the century of the child; the twentieth century is the century of the liberated woman. In the United States, particularly, the feminist movement has made greater advances than in any other country. The absence of caste or class and of a strong feminine tradition, the inheritance of the pioneer woman, the sportsmanship of the American man all have helped the American woman to an unprecedented freedom. She has education, she has the vote and economic independence if she wishes it. Power and opportunity are in her hands.

Some years ago I remember Lord Cecil and later Mr. P. W. Wilson, the English publicist, telling me that the "American woman holds the peace of the world in her hands." Then I resented it as a masculine evasion. Now I believe it, thoroughly. With the United States the dominant power among nations, the world will have peace if the *United States wishes peace*. With the economic supremacy of her country behind her the American woman holds the peace of the world in her hands.

But power brings responsibility, not only to the home but to the nation and to that world which has become our larger home. Not until the intelligence of women is trained to flow in larger channels, until the new power of women is marshaled to act upon greater responsibilities, can the women of any nation hope to vitally influence constructive peace.

The new institutions of peace have been created by men. No laurel can be claimed by women in that crown—although a group of suffragists, including American women, went before the committee working upon the Covenant in Paris and asked that positions under the League be open equally to men and women. This was inserted in Article VII of the Covenant. The new institutions have been created partly to protect the interests of women. The least that the emancipated woman can do is to give them her loyalty and support. What are women doing with their new privileges and opportunities?

FEMININE SELF-EXPRESSION

Their achievements seem little short of marvelous. They are flooding the labor market, no longer as servants or school-teachers alone. They hold executive, well-paid

positions where formerly they went in the early dawn to scrub the floors—(with no one objecting to that form of feminine self-expression!). Human work has found a new dignity. Even *débutantes* want to indulge in it and are creating new jobs for themselves as hostesses, secretaries, organizers, stylists, advertisers, etc. Women are absorbing culture, some of it superficial, some of it fundamental, to a greater degree than men, immersed in the economic struggle. All this is making a change in the relation of the sexes, sometimes deplorably introducing competition, often bitterness and calling for intelligent adjustment. No one is to blame for this social revolution. When the “home went out of the house,” women followed it and worked at the machine, and no amount of invective can ever put her back again.

WOMEN NOT YET POLITICALLY-MINDED

There is one field, however, where the influence of women is negligible—the political field. Ex-Governor Nellie Tayloe Ross of Wyoming says that the American woman has an “unawakened political consciousness.” She neglects to vote on election day—but so do some men. She is not deeply interested in the great issues of her country. Neither are many men. She does not conscientiously read a morning and evening paper to be better informed on world affairs as well as local chit-chat. Neither do all men. One flip at the stock market and the sporting news and he is finished. But there is some excuse for him. Absorption in commercial competition has developed what Lucien Romier, a French writer, has called “a fatigue of the masculine thinking faculties, an indifference towards the fundamental things of life.” But

there is no excuse for her. She has greater leisure and a more direct responsibility towards the fundamental things of life than men: the care and training of children; the conservation of taste and the niceties of life, even the preservation of life itself.

Fundamentals! Honor, the home, standards, a decent progressive civilization! These are every woman's business and no amount of emancipation can free her from these ancient obligations. To fulfill them in the wider life we are living she must help mold public opinion—or be molded by it. Political action is constantly affecting woman. A tariff revised upwards may affect the price of the shoes on her feet, the very lace she loves so well. A high tariff today may also sow the seeds of ill will and war and demand the life of her boy, ten years from today. To guard her home, her family, woman must be conscious that political interest for her is today one of the fundamentals of life.

To help mold public opinion not only must women be politically interested in their government, but they must be interested in the action of other governments as well. They must be world-minded—very different from being worldly-minded. It means seeing the shrunken world as a whole, humanity as one. It means being able to measure things in their proper proportions, seeing big things big and little things little. When we stop making little things big we begin to get away from preoccupation with the trivial. We may remain just as charming. But we are no longer the type of woman whose charm is the only thing that makes her conversation endurable. And we will then guard our leisure jealously. For leisure is only time to do something worth while.

SOLIDARITY OF WOMEN

"No group ever realized its aspirations without defining and directing them." It is often cited as a reproach that women have effected no ethical change in the ten years of their enfranchisement. That seems to me beside the point. The vote was not bestowed on women for political reformation, but as a matter of social justice. The first thing women had to do was to learn how to use it—to overcome the political lethargy of a chattel class through the ages. The League of Women Voters has familiarized women with political procedure in the home town and done much to awaken a social consciousness. Now large groups of women are studying the trend of world affairs as well.

A political bloc among women has always been considered undesirable. But solidarity upon a moral question sufficiently universal and already supported by men surely might be of inestimable value. When Remarque, the author of *All Quiet on the Western Front*, was asked what was the most important event since the war, he said, instantly, "The trend towards peace in every nation." Here is a question certainly challenging the solidarity of women: it is universal, it is ethical, it holds the dearest interests of women in its grasp. "There is no nobler sacrifice," said the Honorable Frank B. Kellogg in a recent speech on the multilateral pact, "than to give one's life for his country, and there is no *higher duty than to prevent the necessity of such a sacrifice*." The alternatives of war are waiting to be used as a means for fulfilling this higher duty. The solidarity of women, not locally, but around the world, supporting and strength-

ening the alternatives, above all seeing that they are used, would give constructive peace the social insurance it needs and raise the moral status of women immeasurably.

American women especially, as we have said, hold the future of this social insurance in their hands. With their security, their freedom, their power of organization, above all, with the obligation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to stimulate them, they can *sell* the idea of constructive progressive peace to their own country and help strengthen it in those countries already committed.

DRAMATIZING PEACE

To sell an idea widely you must advertise, visualize, and dramatize it in order that it may register on public opinion. The pictorial appeal of war has been one of its main fascinations. One may say there is nothing pictorial in the appeal of arbitration. True when its appeal is merely national. But when its processes become international, when it is regarded as the great modern adventure among nations, it becomes the most dramatic, pictorial of movements. Everything utilized for war may be utilized for world peace—bands, uniforms, flags, costumes, etc. The Avenue of the Allies for peace may be just as beautiful, just as picturesque as the Avenue of the Allies for war. For world unity does not aim to level and destroy the precious gifts of national culture—music, art, the drama, language, etc. It aims to make them valued contributions better known to all.

There are plays, pageants, cinemas waiting to be created depicting the common bonds of mankind, not a millennium depicted, not a sentimental mawkishness picturing a sudden change in human nature founded upon

a nebulous brotherly love, but a dramatic presentation of modern facts: that science, invention, commerce, life are transforming us, drawing us closer together and narrowing the horizon of our common interests. The things that are uniting us are becoming stronger than the things that separated us. This new magic fact of human life is waiting the touch of divine genius in every land.

Geneva dramatizes constructive peace. Not consciously. A parliamentary body of world officials is a business-like affair. But the idea is dramatic—fifty-four nations arrived at that stage of willingness to consider their affairs collectively. The costumes of the Orientals are picturesque, the flags on the hotels are colorful—the small flag on the speeding car of each delegation informing you what country is engaged in the adventure of creating peace.

Model League Assemblies produced in this country at colleges and high schools, with the help of the League of Nations Association, have been a successful form of dramatizing peace. The students take the part of statesmen—Briand, Stresemann, MacDonald, etc. An agenda is made up from actual League speeches, or if desired, original reports may be prepared by more advanced students. Speeches are given with gusto. The international spirit is captured. One hundred and eighty-two colleges participated in staging these Assemblies at Yale, Lafayette, the University of Chicago, etc., in 1930.

A World Court Ball given in New York during the campaign for the Court some years ago dramatized the world situation in regard to the Court. The flags of the forty or more nations then in the Court decorated the balcony of the Plaza ballroom. Miss Rosamond Pinchot, dressed in white, standing on a pedestal against a curtain

of black velvet, with an American flag on either side of her, represented the United States outside the circle of the Court. A bugler from the army bugled. Answering the roll call, each nation already in the Court, represented by New York débutantes and young matrons, dressed in the costumes of the various nations, marched past Miss Pinchot, down the steps and around the ballroom. The beauty of the girls, the richness of the costumes, made other methods of glorifying the American woman seem pale. The *New York Evening Post* pronounced this ball the most beautiful ever given in New York because of the "spiritual significance" underlying it. (Incidentally, \$8,000 was cleared.) People will gladly dance for peace as well as for any other object. World balls should be a popular and colorful means of dramatizing the new order in world affairs.

The cause of woman suffrage began to make progress after the women began to parade. What courage it required at first, what thrills, what humor! "We don't know anything about politics, but neither do our husbands," read one banner. The same affirmation might be used in regard to world politics.

What possibilities a parade of women up Fifth Avenue holds, in support, for instance, of the Kellogg-Briand Pact! What an object for politicians that the women mean business: the Pact must be observed, the Pact must be the new fact on which our foreign affairs are built. The most cosmopolitan city in the world could make such a parade a real world event. Its fame would travel far. In time, by concerted action, a parade of women marching in every city from the Atlantic to the Pacific might follow to strengthen and underscore the renunciation of war.

Eventually the feet of all women might be heard echoing around the world in a forward march of humanity for the new hopes of mankind.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

We have been told that one way to avoid war was to dwell on the horrors of war, keeping them ever before young minds. That is not according to the teachings of modern psychology. Modern psychology teaches the uprooting of old ideas no longer useful, old inhibitions, and the planting of new ideas—the law of substitution. We have had enough of dwelling on the brutalities, the bestialities of war, appealing to the savage in us even while they repel. Let us dwell on the facts of the new order—and teach them to the young—a world where war is controlled, where justice and morality is trying to establish itself between states as between men. Let us first know these facts ourselves. Then to the young with all its idealism and ready acceptance of justice, let us keep making them known. Let us have peace—in our minds, in our hearts but above all *support peace in our institutions*—that posterity may live with peace and power.

THE OLD ORDER CHANGES

Nothing is surer in life than that the old order changes. Do you remember how poetically, how pictorially, Tennyson tells us this truth in the passing of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table? At the beginning of the king's leadership, the Lady of the Lake thrust out of the troubled waters a white arm bearing a jeweled sword. On one side of the hilt was written, "Take me." On the other, "Throw me away." Great days of service

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followed when the sword was active; when the King and his knights rid the countryside of beasts of prey and the wild beasts warring in the hearts of men.

"When every morning brought a noble chance,
And every chance brought out a noble knight."

But the day came when Arthur realized that the usefulness of Excalibur was over. The community was finding new ways to protect itself. He saw that

"The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfills himself in many ways
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

So the king, dying, ordered his one remaining knight, Sir Belvedere, to cast the sword back into the lake. Three times the knight tried to obey, but could not. The beauty of the sword, the richness of its jewels, the service it had rendered, prevented. So he hid the sword and returned. Three times he was sent back by the expiring king until the arm of the Lady of the Lake had risen again to accept the sword, its usefulness over. King Arthur died—his mission ended

"And the new sun rose bringing the new year."

Old suns have set for the Excaliburs of today. Civilization is finding other means for the protection of its children than by the use of the old flashing hilt. New years are dawning demanding that the once useful weapon be cast into the dark waters of the past, "Lest one good custom" (now outgrown) "should corrupt the world." New methods are emerging, new round tables forming,

beckoning the knights of today to settle their problems together with the weapons of their God-given minds.

Do we see? Do we understand? Are we the king in our vision—or the short-sighted knight? Do we glimpse the new, just order or are we clinging to Excalibur in our hearts? We may hinder, we may halt, we may delay—but we cannot deter the coming of the luminous day of a noble world order.

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